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Abstract 
This thesis explores the interrelationship between the notions of the Fall, 
repetition and freedom with references to the writings of Kierkegaard and 
secondarily those of Kant, St. Augustine and Schelling. Kierkegaard's 
aesthetic texts and his concept of 'taking notice' are the indispensable 
background to the question of the different possible interpretations in 
regard of the relation between these three concepts. This primary 
interest is furthermore linked to an investigation of the emergence of 
different aspects of human singularity and of the divine that arguably 
emerge alongside each one of the different interpretations. The thesis 
consists of four chapters, the first and last on Kierkegaard, the second 
on St. AugUstine and Kant and the third on Schelling. The first chapter 
investigates the place of the concept of anxiety in Kierkegaard's oeuvre, 
discussing at the same time his understanding of time, freedom and the 
Fall through his appropriation of the story of Adam. Particular attention 
is paid to a discussion of the author's subsequent call to 'take notice' of 
the importance of the possibility of a distinction between a time before 
and a time after the Fall. This paves the ground for the second chapter, 
which is an investigation of St. Augustine's radical distinction between 
the time before and after the Fall and Kant's account of the Fall and the 
unfolding of history. The third chapter discusses the possibility of 
postulating some sort of continuity between the two modes of time 
mentioned above through an interpretation of Schelling's treatment of 
divine and human freedom, time, history and repetition. 
In the fourth chapter, Schelling's elaborations on time, freedom and 
contemporaneity provide the ground for a reinterpretation of 
Kierkegaard's insights on repetition, faith and contemporaneity. 
This discussion is primarily conducted through a revaluation of three 
biblical motifs, namely Job's ordeal, Abraham's saCrifice and the coming 
into existence of the God-man. These narratives are instrumental in 
allowing us to 'take notice' of the articulation between the notions of 
Freedom, repetition and the Fall emerging from Kierkegaard's aesthetic 
writings. 
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Introduction 
The title of this thesis may seem at first sight both ambitious and 
ambiguous since it promises the exploration of religious themes such as 
the themes of the Fall, of repetition and of freedom through Kierkegaard's 
aesthetic writings, with references also to the writings of St. Augustine, 
Kant and Schelling. The question that arises concerns not only the 
choice of aesthetic writings instead of the religious ones but also the 
reasons behind the choice of the three other thinkers. In order to give an 
adequate reply to these questions we have to discuss first Kierkegaard's 
own view of his oeuvre and the distinction that he makes between the 
aesthetic and the religious writings. Kierkegaard's book The Point of view 
of my work as an author: A report to history lwill serve as a guide in this 
brief exploration. Kierkegaard himself urges us to treat this book as an 
occasion of inwardness by calling it 'a report to history'. Anticipating 
somehow the analysis of the fourth chapter of the present work we 
I Even if one wishes to endorse Walter Lowrie's argument that Kierkegaard's book The point o/view o/my 
work as an author: A report to history is quite elliptical as a self-evaluation of the author's oeuvre as a 
whole, one might still wish to treat this feature of this book as a virtue rather than a vice. Lowrie's 
embarrassment ( to borrow Nelson's words) as to how to characterize this book is obvious in the following 
words :"[Kierkegaard ] solely intent upon emphasizing the religious categories: the contrast between the 
'aesthetic' (eudemonistic) and the religious points of view; the concept of the individual; the notion of 
divine providence; indirect communication (which he defends here lamely because he had already detected 
the daimonia which lurk in it); the absoluteness of the Christian claim, &c., &c. So here all but ignores the 
profound psychological concepts which he had presented in his pseudonymous work'l. The "Explanation' 
lilerc/lire. is vt'I),/arjrom being an explanation o/the Work'l as a whole" (PVWA: xxiv-emphasis added). 
Nelson disagrees with Lowrie's argument as he finds the book in question "an authentic map of 
his[Kierkegaard's] labyrinthine world from his own hand and even ifnot true down to the last detail, it is 
an indispensable interpretation of the anguished pilgrimage of an extraordinary spirit"(Nelson 1962:xiii). 
Indeed, one cannot but agree that the very notion of pilgrimage entails longing. and it can never grasp the 
whole; for if it did. then it would be self-annihilating. 
should remark that genuine contemporaneity is not identical for 
Kierkegaard with immediate contemporaneity. Thus, in order for 
someone to become a genuine contemporary with historical events a 
'report' is needed as the 'occasion' of inwardness. 
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Kierkegaard's use of pseudonyms is a topic that intrigues not only most 
of Kierkegaard's scholars but also many of the contemporary 
philosophers like Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas and Derrida to name but a 
few prominent figures being influenced, directly or indirectly, negatively 
or positively, by his work. Many issues such as the question of 
authorship/authority, the question of the possibility of communication, 
etc have consequently been raised. Although the abovementioned issues 
are of great importance for a proper evaluation of Kierkegaard's 
philosophy, their discussion will be approached indirectly, along with a 
discussion of our main topic, that being the space that opens up between 
Kierkegaard's so-called religious works (signed by the author himself) 
and the non-religious ones (signed by the pseudonymous authors). 
As we will see, the religious element is always present in Kierkegaard's 
works even when it seems that his development as an author follows a 
linear path towards the attainment of a more pure or a more consistent 
religious dimension. The latter serves either as the inviSible ground of the 
aesthetic works or, in the case of Kierkegaard's "purely" religious works 
as the pre-eminent element to be discovered by the reader. 
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Kierkegaard himself maps his own works in the following manner: 
First group (aesthetic works): Either jOr; Fear and Trembling; Repetition; The 
Concept of Dread; Prefaces; Philosophical Fragments; Stages on Life's Road-along 
with edifYing discourses which were published successively. 
Second group: Concluding Unscientific Postscript. 
Third group (religious works): EdifYing Discourses in Divers Spirits; The Works 
of Love; Christian Discourses-along with a little aesthetic article, The Crisis and 
a Crisis in the Life of an Actress. (PVWA : 10) 
Regardless of the apparent incompleteness2 of this enumeration it is 
important to point out that Kierkegaard wants to make clear that his 
development as an author does not follow a linear route. In other words 
Kierkegaard does not see himself as an aesthetic author who 
subsequently with the passing of time became a religious author. On the 
contrary, he insists that, right from the beginning, he was and still is, in 
the time of the book's writing, a religious author3 . The religious 
dimension was thus arguably present from the start and this is evident 
in the Eighteen Edifying Discourses signed by him, and which accompany 
his purely aesthetic works. At the same time, the aesthetical dimension 
is present again "at the last moment". The brief aesthetic article The 
crisis and a crisis in the life oj an actress was published in a period where 
2 Joakim Garffpoints to the omission of certain books such as The concept of irony, From the Papers of 
One Still Living, etc. He argues that the alleged "totality of authorship" that Kierkegaard promises to us is 
not identical with "the total production". According to him, this divergence between the "totality of the 
authorship" and the "total production' is mainly due to an intended symmetry between the two groups. 
(Graff 1998: 80-1). 
J This is not to suggest that Kierkegaard remains the same person, with a fixed identity (in that case the 
identity of a "religious author") that underlies his whole work knowing clearly from the beginning his 
intentions. This would exclude the possibility of a continuous development and metamorphosis of his 
personhood. 
1 1 
Kierkegaard was publishing solely religious works (PVWA: 12). In his own 
words 
The little article serves as a testimony in the confrontation of witnesses, in order 
to make it impossible at the end (as the Two Edifying discourses did at the 
beginning) to explain the phenomenon by supposing that there was an author 
who first was an aesthetic author and later changed and became subsequently a 
religious author - for he was a religious author from the beginning and was 
aesthetically productive even at the last moment (PVW A: 12-3) 
What is of crucial importance is that the distinction between aesthetic 
and religious works is not a clear-cut one. Moreover, it is necessary to 
underline the centrality attributed by Kierkegaard to the intersection of 
these domains, which is furthermore seen as always remaining blurred. 
Indeed, one has to keep in mind that Kierkegaard, either under the 
disguise of the pseudonymous authors or using his proper name, is 
constantly attacking every approach that considers human existence as 
a fixed whole or, in other words, as possibly being subjected to the pre-
established categories of an absolute system. What constantly intrigues 
Kierkegaard's pseudonymous authors is the attempt to trace and face the 
paradox of human existence and - even in those cases where the 
individual is not him/herself aware of it- its encounter with the divine4 . 
Kierkegaard's detestation of closed systems and his love of the flux 
allegedly characterizing humans is one of the possible, conscious or 
unconscious, reasons urging him to use pseudonyms . 
.j And it is exactly this encounter with the divine that is the ground and precondition of the religious leap; 
the latter being the always-deferred telos. 
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In the introduction of The Point of View, Kierkegaard almost in a 
confessional5 manner, explains "once and for all, as directly and frankly 
as possible, what is what: what I as an author declare my self to be" 
(PVWA: 5). 
Kierkegaard feels that the moment for him to speak has come: ''The 
moment (however unpropitious it may be in another sense) is now 
approprtate ... there is a time to be silent and a time to speak" (PVWA: 5). 
The usage of language in this passage is indicative. It is obvious that it 
constitutes a direct reference to the biblical language mainly of the 
second part of verse 7 of the book of the Old Testament entitled 
Ecclesiastes (more specifically, see chapter 3 of Ecclesiastes, verses 1-8) 
where there is a constant repetition of the words "a time to". More 
5 Although Walter Lowrie acknowledges that The Point of View "clearly belongs to the distinctive category 
of Christian writings which was first represented by the Confessions of St. Augustine", he also shows the 
problems such a characterization (i.e. confessional) entails. Accordingly, as he points out, the book in 
question "cannot aptly be called a confession, for S.K. refers to his vita ante acta only to exclude it from 
the report"(Lowrie 1962 : xxiii). It is true, that Kierkegaard excludes from his book any reference to his 
"purely personal existence" as the following words indicate: "It goes without saying that I cannot explain 
my work as an author wholly, i.e. with the purely personal inwardness in which I possess the explanation of 
it. And this is partly because I cannot make public my God-relationship. It is neither more nor less than 
the generic human inwardness which every man may have, without regarding it as an official distinction 
which it were a crime to hide and a duty to proclaim, or which I could appeal to as my legitimation. In part 
because I cannot wish (and no one can desire that I might) to obtrude upon anyone what concerns only my 
private person-though naturally there is much in this which for me serves to explain my work as an author" 
(PVW A: 9). Does this exclusion necessarily have to be understood as a "problem" (even if one considers 
this kind of a "problem" as a merit of a text) of the text in question? Or, does this exclusion point to the 
very incomprehensibility and incommunicability of certain aspects of personal existence in general? 
Lossky gives his own answer to the abovementioned issue although he focuses mainly on the Christian 
tradition of the East. In his words: " ... Apart from a few rare exceptions the spiritual literature of the 
Christian East possesses scarcely any autobiographical account dealing with the interior life, such as those 
of Angela of Foligno and Henry Suso, or the His to ire d'une arne of St.Teresa of Lisieux. The way of 
mystical union is nearly always a secret between God and the soul concerned, which is never confided to 
others unless it may be, to a confessor or to a few disciples. What is published abroad is the fruit of this 
union: wisdom, understanding of the divine mysteries ... As to the inward and personal aspect of the 
mystical experience, it remains hidden from the eyes of all. It must be recognised that it was only at a 
comparatively late period, towards the thirteenth century in fact, that mystical individualism made its 
appearance in western literature ... "(Lossky 1991 :20-1). 
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specifically, this chapter of the Ecclesiastes reads: 'To every thing there 
is a season, and a time [kairos] to every purpose6 under the heaven: a 
time to be born, and a time to die ... a time to keep silence and a time to 
speak" (Ecclesiastes 3.1-2 &7-emphasis added). 
It has to be remarked that the biblical usage of the notions of kairos and 
moment is not restricted to the Old Testament. In addition to the 
aforementioned usage of the terms "time" and "moment" one has also to 
bear in mind their usage in the New Testament. According to Tillich, the 
New Testament has called the moment "at which history, in terms of a 
concrete situation, had matured to the point of being able to receive the 
breakthrough of the central manifestation of the Kingdom of God", the 
fulfilment of time7, or "in Greek, kairos" (Tillich 1963: 369). Leaving aside 
for the time being the theological connotations borne by the concepts of 
the "moment", of "kairos", and finally of the "fulfilment of time", we will 
focus mainly on the importance of the aforementioned notions regarding 
Kierkegaard's account of his own work. Both the notions of the proper 
6 The last words of the aforementioned verse remind us one of the mottos of the book The point of view, 
that being: "In everything the purpose must weigh with the folly" (PVW A: 4; see Shakespeare: Henry IV, 
Part II, ii.2). One has to admit the complexity and the different levels of purposes that pervade most of 
Kierkegaard's books. We will endorse Nelson's reading of the motto in question. Accordingly: "the reader 
is given notice that the author intends to judge himself and hopes to be judged by others in the light of his 
perplexing purposes as well as his all too evidentfollies" (Nelson 1962: xiv). Interestingly enough, 
judgement according to follies seems to us as an indirect reference to the biblical book of Job: "Now 
therefore take seven bulls and seven rams and go to my servant Job and offer up for your selves a burnt-
offering, and my servant Job shall pray for you, for I will accept his prayer not to deal with you according 
to rO/l"fo/~v ... " (Job 42.8-emphasis added). 
7 Kierkegaard uses the term "fullness of time" when he speaks of the appearance of God in time perceiving 
this event as a tremendous one, since it is conceived as being both a historical point of departure and the 
beginning of eternity. 
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"time" and "the fulfilment of time" imply the conclusion of a previous8 
stage and maybe, the potential transition to a new one. 
Thus, Kierkegaard's public attestation9 signals the conquest of a certain 
point in his development as an author. Indeed, it seems that he felt with 
almost absolute certainty that his authorship had reached a point of 
completion, not in tenns of quantity but mainly in tenns of quality. The 
previous stage was described as a period of silence, the latter being 
perceived as a "religious duty": 
But the reason I considered silence my duty was that the authorship was not yet 
at hand in so complete a form that the understanding of it could be anything 
but misunderstanding (PVW A: 5). 
It is surely striking that two years before he wrote The Point oj View 
Kierkegaard offered us another "once and for all explanation". At that 
time it was an acknowledgment of him being the author of the 
pseudonymous books. In February 1846, he wrote: "For the sake of fonn 
and order, I hereby acknowledge ... that I am the author of [a list of 
books] ... My pseudonimity or polyonymity has not had an accidental 
basis in my person ... but an essential basis in the production itself ... " (A 
First and Last Explanation: 625). Let us pause for a moment in order to 
reflect upon the relation between the two tenns which, by the place they 
H This can be conceived either in temporal terms or in terms of a qualitative change. 
9 Kierkegaard conceives his declaration as a "public attestation" and not as a "defence" or as an "apology". 
It is at this point that he compares his action with Socrates' attitude in his trial. According to Kierkegaard, 
when Socrates was accused and judged by the crowd, "his daemon forbade him to defend himself'. If 
Socrates had done the opposite then in Kierkegaard's eyes this would have been self-contradictory and 
inappropriate (PVW A: 6). 
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occupy in the very construction of the sentence (Pseudonimity or 
Polyonymity), are presented as interchangeable: In fact it is this or that 
both links and separates them that suggests the possibility of 
substituting one for the other without inflicting a major change in the 
production of the oeuvre itself. 
How are we then to think of them? Do these two words mean the same? 
Do they point to the same state of affairs? 
Pseudonym, in ancient Greek 'P£u8rovu!J-o<; (\II£u811<; + ovu!J-a) means "under 
a false name or falsely called", while Polyonymity, in ancient Greek 
TIoAuroVU!J-O<; (7tOAU<; + ovu!J-a) , means either "having many names" or 
"worshipped under many names" or "of great name, famous". In 
Kierkegaard's work the many pseudonyms do not imply a differentiation 
between truth and falsity or between the one and the many. On the 
contrary, Kierkegaard attempts to grasp 
... the psychologically varied differences of the individualities, [which] poetically 
required an indiscriminateness with regard to good and evil ... despair and 
overconfidence ... etc., which is ideally limited only by psychological consistency, 
which no factually actual person dares to allow himself or can want to allow 
himself in the moral limitations of actuality"(loc. Cit). 
Polyonimity and Pseudonymity acquire their proper meaning if they are 
discussed in relation to the space that opens up between the aesthetic 
and religious works. By declaring to always be a religious author, 
Kierkegaard points to the hidden religious element of his aesthetic or 
16 
pseudonymous works. Before exploring this further, we have first to 
clarify two things. 
First, it has to be remarked once more that for Kierkegaard, authorship 
and personal life are not identical in the sense that being a religious 
author is not synonymous with being a religious single individual. Thus, 
even in his pure religious writings where he could express himself 
directly and discuss openly religious issues, Kierkegaard never alleges 
that he attained the state of what we would call a religious individual. 
Indeed, this becomes clearer, if we bear in mind that the only thing that 
is left aside in his own evaluation of the whole of his authorship is his 
"purely personal inwardness", since as he emphasizes 
.. .1 cannot explain my work as an author wholly. i.e. with the purely personal 
inwardness in which I possess the explanation of it. And this in part because I 
cannot make public my God-relationship .. .In part because I cannot wish (and no 
one can desire that I might) to obtrude upon anyone what concerns only my 
private person - through naturally there is much in this which for me serves to 
explain my work as an author (PVW A: 9). 
Out of respect for this Kierkegaard's wish, the present work refrains both 
from exploring Kierkegaard's own inward religious experiences and also 
from systematically discussing details of Kierkegaard's personal life. 
Indeed, the reader might feel struck by the absence of such references 
especially given that Kierkegaard being regarded as the father of 
existentialist philosophy, his personal circumstances are vested with 
great significance by many a scholar. We would nevertheless wish to 
avoid the slippery path of psychologism that would detect in 
Kierkegaard's insights nothing but the traces of events in his personal 
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life, like his unfortunate relationship with Regina, his ever-present guilt 
about his father's allegedly tremendous sin, etc. 
Secondly, it has to be remarked that although Kierkegaard declares to be 
a religious author, he never professes to be an Apostle. For him, the 
specificity of being an Apostle consists in the fact that an Apostle is an 
individual to whom God gave extraordinary gifts and more importantly, 
the authority to speak about religious matters. According to Kierkegaard 
the Apostle differs from the genius in various many ways. First of all, the 
author readily pOints out, the apostle belongs to the sphere of 
transcendence and of the paradox. The apostle is called and appointed 
by God to accomplish a mission; furthermore, the apostle has been 
granted divine authority, the latter being conceived as the decisive, 
qualitative factor that differentiates the apostle from the genius 
the man who is called by a revelation and to whom a doctrine is entrusted, 
argues from the fact that it is a revelation. from his authority. I have not got to 
listen to St. Paul because he is clever, or even brilliantly clever; I am to bow 
before st. Paul because he has divine authority ... (The difference: 108-9). 
Kierkegaard warns us that he is not an Apostle. He begs the reader not 
"to think of revelations and or anything of that sort, for with [him] 
everything is dialectical" (PVWA: 83). He characterizes himself as a "poor 
insignificant person" that is one "who himself has been educated, or 
whose authorship expresses what it is to be educated to the point of 
becoming a Christian" (ibid: 75). More emphatically, he declares himself 
a fellow student (loc. Cit), describing thus his task in the following 
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manner: "Without authority to call attention to religion, to Christianity, is 
the category of my whole activity as an author" (My activity as a writer: 
151). To call attention to religion' then, becomes the Significant feature 
of his whole authorship, characterizing then both the aesthetic and 
religious writings. Although the religious writings express in a direct 
manner the point of view of the author (PVW A: 42), this is not the case 
with the aesthetic writings. What is especially of interest in the context of 
the present thesis is exactly the special form that Kierkegaard's attempt 
to 'call attention to religion' acquires in his aesthetic writings. 
Kierkegaard emphasizes that a religious author should first start with 
aesthetic writings so as not to destroy abruptly the illusion in which-
according to him- the majority of the human beings live, namely that 
they are truly Christians (PVW A: 26). Kierkegaard argues that "no 
illusion can ever be destroyed directly 10, and only by indirect means can 
it be radically removed" (ibid: 24), employing consequently as his method 
what he calls 'deception'. Under this light, the use of pseudonyms 
acqUires a "deeper significance". Moreover, as Kierkegaard pOints out 
"the aesthetic work is a deception" but 
One must not let oneself be deceived by the word 'deception'. One can deceive a 
person for the truth's sake, and (to recall old Socrates) one can deceive a person 
into truth. Indeed. it is only by this means. i.e. by deceiving him. that it is 
possible to bring into truth one who is in an illusion (PVWA: 40). 
10 Since by using a direct attack the result is the strengthening of one person's illusion and her embitterment 
(PVWA: 25). 
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The aim of aesthetic writings then is pre-eminently to avoid beginning 
directly "with the matter one wants to communicate, but [to begin] by 
accepting the other man's illusion as good money" (loc. Cit). Indeed, 
Kierkegaard clarifies, one should rather start talking about aesthetics 
instead of beginning a communication with the following words: "It is 
Christianity I am proclaiming; and you are living in purely aesthetic 
categories" (ibid: 41). 
The task of the author then, is not to pedantically persuade and compel 
someone to accept a belief but through the aesthetic writings to compel 
someone to 'take notice' (PVWA: 35). The author can neither foresee the 
result of such an action, nor can she determine it, but rather leaves the 
reader free to encounter her own troublesome inwardness. 
What follows after this, however, no one can tell beforehand. But at least he is 
compelled to take notice. Possibly he may come to his senses and realize what 
is implied in calling himself a Christian. Possibly he may be furious with the 
person who has taken this liberty with him; but at least he has begun to take 
notice, he is on the point of expressing a judgement. Possibly, in order to 
protect his retreat, he may express the judgement that the other is a hypocrite, a 
deceiver, a dunce - but there is no help for it, he must judge, he has begun to 
take notice (PVWA: 37). 
Thus, Kierkegaard's concept of 'taking notice' has for us tremendous 
significance not only regarding the evaluation of his authorship as a 
whole but also -and most importantly- concerning the challenges that 
the process of 'taking notice' itself brings to the fore. Indeed, 
Kierkegaard's attempt is not to impose to his readers his own personal 
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view on religious themes but rather to compel them to 'take notice' of the 
religious themes and to attempt their own journey of inwardness and 
discovery. 
While Kierkegaard himself does not seem to elevate the category of 
'taking notice' to the proper level of a concept. in the present work this 
very category will serve as a device for the articulation of disparate 
elements in Kierkegaard's own works. In effect, it is argued that 
Kierkegaard's writings acquire existential and conceptual coherence and 
articulation through the category of 'taking notice' although in an implicit 
and often unacknowledged manner. We have seen it as our task to give 
an explicit function to this principle and to extend its application to the 
writings not only of Kierkegaard but also of St. Augustine, Kant and 
Schelling. 
It has to be made clear from the outset that our exploration of 
Kierkegaard's thought does not exhaust all of Kierkegaard's aesthetic 
writings, but focuses primarily on those writings that in our opinion best 
highlight Kierkegaard's attitude towards the issues investigated in the 
present thesis. In this sense, it can be argued that since the category of 
'taking notice' is a primarily existential one, the selection of texts is but 
the very exemplification of this principle. In any case, even on the 
occasion that we refrain from giving direct references to celebrated 
Kierkegaard's works. they still inform our investigation albeit in an 
indirect manner. This is perhaps best exemplified in the case of Either/ 
Or, which although not explicitly referred to in the present work, is 
nevertheless omnipresent as the primordial resolution and the 
fundamental distinction that cuts across all the levels of human life. 
Having this in mind, we have started this thesis by exploring 
Kierkegaard's concept of anxiety, alongside a preliminary discussion of 
his conception of time and freedom. 
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The first part of the first chapter focuses on finding the proper topos of 
the concept of anxiety in Kierkegaard's oeuvre, challenging at the same 
time the validity of theorizing anxiety as a concept. Anxiety is mainly 
defined as the dizziness that precedes the moment of Adam's fall, or in 
other words, it is conceived as the alien power that "takes hold of the 
individual" and keeps her momentarily captive (Journals III A233: 105). 
Anxiety's ability to take hold and capture the individual makes it eligible 
to be considered among the notions that Kierkegaard urges us to 'take 
notice' since they open up the space for the religious experience to 
emerge. As Kierkegaard claims in his The Point oj View, "this is what is 
achieved by the indirect method, which, loving and caring arranges 
everything dialectically for the prospective captive, and then shyly 
withdraws" (PVWA: 25). The association of Adam's fall with anxiety 
moves us to the second part of the first chapter where we deal with 
Kierkegaard's appropriation of the biblical story of Adam and the Fall, 
conceived not as an event that took place once and for all, but rather as 
an event also taking place in the life of each individual. Kierkegaard 
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emphasizes in his whole authorship the importance of the single 
individual vis-a.-vis the race or the whole of humanity. What he 
advocates is the inner history of every single individual beyond any 
achievements and progress that may characterize the whole generation. 
Whilst being in the dreaming state of anxiety, the single individual for the 
first time senses the imminence of the emergence of spirit and freedom. 
Adam's story then, allows us to take notice of the possibility of different 
approaches of time and freedom that furthermore could be linked with 
the emergence of different aspects of individuality or personhood. To be 
more explicit, the question occupying a pivotal place in the present work 
concerns the very possibility of a distinction between a time before and 
after the Fall. Furthermore, taking into account the interrelation of 
anxiety with the Fall and the emergence of sin in Kierkegaard's oeuvre, 
the question can be formulated thus: Even if the time before and after 
the Fall is different, is there any possibility of reconciling the gap 
between those two postulated times 'in' time or not? It is argued that 
central to Kierkegaard's rather unclear view on the issue is the following 
passage from his book Repetition, which is often cited -by way of 
repetition- in strategic moments of the present work. 
If God himself had not willed repetition. the world would not have come into 
existence. Either he would have followed the superficial plans of hope or he would 
have retracted everything and preserved it in recollection. This he did not do. 
Therefore. the world continues. and it continues because it is repetition 
(Repetition: 133). 
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This passage makes us take notice of other dimensions of the story of the 
Fall, namely the problem of divine and human freedom, of human and 
divine will, and finally of time and creation. Repetition- defined as the 
true movement of freedom, Le. a free movement of recollection forwards-
is another Kierkegaardean notion described as having this magic power 
to capture the individual and her freedom (Repetition: 301). 
Although a proper discussion of the Kierkegaardean concept of repetition 
is suspended until the last chapter of this thesis, the passage mentioned 
above is appropriated in such a manner as to provide us with the 
'occasion' to 'take notice' and subsequently discuss relevant issues in the 
philosophies of St. Augustine, Kant, and Schelling. 
Indeed, although by no means 'necessary' the discussion of these 
thinkers in relation to the works of Kierkegaard is arguably both 
challenging and promising, since it opens up the possibility of a fruitful 
dialogue between Kierkegaard and two philosophers -St. Augustine and 
Kant - whose elaborations on time and morality haunt modern European 
philosophy. Schelling is even more instrumental for the purposes of the 
present thesis as discussed in detail below in the presentation of the 
third chapter, where a juxtaposition of his so-called middle period with 
Kierkegaard's writings is attempted. 
Thus, the second chapter of the thesis is again divided into two parts, the 
first dealing with st. Augustine and the second with Kant. If for 
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Kierkegaard anxiety is not applied only to the Adamic condition 
preceding the Fall but also to the life of every consequent individual, 
inaugurating thus a novel understanding of the Fall that excludes a rigid 
distinction between the time before and after the Fall, by denying the 
abysmal difference between Adam and the subsequent individuals, this 
is arguably not the case for st. Augustine and Kant. It is actually argued 
that both thinkers, directly or indirectly, share an understanding of the 
Fall that inevitably makes us wonder whether they believe in the actual 
existence of a pre-fallen state of Adam or whether the Fall is simply 
viewed as a 'fantastic beginning' of human history. On the one hand, by 
advocating a radical split between what it is called biblical time and the 
historical time after the Fall, St. Augustine presents us with an account 
that devalues the power of the exercise of human freedom after the Fall. 
According to St. Augustine, Adam's fall resulted into his losing the 
supernatural gift bestowed to him by God. In other words, if before the 
Fall, gratia operans was in effect. after the Fall only gratia cooperans is 
effective since the individual is able to do 'good' only with God's 
cooperation. Furthermore, although St. Augustine retains the possibility 
of bridging the gap between the biblical and the fallen time through the 
introduction of theological time, he nevertheless seems to argue that 
fallen time is ontologically connected with theological time, implying thus 
that only death can completely liberate the individual. 
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On the other hand, Kant's approach to the Fall takes the form of a 
narrative based on the rule of the 'as if, namely of an imaginary 
narrative where the pre-fallen state is conceived 'as if it had taken place. 
In the same line of thought, Kant further discusses the narrative of the 
Fall, prioritizing its 'origin in reason' instead of its 'origin in time'. 
This becomes clearer after a discussion of the nature of the Kantian 
antinomies and moreover of his distinction between regulative and 
constitutive principles. The chapter concludes with an exploration of 
what can be termed Kant's two-dimensional approach to history. One 
dimension of Kant's thoughts on the issue understands humanity as a 
whole as being the ultimate purpose of nature, while the other points to 
the individual human being in itself as being the final purpose of 
creation. The attempt is furthermore made to trace at the same time 
Kant's attitude towards human freedom and the problem of evil. 
It is argued that to a lesser or greater degree both st. Augustine and 
Kant transform God into a lifeless and empty entity, depriving the deity 
of its personal character. In the case of St. Augustine this is effected by 
the radical separation of the biblical and fallen times that makes God 
inapproachable, whereas in Kant's case this state of affairs is seen as 
resulting by the thinkers attempt to conceptualize God as a hypothetical, 
regulative principle, i.e. in terms of the 'as if. 
Having established this, we turn in the third chapter to Schelling 
who offers us a quite different approach to the problems of divine and 
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human freedom, of time and creation, and of good and evil. We mainly 
focus on Schelling's texts 'Of human freedom' (1809) and the 'Ages of the 
World' (1813 & I8I5), that belong to the philosopher's so-called 'middle 
period', where he is often seen (see e.g. Goudeli 2002) as trying to 
differentiate himself from his previous system of identity while at the 
same time laying the foundations for the philosophy of mythology and 
revelation. One could object to the choice of the specific texts by arguing 
that Kierkegaard's main reference 1 1 to the philosophy of Schelling 
concerns the latter's late period, i.e. his philosophy of religion and 
revelation and not to the middle one. It has to be emphasized though, 
that in the same way as in the cases of Kant and St. Augustine, the 
choice of discussing certain aspects of the work of a specific thinker is 
not based on Kierkegaard's own discussion of the text or the thinker in 
question. If this were the case, then the list of thinkers discussed in the 
present work would be radically different. Instead, we are rather 
concerned with the indirect references made by the author and more 
importantly with his non-prescriptive attempt to make us 'take notice' of 
certain issues. With regard to our choice of Schelling's writings, it has 
to be reminded that Kierkegaard felt an enormous disappointment when 
he attended Schelling lectures in Berlin, where Schelling expounded his 
late philosophy of mythology and religion. A letter Kierkegaard wrote to a 
II See Notes of Schelling '.'I Berlin Lectures. It goes without saying that Kierkegaard occasionally refers to 
both The Ages of the World and to Of Human Freedom. 
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friend is indicative of his disappointment with this phase of Schelling's 
philosophy: 
Schelling talks the most insufferable nonsense .. .! shall leave Berlin as soon as 
possible. I am coming to Copenhangen. A stay there is necessary for me so that 
I can bring a little order into my affairs again. You see how strange it is. I have 
never in my life felt like travelling as much as I do now. lowe that to Schelling. 
Had Schelling not lectured in Berlin, I would not have gone, and had Schelling 
not been so nonsensical, I would probably never have travelled again (CI: xxiii). 
If we take into account that a huge disappointment is usually preceded 
by the existence of great expectations, then what inspired Kierkegaard -
directly or indirectly-12and prompted him to travel to Berlin should have 
been Schelling's middle period writings. It could be further argued that 
Kierkegaard's severe critique of Schelling's middle period writings is the 
result of a retrospective reflection occasioned by Kierkegaard's 
disappointment with Schelling's Berlin Lectures of 1842-43. 
Having thus constructed our argument, the third chapter is structured 
in the following manner: The first part of the chapter is dedicated to the 
exploration of Schelling's radical conception of identity and freedom, 
which is conducted alongside a discussion of his notions of faith and 
religiosity. By advocating a living relationship with a living and personal 
God, Schelling arguably escapes the fallacies associated with the 
postulation of an abstract and consequently non-existent God. The 
second part of the third chapter focuses on Schelling's account of the 
theo-cosmo-gonic process, where God is viewed both as original nature 
l~ Directly by having read Schelling himself and indirectly by attending Martensen's university lectures 
during 1838-1839 (CI: xix). 
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and original freedom, the two notions being thought in a relation of 
identity without nevertheless being collapsed to each other. It is argued 
that under this new conception of identity, Schelling presents us with an 
unprecedented account of good and evil, where God is conceived 
primordially and evil is presented as having its root "independent of God 
but in God". Moreover, specific emphasis is placed on Schelling's idea of 
the simultaneity of different aeons or times (eternal past, eternal present 
and eternal future), which arguably inaugurates a breakthrough 
conception of history, time and eternity. This moves us to the third part 
of this chapter where we focus mainly on Schelling's account of human 
freedom as the possibility of both good and evil. For Schelling, only the 
human being, among the visible creatures, retains an analogical relation 
with the divine, having thus a peculiar relation with the history of the 
cosmos and with the eternal past. Indeed, Schelling's idea of the eternal 
aeons 13, as developed in the Ages of the World, places the notion of 
repetition under a new perspective. In our view, Schelling's notion of the 
human being's ability to relate with the eternal past informs not only 
Kierkegaard's notion of repetition but also his account of 
contemporaneity. More specifically, in his treatise on freedom Schelling 
argues that each human being, by its being contemporaneous with the 
eternal act of creation, breaks the limits of the conventional treatment of 
time. 
IJ Unfortunately, this work is unfinished and the only part published concerns only the Past. 
The insight into the importance of the relationship between 
Schelling's middle philosophy and Kierkegaard renders a more detailed 
analysis of Kierkegaard's notion of repetition - attempted in the fourth 
and final chapter of the present thesis- indispensable. 
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The first part of this chapter focuses mainly on an assessment of 
Kierkegaard's discussion of the concept of repetition in the homonymous 
book. Repetition is shown to have a special relation with the future and 
with eternity, being thus qualitatively distinct from the notion of 
recollection, since it is established that for Kierkegaard repetition is in 
effect a religious movement towards faith. Two biblical figures, Job and 
Abraham provide us with the indispensable background for a proper 
discussion of the Kierkegaardean notion of faith 'by virtue of the absurd'. 
Job's ordeal makes him in the eyes of the Danish philosopher the 
prototype of the whole of humanity, whilst Abraham's 'silent' sacrifice 
prompts Kierkegaard to name him the 'father of faith' . By calling us to 
follow the prototypes of Job and Abraham, Kierkegaard urges us 
implicitly to become 'genuinely contemporaneous' with those biblical 
figures. In the last part of this chapter the notions of repetition and 
contemporaneity are brought even more explicitly together and the 
inextricable link between the two notions is hopefully established beyond 
doubt. Attention is brought to the fact that Kierkegaard himself develops 
his notion of genuine contemporaneity in relation to the paradoxical 
moment of God-man's coming into existence. Furthermore it is reminded 
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that the moment of God's coming into existence acquires eternal validity 
and that in the philosophy of Kierkegaard contemporaneity with this 
moment expresses repetition in its eminent form. Contemporaneity 
refers therefore not only to the single individual's free resolution to 
become contemporaneous with God-man so as to receive the 'condition' 
and the 'truth', but also to God's own resolution to come into existence 
purely out of love. In the present work and in order to depict as 
accurately and vividly as possible this state of affairs, we will be using 
the term 'double contemporaneity' in order to refer to this reciprocal 
movement. 
The themes of divine and human love, of repetition, freedom and the Fall 
are thus brought to the fore for the final time in the conclusion to the 
present work through a discussion of Andrei Tarkovsky's elegiac film The 
Sacrifice. This compelling piece of artistic creation serves as the most 
effective -though indirect-incentive to 'take notice' once more of the 
fundamental religious themes discussed in this thesis. 
It is with paying due heed to this paradoxical, thought-defying, startling, 
sacrificial expression of divine and human love that the thesis concludes, 
or rather that the author of this 'unconcluding' work wishes to retreat 
again to silence. 
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Chapter One 
The Challenge of Anxiety 
Introductory remarks 
In this chapter we will attempt an exploration of Kierkegaard's treatment 
of the concept of anxiety. Thus, we will focus mainly on a close analysis 
of his celebrated book The Concept of Anxiety. published in 1844, which 
provides the basis for a proper understanding of the notion in question. 
The pseudonymous author Vigilius Haufniensis, whose name means 
"watchman of Copenhagen", is the person that signs the book. 
Importantly, Vigilius Haufniensis can be interpreted as "the Watchman of 
the Marketplace", since Copenhagen means 'marketplace' in Danish 
(Palmer 1996: 58). 
Although the Concept of Anxiety belongs to the group of the so-called 
aesthetic writings in Kierkegaard's famous distinction of his own work, it 
is debatable whether it should be treated as an aesthetic work. 
One of the many peculiarities of this book is undoubtedly that 
Kierkegaard himself Signed the original draft, impoverishing 
consequently the strength of pseudonimity (see Thompte 1980:222; CA: 
177). 
Moreover, in the book that is seen as providing the bridge between his 
aesthetic and religious works- the Concluding Unscientific Postscript-
Climacus characterizes the Concept of Anxiety as being essentially 
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different from the other pseudonymous works "in that its form is direct 
and even somewhat didactic" (CUP: 269-70; CA: 221). Numerous and 
quite significant consequences follow such a definition, especially given 
that in Kierkegaard's terminology, direct communication points to direct 
authorship while indirect communication to pseudonimity. 
Thus, in our treatment of The Concept of Anxiety. we will attempt to leave 
the ambiguity and the oscillation between pseudonimity and direct 
authorship open, since it would be arguably unfair to both the author 
and to the works if hasty conclusions were drawn at the outset. It 
furthermore seems that paying heed to this ambiguity is more than 
consonant with the "spirit" of the book in question, the very title of which 
is but a provocation. 
Moreover in this chapter we also consider many of Kierkegaard's other 
works, while specific emphasis is placed on his books Sickness Unto 
Death and Johannes Climacus in an attempt to 'take notice' of the Fall 
and anxiety, of inwardness and pseudo-Christianity. In this respect a 
fruitful comparison is drawn with Nietzsche's announcement of the death 
of the divine in the heart of European Civilization. 
33 
1.1 Placin~ anxiety 
Can anxiety be treated as a concept? This is a compelling question facing 
everyone attempting to come to terms with Kierkegaard's philosophy. In 
effect, it can be argued that only provisionally can anxiety14 be said to be 
a pivotal concept in Kierkegaard's thought, since to treat anxiety as a 
concept proper, would amount to fail taking into account its "abysma115" 
qualities that compelled J ean Wahl to suggest that the very title the 
Concept of anxiety is a provocation (as discussed in Sartre 1974: 164). 
Sartre too did not fail to acknowledge the peculiar status anxiety 
occupied in Kierkegaard's thought in his argument against its treatment 
as the object of a concept. This is because anxiety so far as it is "the 
source of a free and temporalising choice of finitude, it is also the non-
conceptual foundation of all concepts"(Sartre 1974: 164). In Haufniensis 
own words, "anxiety makes its appearance [as] the pivot upon which 
everything turns"(CA: 43). Thus, anxiety is conceived as a pivot around 
which all of existence, actual or possible is revolving. The full title of the 
14 In the English translations of Kierkegaard, anxiety is used as synonymous with dread. 
15 It is almost impossible to give a proper definition of anxiety since in its very nature it is beyond 
definitions. This is consonant even with Kant's analysis of concepts. Kant remarks that one should not 
attempt a definition of the concepts for on the one hand in the case of empirical concepts one is never sure 
about their limits and originality and on the other hand, in the case of a priori concepts, one is never certain 
about the completeness of her analysis. Thus, definition can only be applied to "invented concepts" where, 
since I am the inventor I certainly can set their limits (CPR: 587). It is evident that anxiety is not at all an 
invented concept; so even under the scrutiny and strictness of Kant's analysis, the concept of anxiety can 
only be exposed (see Kant's discussion regarding 'invented concepts' in CPR: 587). Accordingly, it 
resembles some chaotic kinesis; it is dizziness, since "he whose eye happens to look down into the yawning 
abyss becomes dizzy"; it is the dizziness of the possibility of freedom (CA: 61). It appears also as a ypt<!>oC;, 
as a "witch '.'I letter, which is a magic-like set of picture segments of people and animals that recombine 
when unfolded and turned" (ibid: 254). 
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book significantly reads The Concept of Anxiety: A simple psychologically 
orienting deliberation on the dogmatic issue of hereditary sin. 
It is important to note from the outset that by being described as a 
"simple deliberation" the book is designed with the intention to keep the 
maximum possible distance from any kind of speculative and systematic 
philosophical knowledge. Once again, in his criticism of Hegel's 
elaboration of "actuality" in the Science of Logic, Hegel's speculative 
science becomes the constant target16 of Kierkegaard's thought. 
Accordingly, Kierkegaard argues that entitling the last section of Logic as 
Actuality gives Hegel "the advantage of making it appear that in logic the 
highest has already been achieved, or if one prefers the lowest". While 
actuality is not served when it is treated within the limits of Logic, 
because actuality has contingency as an essential part and the latter 
cannot be admitted within the realm of logic, logic is not served either if 
it incorporates actuality since "it has included something that it cannot 
assimilate, it has appropriated at the beginning what it should only 
praedisponere (presuppose)" (eA: 10). The main point of Haufniensis's 
discussion of the relation between actuality and logic concerns not only 
the dynamics of actuality that transgress the limits of logic and necessity 
16 The main accusation being that a philosophy such as Hegel's, that claims that it can explain and 
incorporate the "whole" and the "universal" does not leave space for the "single individual" and for the 
absurd. Thus, according to anti-Climacus, the important category is the category of particularity and "the 
particular individual cannot be thought speculatively; the particular human lies below the level of the 
concept; one cannot think an individual human being, but only the concept 'man '''. This is why, according 
to the author, "speculative philosophy promptly alludes to the doctrine of the generation's superiority over 
the individual; for one cannot expect speculation to acknowledge the concept's powerlessness in relation to 
actuality" (SUD: 152). 
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but also and as a consequence the boundaries of each "science l 7" and 
the confusions that any failure to observe this rule may bring. Indeed, 
the introduction to the Concept of Anxiety focuses mainly on an 
explanation of the author's intention to explore anxiety within the field of 
psychology 18. 
Under the heading Introduction. in the form of a subtitle, Haufniensis 
delineates thus his own project: "The sense in which the object of our 
deliberation is a task of psychological interest and the sense in which, 
after having been the task and interest of psychology, it points directly to 
dogmatics" (CA: 9). 
So, although the background for his treatment of anxiety is the third 
chapter of the book of Genesis (loc. cit; Genesis 3) where "the Fall" of 
human beings is narrated, and making it a proper subject of dogmatics, 
Kierkegaard emphasizes that although he will be touching upon a 
dogmatic issue, he will treat it within the field of psychology. This is 
further explained if we take into consideration that although the 
predominant concept of the book in question is obviously anxiety. 
Haufniensis sets as his task to treat it in such a way as constantly to 
keep in mind and "before its eye the dogma of hereditary sin" (CA: 14). 
Thus, the concept of sin is introduced as both the prerequisite and the 
17 The usage of the tenn "science" can be seen as a further ironic remark towards all the thinkers that taking 
themselves seriously conceive of their corpus as a scientific contribution. Thus, although he opts in favour 
of the limits of each science, at the same time he treats the tenn "science" ironically. 
IN It seems important that psychology offers the topos for the treatment of many concepts in Kierkegaard's 
work. This can be seen if we take into account the headings of some of his books, e.g. Repetition is 
described as "a venture in experimenting psychology", The sickness unto death as "a Christian 
psychological exposition for upbuilding and awakening" etc. (Thomte 1980 : xv). 
36 
complementary dimension of any analysis of the concept of anxiety. 
Indeed, Kierkegaard's attempt to deal with "a dogmatic issue while being 
psychologically oriented" is mainly in order to emphasize sin as 
possibility instead of sin as actuality (Thomte 1980: 221). 
In order to understand clearly the aforementioned distinction, and 
before proceeding to a proper analysis of the concepts of anxiety and the 
sin as possibility under the light of psychology, it is also important to 
notice that although the concept of anxiety can be well treated within the 
field of psychology, this is not the case with the concept of sin as 
actuality. Kierkegaard emphasizes once again his argument regarding 
the boundaries of each science, insisting that we have to be very careful 
in the treatment of the concepts. Thus, according to him, each concept 
belongs to a certain "place", while to each place corresponds a mood. Sin 
therefore has its "specific place", or more accurately, 
It has no place, and this is its specific nature ... When sin is treated in a place 
other than its own, it is altered by being subjected to a nonessential refraction of 
reflection. The concept is altered, and thereby the mood that properly 
corresponds to the correct concept is also disturbed, and instead of the 
endurance of the true mood there is the fleeting phantom of false moods (CA: 15) 
The proper mood that corresponds to sin is "earnestness19". For 
Kierkegaard thus, the peculiarity of sin consists mainly in that "its idea 
19 The theological and even mystical connotations of the notion of earnestness are evident if one takes into 
account the central place this notion occupies in Boehme's The Way to Christ. As an example of one of his 
numerous references to earnestness, one can refer to his brief introduction to the First Treatise on True 
repentance, where Boehme describes how a man should "arise himself in his will and mind, and what his 
consideration and earnest resolution are to be when he wishes to powerfully repent. .. " (The Way to Christ: 
27). The affinities with Kierkegaard are more explicit if one bears in mind the relation between sin and 
repentance that permeates all of Kierkegaard's works (e.g. in The Concept of Anxiety, p.17). Moreover, as 
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is that its concept is constantly annulled"(CA: 15). The task then 
becomes the overcoming of sin in earnestness. Consequently, 
Haufniensis concludes, the proper topos of dealing with sin is not to be 
found in any of the known sciences, but it nevertheless consists the 
subject of a sermon20, "where the single individual speaks as the single 
individual to the single individual" in earnestness (ibid: 16). 
In the following paragraphs we will briefly present Kierkegaard's 
objection to the treatment of sin within the field of certain sciences21 . It 
seems that he provides us with a strict methodological rule according to 
which a distinction between sciences and a classification of them has to 
be made. Accordingly, Haufniensis sets the limits of each science in a 
manner reminiscent of Kant. Although in a completely different context 
and without making a similar distinction between the sciences22 , Kant in 
his Critique of Pure Reason, makes a clear-cut distinction between the 
concepts/ categories of the understanding and the transcendental ideas 
we are going to discuss later, earnestness is related with repetition, the latter being described as "actuality 
and the earnestness of existence" (Repetition: 133). 
20 Haufniensis found that contemporary pastors were tricked by scientific self-importance and they 
consequently become "something like professional clerks who also serve science and find it beneath their 
dignity to preach" (CA: 16). What he thinks that is lacking in the sermons is the element of appropriation, 
the latter being regarded by the thinker as the secret of conversation. In order to ground his view he takes 
recourse to a famous saying of one of his favourite thinkers, Socrates, who in his critique of the Sophists, 
claimed that "they indeed knew how to make speeches but not how to converse" (loc. cit). Appropriation 
and Inwardness always go side by side in Kierkegaard's oeuvre. 
21 It may be the case that Kierkegaard's ironic usage of the term science is not only an allusion to Hegel's 
employment of this term but also to Kant's definition of science. According to the latter, science is 
"the ... knowledge of our ignorance, which is possible only through criticism of reason itself. .. " (CPR: 606). 
As we are going to see, ignorance for Kierkegaard is a fundamental feature of the human existence. 
22 Nevertheless, Kant speaks of a general and fundamental distinction between mathematics and 
philosophical knowledge. Accordingly, the former kind of knowledge "is gained by reason from the 
construction of the concepts" whilst the latter "is the knowledge gained b)' reasonfrom concepts" (CPR: 
577). Furthermore, although he did not mention the same sciences that Kierkegaard enumerates, Kant as we 
are going to see later, speaks about the different subject matter of different sciences, e.g. of psychology, 
theology etc. 
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of reason, warning against any kind of intermingling the two faculties 
and fields. Thus, according to Kant, the pure concepts of the 
understanding (i.e. unity, reality, etc) deal with possible objects of 
experience, whilst ideas (i.e. God, soul, etc) are 
nothing but regulative principles, which ... indeed prescribing greater unity than 
the empirical employment of understanding can achieve .. .if. on the other hand 
they be misunderstood, and be treated as constitutive principles of transcendent 
knowledge, they give rise. by a dazzling and deceptive illusion. to persuasion 
and a merely fictitious knowledge. and therewith to contradictions and eternal 
disputes"(CPR: 569) 
Consequently, for example any employment of the transcendental ideas 
in the field of experience could lead into illusions, paralogisms, 
antinomies, etc. (CPR: 318 & 555). 
Indeed, the function of the transcendental ideas of reason is restricted; 
they act as if they were what they are supposed to be. For example, in 
Kant's view, "we declare ... that the things of the world must be viewed as 
if they received their existence from a highest intelligence" (CPR: 550). 
Kant further discusses three sciences that are psychology, cosmology 
and theology that make transcendental ideas, i.e. the ideas of soul, world 
and God respectively, their subject-matter; all of those sciences should 
base their analysis on an "as if' (CPR: 551). It has been remarked that 
Kant mainly re-formulates in a critical way, Wolffs distinction between 
the branches of "metaphysics", i.e. ontology23, cosmology, theology and 
2.\ Ontology has as its object being-in-general. In Kant's formulation, ontology "is replaced by 
transcendental analytic" (Caygill 1995: 338). 
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psychology24 and their respective objects (Caygill 1995: 338). Whilst 
Wolffs system presents us with an inevitable dialectical confusion 
between the a priori and a posteriori elements of those sciences, Kant 
attempts to secure the limits of each science, and constructs his very 
own metaphysics. Accordingly, in his Architectonic of Pure Reason, Kant 
defines architectonic "as the scientific in our knowledge", or as the art of 
constructing systematic unities, while systematic unity is exactly "what 
first raises ordinary knowledge to the rank of science" (CPR: 653). Thus, 
philosophy "is the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential 
ends of human reason" or in other words "the legislation of human 
reason" (CPR: 658). As such, it has a twofold function, that is firstly as a 
propaedeutic, "which investigates the faculty of reason in respect of all its 
a priory knowledge and is entitled criticism" and secondly, as the system 
of pure reason. The latter is conceived as the "science which exhibits in 
systematic connection the whole body of philosophical knowledge arising 
out of pure reason (true as well as illusory) and which is entitled 
metaphysics25" (CPR: 659). More explicitly, the philosopher presents us 
with his four-partite distinction of the sciences that constitute 
metaphysics, and which are ontology, rational physiology, rational 
24 Psychology, cosmology and theology - for Wolff they consist "the branches of special metaphysics"-
have as their respective objects the soul, the world and God and they constitute in Kant's formulation the 
transcendental analytic. Furthermore, if one does not critically set the limits of those sciences, they are 
"ridden with dialectical inferences- theology with transcendental ideas, cosmology with antinomy, and 
psychology with paralogism" (Caygill 1995: 338). 
25 However, in the wider sense, metaphysics can include the whole of pure philosophy, that is 
propaedeutiCl(Jitical philosophy as well. Another distinction that Kant makes is between metaphysics in 
the strict sense that comprise only the speculative employment of pure reason and metaph.vsics that 
includes also the practical employment of pure reason, that is metaphysics of morals (CPR: 659). 
cosmology and rational theology, whilst rational physiology is divided 
into physica rationalis and psychologia rationalis (CPR: 663-4). 
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Does Kierkegaard develop a similar distinction to that of Kant's 
systematic distinction between sciences and concepts/ideas? On the one 
hand it would be outrageous to succumb to the argument that 
Kierkegaard, the exponent of "indirect communication" would ever even 
attempt to develop a proper theory of knowledge. How can one really 
believe that the criterion of the limits of each science has to do with 
moods? It would be fairer to ascribe an ironic tone to his analysis; does 
he really want us to be tricked in believing that he develops a strict 
theory of knowledge? Or is he playing with his readers, confusing them 
with contradictory statements, such as criticizing on the one hand Kant 
and Hegel's so-called science and on the other hand discussing the 
possibility of different sciences? Irony for Kierkegaard is a way of life, a 
sign of inwardness; as such it is synonymous with the phrase know 
yourself which in his interpretation means "separate yourself from the 
other" (CI: 1 77). 
So, he may be seen as urging us to separate ourselves from him 
as a thinker, excluding then any possibility of adopting any of the 
theories he develops. Quite to the contrary, this is not tantamount to a 
repudiation of what he says. He wants us to "take notice", to feel that 
behind the words something is hidden; he invites us to behold, not in the 
sense of discovering a hidden truth but in the sense of noticing that 
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there is something that can trigger the movement of inwardness. Thus, 
the adoption of an ironic tone is not an indication of something "false". 
The interplay is neither between the two poles of falsity and truth nor 
does it point to a reconciliation of the two of them into something higher. 
The emphasis is put on the more26 or less of interiority rendering useless 
any kind of external criteria. Indeed, the help of interiOrity and 
inwardness are of crucial importance, since they make the connection of 
concepts with moods more intelligible. Indeed, Kierkegaard explains in 
an ironical manner 
... that science, just as much as poetry and art, presupposes a mood in the 
creator as well as in the observer, and that error in the modulation is just as 
disturbing as an error in the development of thought, have been entirely 
forgotten in our time, when inwardness has been completely forgotten, also the 
category of appropriation. because of the joy over all the glory men thought they 
possessed ... (CA: 14) 
On the other hand, to return to Kierkegaard's affinities with Kant, it can 
be argued that Kierkegaard substitutes inwardness for reason, thus 
making existence the central theme of his philosophy while this can be 
verified by his employment of "moods". Thus, to expand this argument 
further, we can say that Kierkegaard develops a Critique of Inwardness 
instead of a Critique of Pure Reason, in the sense that he sets limits and 
even, as Wahl formulated it much later, he furnishes us with "categories 
of existence" (Wahl 1969: 19-29). Similarly, Ricoeur although 
21> It should be noted though that the "grade" (if we are justified to use such an expression) of interiority is 
not at all measurable and that one single individual is only sure about oneself. See the fourth chapter of our 
thesis. 
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acknowledging that Kierkegaard is not a critical thinker and "had no 
interest in conditions of possibility, at least not as an epistemological 
problem" in the Kantian sense, he nevertheless pOints to some affinities 
between the two thinkers (Ricoeur 1998: 16). Firstly, advancing the 
argument that both the thinkers draw a limit to "knowledge", he parallels 
the "philosophical function of paradox in Kierkegaard ... to that of limits 
in Kant" (loc. cit). Secondly, Ricoeur even argues that 
Kierkegaard's categories of existence constitute a different kind of critique, a 
critique of existence, ant that they address the question of the possibility of 
speaking about existence. The existence of the singular individual is not a 
mystica127 experience that must be passed over in silence. Kierkegaard was far 
from being an intuitiOnist; he was a reflective thinker. (Ricoeur 1998: 16) 
We should leave the question concerning how Kierkegaard wants us to 
read his introduction in The Concept of Anxiety open. Strangely enough 
his thought seems contradictory even when he tries to give us a strict 
and systematic account. Nevertheless, he claims that "a contradiction is 
always the expreSSion of a task, and a task is a movement. .. " (CA: 28). 
Such a task can never be achieved but this does not lessen its dynamics 
since as an aporetic movement, it opens up infinite possibilities. 
Let us now return to the parading of the sciences/suitors thatflirt 
with the concept of sin, the first science that Haufniensis examines being 
esthetics. Accordingly, if sin is treated in the field of esthetics the mood is 
altered and it becomes either "melancholy" or "light-minded"; this is 
27 This is debatable though, since the mystical element in Kierkegaard's philosophy cannot be eliminated. 
As remarked above the usage of the mood of earnestness has its root in the mystical theology of Boehme. 
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because in his perception of esthetics, tragic or comic are the two poles 
of the contradiction that is peculiar to the category in which "sin lies" 
under esthetics. Thus, although "according to its true concept, sin is to 
be overcome", in the case of esthetics sin becomes either something that 
endures and causes grief to the individual, or something "nonessential 
that is annulled" and as such causes laughter. 
Now is the tum of metaphysics28 • If sin is dealt within the field of 
metaphysics the mood becomes that "of dialectical uniformity and 
disinterestedness29 , which ponder sin as something that cannot 
withstand the scrutiny of thought" (CA: I5). The problem with 
metaphysics lies mainly in the fact that it does not offer an active, vivid 
account that by touching the heart of each individual would make sin a 
matter of life concern for any human being. On the contrary, even in its 
attempt to overcome sin, metaphysics restricts itself in doing this" ... as 
something to which thought is unable to give life" (CA: I5). More clearly, 
sin and its proper mood, earnestness, "cannot be thought". As anti-
Climacus explains "one cannot think a particular human being, so 
neither can one think a particular sinner" (SUD: I52). Indeed, because of 
this, "there can be no seriousness [earnestness] with sin- when it is only 
2X When Haufniensis discusses metaphysics, it seems that he has in mind both traditional metaphysics and 
metaphysics in the Kantian reformulation of the term. 
29 Climacus in the De omnibus dubitandum est classifies metaphysics and aesthetics among all the 
disinterested knowledge. This is why they mainly use categories of reflection, the later being always 
disinterested. Shortly we'll discuss reflections' relation with consciousness. In advance we can remark that 
consciousness does not belong to the "disinterested knowledge" but is described as being "interest". 
"Interest" to be understood as having its root in the word "interesse" which means "being between" (JC: 
170). 
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to be thought. For seriousness is precisely that you and I are sinners. 
Seriousness is not sin in general. .. " (SUD: 152). On the contrary, thought 
concerns the whole of humanity as the writer clearly points out: 'To be a 
particular human being is to be nothing; just think- and then you are the 
whole of humanity, cogito ergo sum" (SUD: 152). 
Regarding the possibility of ethics30 being the proper topos of 
dealing with sin, Kierkegaard argues that this is impossible due to the 
fact that ethics is an ideal science. He furthermore explains that its 
ideality is not confined only to the natural ascription of ideality into every 
science. Ethics on the contrary aims at "bring[ing] ideality into 
actuality", whilst, it is not "the nature of its movement to raise actuality 
up into ideality" (CA: 16). Consequently, its movement is a movement 
from above and downward and as such it is never complete and thus 
Kierkegaard concludes, sin can belong to ethics only "insofar as upon 
this concept it is shipwrecked with the aid of repentance. If ethics is to 
include sin, its ideality comes to an end" (ibid: 17). 
Furthermore, Kierkegaard examines the possibility that another 
sCience, namely dogmatics. could be the proper tapas for studying sin, 
since in opposition to ethics, dogmatics follows the opposite movement 
that is from actuality to ideality. This science, although it does not deny 
the concept of sin, it cannot act as the proper topos where sin could be 
addressed, since it can only offer an explanation only in so far as 
30 By ethics, Kierkegaard means traditional ethics. 
45 
"hereditary sin" is presupposed, and this in Kierkegaard's eyes is a far 
cry from an adequate explanation (ibid: 19-20). 
There is only one, so called science, the "second ethics" that can deal 
with the manifestation of sin, but not "with its coming into existence" 
(ibid: 21). This new science has its point of departure31 in the science of 
dogmatics: 
Here ethics again finds its place as the science that has as a task for actuality 
the dogmatic consciousness of actuality. This ethics does not ignore sin, and it 
does not have its ideality in making ideal demands; rather, it has its ideality in 
the penetrating consciousness of actuality, of the actuality of sin, but note 
carefully, not with metaphysicallight-mindedness or with psychological 
concupiscence (CA: 20). 
It seems that Haufniensis's task converges with that of Johannes de 
Silentio's, who in his book Fear and Trembling, 
... allows the desired ideality of esthetics to be shipwrecked on the required 
ideality of ethics, in order through these collisions to bring to light the religious 
ideality as the ideality that precisely is the ideality of actuality, and therefore 
just as desirable as that of esthetics and not as impossible as the ideality of 
ethics (CA: 17n*). 
Thus, "second ethics" are completely different from what is commonly 
perceived under the name of ethics32 • In order to make it clearer, 
31 "Second ethics" is said to have dogmatics as its point of departure in the same sense "that immanental 
science begins with metaphysics" (CA: 20). This shall be explained later. 
.,2 This is debatable though especially if one takes into consideration that by second ethics Kierkegaard 
means mainly Christian ethics. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that for Kierkegaard, second 
ethics do not point to an external imposition of moral rules. On the contrary, he points mainly to an 
existential ethical view. Thus, it seems that for him, inwardness, "authentic" existence, appropriation and 
transcendence are more or less synonymous with a proper ethical existence. So, "love as duty", "sacrifice" 
etc, do not take the form of Kantian maxims, for they do not claim objective validity and universality, but 
on the contrary they are subject to individual experience, inwardness and appropriation. Second ethics' 
demands are, "specified by genuine divine commands and not merely by a moral law that can also be 
thought of as a divine command" (Quinn 1998:352). Until those demands have been appropriated. they 
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Haufniensis refonnulates Aristotle's canonical distinction of the sciences. 
He includes under what Aristotle has called rrproTIl <jnAoO"o<j>l(x , "the totality 
of science which we might call ethnical33 , whose essence is immanence 
and is expressed in Greek thought by recollection". Under the name 
secunda philosophia, he understands "that totality of science whose 
essence is transcendence or repetition" (CA: 21). So, secunda 
philosophia, and within it second ethics provide the place for sin to 
emerge (ibid: 182). 
Although second ethics are dealing with the manifestation of the 
existence of sin, we have seen that there is a residue that is left 
unexamined, that being sin's coming into existence. 
At this very point, psychology comes into play. If sin is dealt with 
from the point of view of psychology, the mood "becomes that of 
persistent observation, like the fearlessness of a secret agent, but not 
that of the victorious flight of earnestness out of sin" (CA: 15). Indeed, 
remain to the state of untruth. The transition from one's own untruth to his/her truth presupposes a 
redoubling of the existence, in other words, one has to become a new person (see PF p.14-22). Moreover, 
this qualitative transformation of the whole existence does not indicate an internalisation of some fixed, 
divine demands, that once internalised acquire universal validity. On the contrary, every person is 
conceived as having a completely singular way of appropriating them, while it follows that there are no 
external criteria by which one can judge the ethicallreligious life of another person. Appropriation and 
inwardness then constitute the meaning of the Delphic Oracle for Kierkegaard and as such they provide a 
wholly new approach of life, ethics included. Instead of judgment according to moral laws, for Haufniensis 
appropriation and sincere conversation constitute the proper relationship between two individuals. For 
him, "appropriation is precisely the secret of conversation" (CA: 16). Moreover, his conception of 
existence is not static and thus the struggle of inwardness never ends. Also, Johannes Climacus in the 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments while commenting on Plato's S.vmposium. 
emphatically concludes (if this should be considered as a conclusion proper, rather than as an aporetic 
statement) that: "[existence] is that child who is begotten by the infinite and the finite, the eternal and the 
temporal, and is therefore continually striving"(CUP: 92). A further elaboration of this issue takes place in 
chapter four of the present work. 
JJ Ethnical (£8vtKOt) is the Greek word for pagans. 
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psychology has been one of the many suitors offering a possible "place" 
wherefrom sin could be dealt with, although in the end it too fails to 
succeed. One of the main drawbacks of psychology is exactly that 
following what Haufniensis considers its main feature, that being 
"persistent observation". According to Haufniensis, psychology, in order 
to study a phenomenon, has first to take hold of it, like taking a 
photograph, and then to stick to this very moment and to make it static. 
In Haufniensis' words, "the subject of which psychology treats must be 
something in repose that remains in a restless repose, not something 
restless that always either produces itself or is repressed" (eA: 21). 
Therefore, if the concept of sin were treated within the field of 
psychology, then it would suffer the consequence of being transformed 
into another concept, due to the fact that its main characteristic, namely 
that it is continually annulled, is cancelled. Thus, sin becomes a state, 
and as such "de potentia, it is not, but de actu or in actu it is, again and 
again" (ibid: 15). Moreover, 
The mood of psychology is that of discovering anxiety, and in its anxiety 
psychology portrays sin, while again and again it is in anxiety over the portrayal 
that it itself brings forth ... That this state has its truth is certain; that it occurs 
more or less in every human life before the ethical manifests itself is certain. But 
in being considered in this manner sin does not become what it is. but a more or 
less. (CA: 15) 
Since the main concern of Haufniensis is to grasp the moment before the 
human being commits sin, namely the moment where anxiety reaches its 
peak, it follows that sin will be dealt as a possibility: if we keep our gaze 
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fixed to the moment just before the manifestation of sin then we will 
grasp the possibility of sin: 
... but this abiding something out of which sin constantly arises, not by necessity 
(for a becoming by necessity is a state, as, for example , the whole history of the 
plant is a state) but by freedom - this abiding something, this predisposing 
presupposition, sin's real possibility, is a subject of interest for psychology (eA: 
21). 
Furthermore, one has to bear constantly in mind that there is a 
qualitative difference that splits the "before" and the "after" of sin's 
coming into existence, and therefore psychology is thought to "bring its 
concern to the point where it seems as if sin were there, but the next 
thing, that sin is there, is qualitatively different from the first" (ibid: 22). 
It is evident, then, that in his treatment of anxiety, Haufniensis focuses 
mainly on the "moment" preceding sin's coming into existence, for this 
very moment is the home place for anxiety. 
The importance of the introduction of anxiety and its centrality for an 
interpretation of the biblical corpus is tremendous regarding the 
possibility of a different understanding of the individual, time, and 
history. The lack of a proper treatment of the concept of anxiety can be 
said to result in the adoption of a clear-cut distinction between a 
postUlated "before" and an "after" regarding the event of "the Fall", which 
was indeed adopted by numerous philosophical and theological 
interpretations based on the third chapter of Genesis. Kierkegaard offers 
us instead a somewhat different account in the sense that the difference 
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between Adam and the subsequent individual human beings is not seen 
as abysmal in qualitative terms. 
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1.2 Anxiety and the Fall 
Kierkegaard does not offer us a distinctive analysis of the time before34 
the Fall, and seems to be indifferent to any distinction between 
cosmological and fallen time. But in his analysis on anxiety where he 
seems to oscillate between two conceptions of time, one that could not be 
considered temporal in the familiar sense of the term, i.e. the time just 
before Adam's qualitative leap of sin, and a strictly speaking temporal 
one, the time just after the Fall. 
Kierkegaard's narrative of the Fall differs radically from the respective 
narratives of previous and contemporary philosophers in the sense that 
he does not present us with a "myth of understanding". The paradox of 
the "present age" is - for Kierkegaard - that although it struggles to get 
rid of all myths at the same time it is incomparably more skillful- in 
comparison to the previous ages- in "producing myths of the 
understanding" (CA: 46). By "myths of the understanding" the thinker 
means mainly Kant's story of the Fall and most importantly Hegel's 
treatment of it. Hegel, according to Kierkegaard, treats the story of the 
Fall as a myth of understanding. in the sense that "such a myth is based 
on the assumption that it adequately expresses the eternal in temporal 
qualities and that its truth can be grasped by the understanding". If for 
example, the Genesis story makes us face the question of how sin enters 
the world and the reply is "sin came into the world by a sin", that is that 
1.1 Although it can be argued that the whole analysis of anxiety is a proper and distinctive treatment of the 
time before the fall. 
"sin presupposes itself' and it came into world "as the sudden, i.e. by a 
leap ... [that] also posits the quality" then the understanding conceives it 
as an offence, "ergo it is a myth". Understanding's reaction to this 
paradox is to invent its own myth 
which denies the leap and explains the circle as a straight line, and now 
everything proceeds naturally. The understanding talks fantastically about 
man's state prior to the Fall, and, in the course of the small talk, the projected 
innocence is changed little by little into sinfulness, and so there it is (CA:32) 
On the contrary, what Kierkegaard advocates is the "paradoxicality" of 
the narrative of the Fall since it "involves a transcendence that is 
incapable of being grasped by reason" (Thompte 1980: 233 n.22). 
Furthermore, it has to be noted that for Kierkegaard, myths though are 
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not true stores they nevertheless contain an element of truth: "the myths 
are not true, though they are supposed to contain truth; they are 
fabricated, though not by reflection" (CI: 102 f *). Moreover, Kierkegaard 
is not objecting to a usage of the term "myth" if it is to be conceived as 
something that "allows something that is inward to take place outwardly" 
(CA: 47). That inwardness is the presupposition of outwardness makes 
evident the significance and the meaning of "psychology" in Kierkegaard's 
thought. It reminds us also Schelling's similar remark in the Introduction 
of his Ages oj the World which reads: 
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Everything, absolutely everything, even that which by nature is eternal, must 
have already become internal to us before we can present it externally or 
objectively. If the writer of history does not awaken in himself or herself the past 
age whose image they want to project to us, then they will never present it truly, 
nor vividly, nor in a lively fashion (AGW 1815: xxxvii). 
Thus, let us see Kierkegaard's story as a similar procedure and focus our 
attention on his narrative of Adam's fall as it is developed in the Concept 
of Anxiety, in order to address the problem concerning how temporality 
and sin "enter" the world. The notion of the moment plays a central role 
in his analysis. The moment35, as he defines it, is "that ambiguity in 
which time and eternity touch each other, and with this the concept of 
temporality is posited, whereby time constantly intersects eternity and 
eternity constantly pervades time"(CA: 89). Thus the moment should be 
construed as residing beyond temporal definitions, but it is exactly 
because of its being posited that the division between present time, past 
time and future time acquires its significance (CA: 89). This is why the 
moment is not to be conceived as a point in a line, that is, as a limit that 
35 It will be better understood in the last chapter how the exemplary form of the "moment", that is the 
moment of Christ's incarnation is, in Wahl's words, the centre of history according to Kierkegaard (Wahl 
1969: 56). This very "moment" exemplifies the fusion of eternity and time; it also signifies the 
inauguration of a new era where both the moment and eternity acquire different and essential significance 
from the one that they had in paganism. This will explain Kierkegaard's critique of Plato's treatment of the 
moment, since until the emergence of Christianity (it will be discussed later if Christianity in his perception 
has a temporal beginning), eternity had a different and non-essential meaning. If we look briefly at 
Kierkegaard's treatment of Plato's reference to the moment (the Greek word is Esat<j>VnS - it was due to 
Scleiennacher's translation that it was rendered as Augenblick in German that is as moment), it will become 
evident that in Kierkegaard's perception, Plato in Parmenides, remains in the level of abstraction (CA: 82*; 
Ruin 1994: 182). Accordingly, Plato discusses the category of transition (~E'ta~OAn) from the many to the 
one, of likeness to unlikeness etc and focuses on the moment of the transition where there is neither one nor 
many, etc. Although Kierkegaard acknowledges Plato's contribution to the development of the notion of 
the moment, he finds that it remains an "atomistic abstraction" (CA: 82). 
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although disrupting the continuity of time still retains its immanence36 
and thus belongs to temporal definitions. On the contrary, the moment 
signals a passage37 to a qualitatively different kind of living / existing 
where eternity and time are intermingling. It signifies a rupture of the 
immanence of time, or in other words "it is an atom of eternity ... the first 
reflection of eternity in time, its first attempt, as it were, at stopping38 
time" (CA: 88). What is of crucial importance is the very fact that 
Kierkegaard insists that "only with the moment does history begin", while 
for nature time has no significance at all (loc. Cit). Here there is a 
possible hint to the existence of a different time, preceding that of the 
Fall, where history had not yet begun. It is interesting to note, that 
36 Haufniensis criticizes harshly Hegel's treatment of the concepts of passage, moment, negation and 
mediation. According to Haufniensis, they are presupposed uncritically and they belong to the sphere of 
becoming, which on his interpretation of Hegel, remains to the level of logic. Thus, such a logical 
movement that comprises negation, passage and the moment remains in the sphere of immanence and as 
such is not a proper movement (CA: 12-l3; Ruin 1994: 182). 
37 It seems interesting that many years after Kierkegaard wrote his Concept of Anxiety, Nietzsche in his 
Zarathustra gives us an image of a two-faced gate, the name of which is "Moment" and which is the point 
where two different paths touch each other. Both of them have no ends and thus represent two kinds of 
eternity, the one that is behind us and the other that is ahead us (Zarathustra: 178-9). Those two modes of 
eternity do not collapse to the common held distinction between a past that has been and a future that will 
be. On the contrary, in this passage Nietzsche reinforces his idea of the eternal return of the same that is 
built upon this notion of the moment. As he wonders: "Must not all things that can run have already run 
along this lane? Must not all the things that can happen have already happened, been done, run past?" 
(Zarathustra: 178). Thus, it may be the case that his perception of those two eternities has implicitly 
something in common with Schelling's conceptions of the eternal past and eternal future that are best 
exposed in his Ages of the world. Additionally, although Nietzsche ridicules Kierkegaard's leap of faith -
that is an example of a moment- characterising it as a death-leap (p.59) one cannot fail to question whether 
Kierkegaard's concept of repetition (and the circular perception of time that it entails) informs and shapes 
Nietzsche's concept of the eternal recurrence. 
3N In order to show the "power" of the moment, Kierkegaard cites a fragment from St.Paul where he says 
"the world will pass away in a moment, £v (X'tO~{J) Kat £V pt1t1l o<l>eaA~ou [in the twinkling of an 
eye]"(CA: 88*). It is notable that etymologically, St.Paul's expression of the moment is closer to the 
German (Augenblick) and Danish (Oieblick) word for it. Ruin notices that this maybe the first time that a 
literal equivalent to the German word is used in the Greek language. He also points to the apocalyptic 
connotation of St.Paul's fragment - enhancing thus the argument that the moment is related with kairos. that 
is a theological concept that among its fourth (according to Bauer) uses, the fourth one denotes "the last 
day, the time of the return of the Lord., ... the moment when this time will come to an end" (Ruin 1994: lSI 
&181 n.IS). 
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although nature39 seems not to have a proper history since only human 
beings can posit the moment, Kierkegaard speaks of the leap, which is 
defined as a "diminutive moment", in terms of Aristotelian physics40 . The 
aporia consists in the fact that he tries to define Aristotle's notion of 
KlvT7azr; in terms of historical freedom. Let us follow his thought more 
closely. 
For Kierkegaard freedom is a movement41 , a Ktvllcrt<;, that being a 
transition from possibility to actuality. In the Concept of Anxiety he adds 
that "transition belongs in the sphere of historical freedom, for transition 
is a state and it is actual" (CA: 82). Therefore, he continues, "when 
39 The question of nature's relation with history is a complex one. Climacus, in the Philosophical 
Fragments, considers the past as the "distinctively historical" since " ... (it is gone; whether it was years or 
days ago makes no difference), and as something bygone it has actuality, for it is certain and trustworthy 
that it occurred" (PF: 79). On the other hand, nature as "spatial determination" exists only immediately and 
the question is "how, then can nature, although immediately present, be said to be historical ... ?"(ibid: 76). 
Nature's imperfection is "that it does not have a history in another sense, and its perfection is that it 
nevertheless has an intimation of it (namely that it has come into existence, which is the past; that it exists, 
which is the present)" (loc. Cit). It seems therefore that there is a definite distinction between human 
beings that can come into existence within their own coming into existence and nature that has come into 
existence in the past. If this is the case one could not but reflect on the implications it has for nature and its 
relation with human beings. Could we here point to the possibility of nature being somehow affected -and 
in a certain sense even "transformed"- by this second coming into existence that human beings are capable 
of? In this respect, one could evoke that in the Concept of Anxiety, Haufniensis explicitly points to the 
existence of what he terms objective anxiety, where it is emphatically stressed that "[b]y coming into the 
world, sin acquired significance for the whole creation. This effect of sin in nonhuman existence I have 
called objective anxiety" (CA: 57). 
40 This is not to suggest that the notion of physis in Aristotle is synonymous with that of nature. Arguably, 
quite the opposite is the case, and Kierkegaard was well aware of that. See for example his reply to 
Professor's Heiberg's (a Hegelian, contemporary with Kierkegaard) accusations that he applies to concepts 
such as repetition a "concept from natural philosophy, namely, movement" (Repetition: 308 &379-382 
n.14). Additionally, one could even argue that physis for Kierkegaard signifies a continuous emergence 
from a possibility, by means of freedom, towards an actuality that "emerges as transcendence" (Repetition: 
310) . 
.JI The notion of movement, as we are going to see later, is understood neither in spatial nor in logical terms 
but rather in qualitative ones, mostly following Aristotle's point of view that the movement or change 
should not be conceived only in spatial terms but also in terms of substance, quantity or quality (Physics 
200b32). 
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Aristotle says that the transition from possibility42 to actuality is a 
KtVllcru;, it is not to be understood logically but with reference to historical 
freedom" (CA: 82, n *; Repetition: 310). In Kierkegaard's thought, this 
transition is mainly qualitative; it consists of a qualitative leap. It is this 
very notion of the qualitative leap that excludes the possibility of 
predestination43 and brings into play the importance of freedom. The new 
is brought about through the leap and "if this is not maintained, the 
transition will have a quantitative preponderance over the elastiCity of 
leap" (CA: 85). The first qualitative leap that Kierkegaard mentions was 
that of Adam, and in contradistinction to the following leaps44 that 
depend solely upon the individual's will (in cruvEp)'Ela with God's will and 
call), the first leap was somehow present to all the creatures that 
according to Haufniensis are endowed with spirit. It is exactly because of 
that first leap, that the human race45 and the individual are bound 
together and separated at the same time while in the case of the religious 
42 Kierkegaard mainly uses Tennemann's reading of Aristotle who paraphrases Aristotle's words as 
following" ... change, motion, is the actualization of the possible insofar as it is possible" (PF: 298, n.8). 
43 More emphatically put: " ... reflectiveness is a predisposition that, before the individual becomes guilty, 
signifies essentially nothing; whereas when by the qualitative leap he becomes guilty, it is the 
presupposition by which he goes beyond himself, because sin presupposes itself, obviously not before it is 
posited(which is predestination) , but in that it is posited" (CA:62). 
44 As for example the leap of faith. 
45 The relation of the history of the human race and of the history of the individual is simultaneously 
parallel and separated, or as Adorno puts it "the inner history of the person is bound anthropologically to 
external history through the unity of the race" (Adorno 1989: 33). In the Concept of Anxiety Vigilius 
Haufniensis states: "at every moment, the individual is both himself and the race. This is the individual's 
perfection viewed as a state. It is also a contradiction. A contradiction, however, is always the expression 
of a task; a task however, is a movement; but a movement that as a task is the same as that to which the task 
is directed is an historical movement. Hence the individual has a history. But if the individual has a 
history, then the race also has a history" (CA: 28-29). And he concludes by saying that while the history of 
the human race is continuous, the person starts always da capo and it is exactly this that prevents him; her 
of considering himlherself inferior or superior in comparison with people of other generations. 
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leap Johannes de Silentio points out that: " ... the highest passion in a 
person is faith, and here no generation begins at any other point than 
where the previous one did. Each generation begins all over again" (F&T: 
121-122). 
The archetypal figure of the first qualitative leap was Adam, although for 
Haufniensis the difference between Adam and the following generations 
is solely quantitative46 . Every individual as a single individual "posits sin 
by the qualitative leap" (CA: 61). It is exactly the fusion of the first and 
the subsequent individuals that makes Sartre to remark that 
Haufniensis's development of the concept of anxiety could be seen as an 
attempt of a "displacement of the beginning" (Sartre 1974: 154). 
46 The relevant passage reads: "let us now consider Adam and also remember that every subsequent 
individual begins in the very same way, but within the quantitative difference that is the consequence of the 
relationship of generation and the historical relationship. Thus the moment is there for Adam as well as for 
every subsequent individual" (CA: 90). Or more emphatically: "since the race does not begin anew with 
every individual, the sinfulness of the race does indeed acquire a history. Meanwhile, this proceeds in 
quantitative determinations while the individual participates in it by the qualitative leap. For this reason the 
race does not begin anew with every individual, in which case there would be no race at all, but every 
individual begins anew with the race"(CA:33-34). 
In the same vein, Rose notices that 
the beginning or first task of discovering anxiety is to dethrone two customary 
beginnings: the concept of hereditary sin and the first sin, Adam's sin, which, 
preceding the history of the human race, would give it afantastic 
beginning, .. (Rose 1992: 92) 
Haufniensis does not provide us with a theological argument of how sin 
enters into the world, rather he provides us with a psychology of the 
57 
possibility of sin, since "how sin came into world, each man understands 
solely by himself' (CA: 51&21)). According to him, every individual is a 
synthesis of body and soul, while the element which unifies the two is 
spirit47. In innocence, Adam (and every consequent Adam) was a spirit48, 
although a spirit in a dreaming state. Moreover, since "the combining factor 
is precisely the spirit, and as yet this is not posited as spirit", the synthesis 
of the physical and the psychical is not yet actual" (ibid: 49). The spirit is 
for Haufniensis eternal, and what follows the first synthesis is a second one, 
a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal. In innocence, where the spirit is 
qualified as a dreaming49 spirit, the "eternal appears as the future" (ibid: 
90-1). The quasi-presence of the spirit is in a sense a hostile power, for it 
"disturbs the relation between soul and body, a relation that indeed has 
persistence and yet does not have endurance, inasmuch as it first receives 
47 Anti-Climacus in The Sickness unto death defines the human being as a spirit and identifies it with the 
self. The latter, "is a relation which relates to itself, or that in the relation which is its relating to itself' 
(SUD: 43). It is not simply a relation, since if a synthesis of the two terms (i.e. of body and spirit, temporal 
and eternal, etc) is a relation, then the human being is not yet a self. This is because in a relation between 
two things "the relation is the third term in the form of a negative unity, and the two relate to the relation, 
and in the relation to that relation; this is what is from the point of view of soul for soul and body to be in 
relation". On the other hand, if "the relation relates to itself, then the relation is the positive third, and this 
is the self' (Joe. Cit). 
4X For even in innocence, man is not merely animal for "ifhe were at any moment of his life merely animal, 
he would never become man ... so, spirit is present, but as immediate, as dreaming" (CA: 43-4). 
4<) Quite interestingly, also possibility is presented as a dreaming state. 
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the latter by the spirit" (loc. Cit). At the same time, the spirit is a friendly 
power, "since it is precisely that which constitutes the relation" (ibid: 44). 
At this state, the spirit "projects its own actuality, but this actuality is 
nothing, and innocence always sees this nothing outside itself' (ibid: 41). 
Therefore the question regarding the effect of nothing is raised, only to be 
followed by the answer that: "It begets anxiety" (loc. Cit). According to 
Wilhelm Anz, Kierkegaard defines anxiety more profoundly than St. 
Augustine. The latter, sees anxiety as developed out of fear, as being a limit 
case of fear, "fear which has lost its object, fear trapped within itself' (Anz 
1998:46). Haufniensis does not identify anxiety with fear, for fear is about 
something definite, it has an object, whilst anxiety's object is nothingness 
and this hardly consists of an object proper. Anxiety has "an ontologically 
fundamental meaning" (loc. Cit). Thus, according to Tillich, it would be best 
to understand anxiety in the context of the interplay between nonbeing and 
being that troubles philosophy for years. Tillich describes anxiety as "the 
existential awareness of nonbeing" whilst he takes the term existential to 
mean, "not the abstract knowledge of nonbeing which produces anxiety but 
the awareness that nonbeing is part of one's being" (Tillich 1980: 35). This 
explains why anxiety lacks any definite object; its object, this "threatening 
nothing" is not the unknown as it is commonly perceived, that is as 
something that ultimately will be revealed. On the contrary this unknown is 
"of a special type which is met with anxiety. It is the unknown which by its 
very nature cannot be known, because it is nonbeing" (ibid: 37). 
Anxiety nonetheless is the opening to an infinite peZagos of possibilities, 
where certainty50 is almost violently removed and the possibility of 
possibility emerges. There lies freedom, since for Haufniensis anxiety is 
"freedom's actuality as the possibility of possibility" (CA: 42). 
59 
If we follow his thought more closely, we will be able to pay heed to his 
identification of innocence with ignorance, while ignorance should not be 
understood as "animal brutality" but as "ignorance qualified by spirit". 
Such an innocence is then conceived as anxiety, or rather is "precisely 
anxiety, because its ignorance is about nothing" (ibid: 44). When God 
prohibited Adam to eat from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, Adam 
did not understand this word, for "how could he understand the difference 
between good and evil when this distinction would follow as a consequence 
of the enjoyment of the fruit?"(loc. Cit). In that point, Berdyaev would agree 
with Kierkegaard, since he holds that Paradise "is the state of being in 
which there is no valuation or distinction", where not everything was 
revealed to man and "ignorance was the condition of the life in it". Therefore 
the Paradisic state is for him "the realm of the unconscious", while in this 
state, Berdayev concludes, "man's freedom was not as yet unfolded, it had 
not expressed itself or taken part in creation"(Berdyaev 1937: 36-38). 
Thus, when this word was spoken by God, anxiety "caught its first 
prey" and instead of "nothing, it now has an enigmatic word" (CA: 44). 
God's prohibition did not awake Adam's desire, for if this were the case, 
50 Such certainty is conceived as the pre-adamic state of peace and repose (CA: 41). 
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one should have to presuppose the pre-acquisition of the foreknowledge 
of freedom because of Adam's desire to use it. On the contrary, the 
prohibition "induces to him [Le. Adam] anxiety" for it was exactly this 
that "awakens in him freedom's possibility" (CA: 44). The nothing of 
anxiety has entered Adam but it has not been transformed into 
something. It remains nothing but now it appears in a higher form of 
ignorance, in the form of "the anxious possibility of being able51 " (loc. 
Cit). The character of anxiety is exactly its ambiguity, and this is why 
Haufniensis defines it as a "sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic 
sympathy" (CA: 42). 
In an entry to his Journals Kierkegaard observed: 
The nature of the original sin has often been examined, and yet the principle 
category has been missing - it is dread (anxiety), that is what really determines 
it; for dread is a desire for what one fears, a sympathetic antipathy; dread is an 
alien power which takes hold of the individual, and yet one cannot extricate 
oneself from it, does not wish to, because one is afraid, but what one fears 
attracts one. Dread renders the individual powerless, and the first sin always 
happens in a moment of weakness; it therefore lacks any apparent 
accountableness, but that want is the real snare (Journals III A 233: 105). 
The characterisation of anxiety as an alien power which takes hold oj the 
individual is striking. One cannot help thinking of another relevant 
passage, this time to be found in the book entitled Repetition. 
Constantius discusses there the history of the concept of repetition, as 
51 Although the fall and the alleged end of innocence have been seen as the initiation to knowledge, Rose, 
in her reading of the Concept of Anxiety, emphasises the importance and role of prohibition: "Adam's 
innocence does not provide the beginning yet innocence is ignorance. The beginning is not, however the 
end of innocence understood as initiation into knowledge. The fall or beginning involves initiation into 
prohibition: it was the prohibition itselfnot to eat of the tree o/knowledge that gave birth to the sin 0/ 
Adam "(Rose 1992:92) 
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long as it is applied in the sphere of individual freedom. Freedom "passes 
through several stages in order to attain itself'. 
In the first stage, where one can easily compare it with the first 
emergence of freedom as it is developed in the Concept of Anxiety. 
Freedom is qualified as desire or as being in desire. What it now fears is 
repetition, for it seems as if repetition has a magic power to keep freedom captive 
once it has tricked it into its power. But despite all of desire's ingenuity, repetition 
appears. Freedom in desire despairs. Simultaneously freedom appears in a 
higher form (Repetition: 301) 
Adam was oscillating between his longing to surrender himself to anxiety 
and to its nothingness, and his simultaneous fear of the possibility of 
freedom that was thereby generated. Simultaneously, repetition makes 
its appearance, for the time being as a possibility. Adam in his dreaming 
state has to face a dilemma; but one that does not fall under the category 
of liberum arbitrium, that is of the freedom of indifference or "the ability of 
the will to choose independently of antecedent factors" (CA: 48-9 & 236 
n. 58). Kierkegaard compares a perfect disinterested will with a chimera, a 
nothing. Anxiety, described as entangled freedom that is freedom that "is 
not free in itself but entangled, not by necessity, but in itself', has 
captured Adam, and since spirit has not yet posited itself, there is no 
question of a possibility of a rational choice (CA: 49). But even after 
spirit's positedness, Kierkegaard's main concern remains "freedom for 
possibility" to the detriment of "freedom of choice". As Stack puts it 
Kierkegaard emphasises "man's primordial freedom", freedomfor 
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possibility, since "a choice, before it is made, is a possibility" (Stack 1977: 
50). 
Freedom's actuality as the possibility of possibility comes closer when 
God continues: "You shall certainly die". Although these words were 
again incomprehensible to Adam's ears because finitude had not yet 
entered the world, anxiety has reached its peak point, for "the infinite 
possibility of being able that was awakened by the prohibition now draws 
closer, because this possibility points to a possibility as its 
consequence" (CA: 45). 
Although in the biblical narrative God appears as the one who speaks to 
Adam, Haufniensis proposes that this is not the case. The voice 52 who 
prohibits (Le. not to eat from the tree of knowledge) and judges (Le. if you 
eat, then you certainly die) is not exoteric to Adam. If this were the case, 
then the narrative would be incomplete for "how it could have occurred 
to anyone to say to Adam what he essentially could not understand" (CA: 
47). According to Haufniensis, one has to bear in mind that "the 
speaker is language, and also that it is Adam himself who speaks" (loc. 
Cit). But he concludes 
From the fact that Adam was able to talk. it does not follow in a deeper sense 
that he was able to understand what was said. This applies above all to the 
difference between good and evil, which indeed can be expressed in language 
but nevertheless is only for freedom ... [becausel ... innocence can indeed express 
this difference. but the difference is not for innocence ... (ibid:45-6). 
52 We will see in the next chapter the transformations that the voice of God undergoes in Kant. 
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One cannot but wonder, whether there are similarities to be drawn with 
Johannes' de Silentio's account according to which God has asked 
Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, if in the present account it is considered as 
an imperfection to assume that God said something to Adam that the 
latter could not essentially understand, or was it again language itse1j53? 
If so, then the question is what Kierkegaard means by language. On the 
one hand, one has to assume that what Haufniensis means by language 
is God in his hypostasis as Logos in which hypostasis Adam was 
participating and consequently Logos, the Word was not something 
external to Adam but on the contrary Adam was and lived (participated) 
in it. 
On the other hand, if one takes into account Johannes Climacus's 
account on his unfinished De omnibus dubitandum est, s/he will face an 
interesting and challenging treatment of language54 conceived as thought 
and ideality. In this book, Climacus ironically discuses Descartes' 
assertion that the "mind", the I, escapes the threat of doubt and 
53 I f the "existence" of the voice of God is under question then the question of the "existence" of such a 
God arises. This is best understood if we take into consideration that the whole philosophy of Kierkegaard 
is grounded upon the suspension of the ethical, a suspension which according to Wahl is "prompted by the 
fact that I hear the voice of God, and God can absolve us from our moral obligations". But how I know 
that I hear the voice of God, or how Abraham knew that it was the voice of God "bidding him to go and 
sacrifice Isaac?" asks Wahl (Wahl 1969: 58). There is no definite reply, neither a definite sign that assures 
the individual that slhe hears the voice of God. The lack of any certainty, the faith in the absurd, is the 
fundamental stone in Kierkegaard's thought. It is solely upon and through our inwardness and subjectivity 
and "independently of all established values, independently of all determined essences", that we "shall 
decide that what we hear is the voice of God" (loc. Cit). Thus, if what I decide to be the voice of God is 
"language", do I not exclude the possibility of any relation with such a God? 
54 It is questionable if Kierkegaard makes a distinction between the 'language' before and after the Fall as 
for example does Benjamin (see next chapter). Nevertheless, Kierkegaard points out repeatedly the 
shortcomings of human language: "What kind of miserable invention is this human language, which says 
one thing and means another?" (Repetition: 200). Taking into account Benjamin's distinction, then one 
may even argue that the account on the Concept of Anxiety represents the language of the creation and the 
account on De omnibus dubitandum est the fallen language. 
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establishes certainty at least regarding itself. According to Descartes 
"this proposition, lam I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put 
forward by me or conceived in my mind" (Descartes 1996: 17). Descartes 
further clarifies this I am, saying that it is a thing that primarily thinks, 
"a thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing ... , etc (ibid: 
19). Thus, the thinking lis perceived as the substratum upon which 
understanding, doubt, etc are grounded. Kierkegaard on the other hand 
considers doubt as inherent in thought, or in other words as belonging 
into the primordial features of the self. If for Descartes the immediacy of 
'the r secures it against uncertainty, for Kierkegaard such immediacy is 
questionable and there is only a volatile self, emerging in the midst of a 
dreaming state. Quite interestingly, Descartes in his first meditation, 
describing the different aspects of doubt compares human's contact with 
the external world as being in a dreaming state, whilst Kierkegaard on 
the other hand speaks of the dreaming state as the necessary passage 
into existence, through the emergence of spirit and the turmoil that 
anxiety brings into play. This will become clearer if we follow his 
thoughts more closely. According to Kierkegaard, there is interplay 
between ideality and reality, mediacy and immediacy, where language, 
the word, is juxtaposed to reality that is to immediacy. The consequence 
of the encounter between ideality and reality is the emergence of 
possibility, since "not until the moment that ideality is brought into 
relation with reality does possibility appear". This is because in reality 
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(immediacy) everything is actual and true, i.e. "the most false and the 
most true are equally true ... the most possible and the most impossible 
are equally actual" (JC: 168)). For Climacus, consciousness is not yet 
present; before the establishment of the relation, we are still within the 
categories of reflection that are always dichotomous, i.e. "ideality and 
reality, soul and body, to know the true ... God and the world ... "(ibid: 168-
9). Furthermore, to the extent that for him "reflection is the possibility 
of the relation" then "consciousness is the relation, thefirstform of which 
is contradiction". Consciousness presupposes reflection, and its 
categories are always trichotomous, for they include also the relation, or 
more clearly, the "third, which places the two in relation to each other" 
(loc. Cit). If we consider either reality or ideality in themselves, we could 
not possibly account for doubt, since doubt comes into play along with 
the emergence of consciousness. Consequently, alongside the emergence 
of spirit, consciousness comes into existence through the collision of 
ideality and reality, for "the moment I make a statement about reality, 
contradiction is present, for what I say is ideality" (ibid: 168-9). The 
collision between ideality and reality brings repetition into play since 
when someone sees something in the moment55 "ideality comes into play 
and will explain that it is a repetition56" (ibid: 171). Thus, for 
55 Here moment is used in its everyday usage, pointing to someone who lives carelessly, only for the present 
~ or in Kierkegaard's term aesthetically. 
)~ At this context repetition is better to be understood as synonymous with recollection. Indeed, as 
Climacus explains: "Here the question is more specifically one of a repetition in consciousness, 
consequently ofrecollection" (JC: 172). 
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Kierkegaard doubt is an existential category that questions even the 
certainty of the 1. According to Hannah Arendt, Kierkegaard may offer us 
the "deepest interpretation of Cartesian doubt" in the sense that he puts 
doubt in the heart of human existence (Arendt 1989: 275n.32). If doubt is 
to be seen as the "beginning of the highest form of existence", it is 
because every human existence requires the constitution of 
consciousness, of self, and thus the emergence of spirit in order to differ 
from a simple body and soul combination (JC : 1 70). Indeed, what for 
Descartes is an epistemological and methodological problem becomes in 
Kierkegaard57 an "existential one" and as such "the solution of doubt lies 
not in reflection but in resolution" (Thompte 1980: ix). Descartes's 
insistence on the prioritisation of reflection (as thought) over act58 (as 
will) consists the focal point of Kierkegaard's reaction. As he writes in his 
Journals 
Since Descartes they have all thought that during the period in which 
they doubted they dared not to express anything definite with regard to 
knowledge, but on the other hand they dared to act, because in this respect they 
could be satisfied with probability. What an enormous contradiction! As if it 
were not far more dreadful to do something about which one is doubtful (thereby 
incurring responsibility) than to make a statement. Or was it because the ethical 
is in itself certain? But then there was something which doubt could not reach! 
(as quoted in Thompte 1980: ix; JP 1 774). 
57 Although one has to notice that Kierkegaard's criticism is mainly against those philosophers that 
interpreted and used (i.e. Hegel) Descartes for their own specific reasons and in a certain manner. 
According to Arendt, Kierkegaard's book De omnibus dubitandum est consists a spiritual autobiography 
where the thinker explains how he became aware of Descartes' work through Hegel and how then he felt 
sorry that he did not start his journey in philosophy with Descartes oeuvre (Arendt 1989:274n.32) .. 
5K Descartes, in his fourth meditation, discusses the possibility of error and concludes that neither the power 
of willing nor the power of understanding- if they are taken separately- are to be blamed. Thus, he argues 
that the source of error is the following: "the scope of the will is wider than that of the intellect; but instead 
of restricting it within the same limits, I extend its use to matters which I do not understand ... " 
(Meditations: 40). 
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Johannes Climacus, the hero of De orrmibus dubitandum est, took 
seriously and followed the homonymous maxim of Descartes, doubting 
everything in his life. This brought him unto the utmost depths of doubt 
that is unto despair: 
By means of the melancholy irony, which did not consist in any single utterance 
on the part of Johannes Climacus but in his whole life, by means of the 
profound earnestness involved in a young man's being sufficiently honest and 
earnest enough to do quietly and unostentatiously what the philosophers 
say ... Johannes does what we are told to do- he actually doubts everything- he 
suffers through all the pain of doing that, become cunning, almost acquires a 
bad conscience .. .If he abandons this extreme position, he may very well arrive at 
something, but in doing that he would have also abandoned his doubt about 
everything. Now he despairs, his life is wasted, his youth is spent in these 
deliberations. Life has not acquired any meaning for him, and all this is the fault 
of philosophy ... (JC: 234-5). 
The lack of any certainty is what torments Johannes Climacus and it 
seems that only a leap would redeem his despair. 
This is going to be a leap from doubt since for Johannes Climacus, 
appearing this time as the author of Philosophical Fragments, "all coming 
into existence occurs in freedom"(PF: 75) and not by way of necessity59. 
Thus, the emergence of consciousness6o happens in freedom61 , and by 
59 The necessary, on the contrary" ... cannot suffer the suffering of actuality-namely, that the possible (not 
merely the possible that is excluded but even the possibility that is accepted) turns out to be nothing the 
moment it becomes actual, for possibility is annihilated by actuality" (PF: 74) 
60 Thus language, that is ideality the appearance of which is the presupposition of the emergence of 
consciousness, is one of the fundamental and primordial features of existence, or in another sense it is 
existence. 
hi According to Berdyaev, the human being freely rejected the "bliss and wholeness of Eden" preferring 
instead the world of suffering, of death, "the pain and tragedy of the cosmic life in order to explore his 
destiny to its innermost depths". This was the "birth of consciousness with its painful dividedness", the 
inauguration of a new epoch where "man began to make distinctions and valuations, tasted the fruit of the 
tree of knowledge and found himself on this side of good and evil". Moreover, since consciousness is born 
in pain and suffering, all the "distinctions and valuations made by consciousness always cause pain" 
(Berdyaev 19J7: 36 &38). 
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way of its belonging to the category of "coming into existence", it is 
defined as suffering (ibid: 74). 
As Hannah Arendt has noticed, Kierkegaard's contribution to the 
exploration of the Cartesian doubt consists mainly on that he discovered 
the true dimensions of it "when he leaped -not from reason, as he 
thought, but from doubt- into belief, thereby carrying doubt into the very 
heart of modern religion" (Arendt 1989: 275). If the motto of the modern 
philosophy was cog ito ergo sum, Kierkegaard instead re-formulates the 
sCriptural sayings "as thou hast believed, so be it done unto thee" and 
"as thou believest, so art thou" into "to believe is to be" (SUD: 126). Still, 
doubt is for Kierkegaard the point of departure and penetrates his whole 
theology. Interestingly enough, Tillich concludes his book entitled The 
courage to be with the following words: 
The courage to take the anxiety of meaninglessness upon oneself is the 
boundary line up to which the courage to be can go. Beyond it is mere non-
being. Within it all the forms of courage are re-established in the power of the 
God above the God of theism. The courage to be is rooted in the God who appears 
when God has disappeared in the anxiety of doubt' (Tillich 1980: 190) 
Naturally, in the case of Kierkegaard, the question concerning the nature 
of such a God arises. How can a human being escape doubt and "believe" 
when all his/her certainties have been removed? A recurrent phrase in 
Fear and Trembling is the follOwing 
... either there is a paradox, that the single individual as the single individual 
stands in an absolute relation to the absolute, or Abraham is lost (IT: 120-
emphasis added) 
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Or Abraham is lost: a meaningful phrase that introduces us to the 
either / or opposition, where the two parts are of equivalent power and 
importance. So, what if Abraham is lost? It seems that in Kierkegaard's 
thought no one can remove this possibility, so as to remove doubt 
completely. In a peculiar way, Kierkegaard's attempt to avoid necessity 
and to emphasise "contingency" and the existence of "infinite 
possibilities", leads him into the opposite direction. Making possibility 
the presupposition not only of his thought but also of his existence, he 
nevertheless concludes to the necessity of the existence of the infinite 
possibilities, or in other words to the necessary existence of different 
possible "or's". As a consequence, despair, in all its disguises, is always 
present. 
No one can escape from despair in the same way as no single human 
being enjoys perfect bodily health. Thus, 
... there is not a single human being who does not despair at least a little, in 
whose innennost being there does not dwell an uneasiness, an unquiet, a 
discordance, an anxiety in the face of an unknown something, or a something he 
doesn't even dare strike up acquaintance with, an anxiety about a possibility in 
life or an anxiety about himself ... (SUD: 52). 
At the same time, to be able to despair is conceived as an infinite merit, 
although the actual fact of being in despair is conceived as a misery. As 
anti-Climacus himself notices, in contrast to the common perception of 
the relation between possibility and actuality that attributes a greater 
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merit to actually be something than, to be able to be something, in this 
specific relation the opposite is the case. This is because, although the 
actuality of despair is not at all desired, the possibility of being in despair 
is tantamount if not identical with the possibility of spirit's emergence 
and as such is conceived as a merit. 
We have seen how the self (i. e. spirit) is a synthesis of 
temporality /finitude and eternity/infinity whereas the dissolution of this 
synthesis is unattainable, for although the synthesis occurred at the 
moment of sin, it was already present as a possibility62 before, when 
anxiety reached its highest point. Thus, according to Anti-Climacus, 
... every human existence which has supposedly become, or simply wants to be 
infinite .. .is despair. For the self is a synthesis in which the finite is the 
confining factor, the infinite the expanding factor. Infinitude's despair is 
therefore the fantastic, the boundless; for the self is only healthy and free from 
despair when, precisely by having despaired, it is grounded transparently in God 
(SUD: 60) 
Despair does not stem from the synthesis, the latter is just the 
possibility, or in other words "the possibility of the imbalance lies in the 
synthesis". According to anti-Climacus, "despair is the imbalance in a 
relation of a synthesis, in a relation which relates to itself. .. if the 
synthesis were itself the imbalance, there would be no despair" (SUD: 
45). In that case, the imbalance would have taken the form of something 
that happens to a person, and which "lay[s] in human nature itself' (ibid: 
62 For Anti-Climacus there is another couple of seeming oppositions that are constitutive of the self as a 
result of a conscious synthesis. This is the couple of possibility and necessity. As he writes: "For the 
purpose of becoming (and the self must become itself freely) possibility and necessity are equalIy essential. 
Just as infinitude and finitude (a1tEtpov & 1tEpaQ belong to the self, so also do possibility and necessity. 
:\ self that has no possibility is in despair, and likewise a self that has no necessity."(SUD: 65). 
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45-6). Thus, this something acquires for example the form of death 
"which is the fate of everyone" or of a sickness one succumbs to. On the 
contrary, despair 
lies in the person63 himself. But if he were not a synthesis there would be no 
question of despairing; nor could he despair unless the synthesis were originally 
in the right relationship from the hand of God (ibid: 46) 
Even death is not the ultimate resolution as it is in St. Augustine64, for 
the consequences of the despair may result to the opposite direction and 
one may suffer from the inability to die. Indeed, Kierkegaard 
acknowledges that for the Christian understanding "death is itself a 
passing into life" and due to this "no earthly, physical sickness is unto 
death" (ibid: 47). More emphatically put, the physical death is not 
considered as absolute death, for it points to a new existence. On the 
contrary death is simply considered as "another minor event" (ibid: 38). 
Thus, Lazarus is not to been seen as suffering from a sickness that led 
him into death because his physical sickness was not "a sickness unto 
death" but quite the opposite65 . As anti-Climacus explains the reason 
that Lazarus's sickness is not unto death is that "Christ exists" and not 
that he (Lazarus) was risen from the dead since in that case "in the end 
he must die anyway" (SUD: 37). 
h.\ Kierkegaard seems to distinguish between "human nature" and person; the first being what is common to 
all people as a ground, the latter what emerges from a synthesis which although was perfect originally, it 
longs for its former state now. 
64S ee Chapter Two. 
1>5 "The sickness is not unto death" reads John's Gospel (11.4); this fragment paves the ground upon which 
anti-Climacus builds his Sickness unto death (SUD: 37). 
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"Sickness unto death" is despair; it is exactly this sickness that 
distinguishes the human being from the "beast" in a different way than 
standing in an upright position66. This is because "it bespeaks the 
infinite erectness or loftiness of his being spirit". So, despair is a sickness 
of the spirit, uneasiness, and an "inexplicable" anxiety. Although in this 
chapter we have focused on the first instance of anxiety's emergence and 
consequently a proper analysis of the consequent forms of anxiety that 
would allow a thorough discussion of its relation with despair has to be 
put aside, we can nevertheless remark that both anxiety and despair are 
bound with possibility. It is not only the relation of anxiety with the 
possibility of the awakening of spirit, that is a possibility that puts 
anxiety temporally67 before68 despair, but is also the possibility of 
salvation from "nothing" that binds both anxiety and despair together. 
The educative role of possibility points to the liberation of the "death" of 
the spirit, that is the ultimate form of despair; the possibility of such a 
death is already present in the possibility of spirit's emergence. Thus, 
the worst kind of despair is the "inability to die", that is the inability to 
pass through the earthly death in order to be re-born. 
66 There are other thinkers that give great importance to the erect position of the human being. For example, 
as Kant argues that for Herder the erect position is the essence of being human since he even acquires 
reason because of it. In Herder's own words as quoted by Kant: "Let us pause for a moment to contemplate 
with gratitude this sacred work of art, this blessing which enabled our race to become human, and to 
wonder at it as we perceive the new organisation of forces which arose out of man's erect stature, and as we 
see that it was through this alone that man became man" (RHIPM: 204). 
67 Although in Kierkegaard's eyes temporality has not yet entered the world. 
6X Or one can also say that anxiety and despair made simultaneously their appearance since despair can be 
clearly seen as one of the possibilities anxiety faces, the other being freedom. 
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More emphatically put, 
... the torment of despair is precisely the inability to die ... Thus to be sick unto 
death is to be unable to die, yet not as though there were hope of life. No, the 
hopelessness is that even the last hope, death, is gone. When death is the 
greatest danger, one hopes for life. But when one learns to know the even more 
horrifying danger, one hopes for death. When the danger is so great that death 
has become the hope, then despair is the hopelessness of not even being able to 
die (SUD: 48). 
According to Tillich, even the etymology of the word despair indicates its 
meaning a state of being "without hope" (Tillich 1980: 54). It also points 
to the threat of "nothingness", or "in religious terms of eternal death" 
(ibid: 38), that is of the death of the spirit. This is furthermore the same 
kind of death as that dreaded by Adam and every consequent "Adam". 
But if we take into account anti-Climacus words, according to which 
Only the Christian knows what is meant by the sickness unto death. As a 
Christian he has acquired a courage69 unknown to the natural man, a courage 
he acquired by learning to fear something even more horrifying ... When one fears 
a danger infinitely, it is as if the others weren't there at all. But the truly 
horrifying thing which the Christian has learned to know is the sickness unto 
death (SUD: 39), 
then the question arises: How can despair be a fundamental and 
constitutive characteristic of the self from time immemorial and at the 
same time acquire its full significance only in Christian consciousness? 
In other words, did the people before the coming of Christ despair? 
1>9 Anti-Climacus argues that the Christian needs a kind of courage "unknown" to the natural human being 
in order to learn the meaning of the sickness unto death. This Kierkegaard's assertion might seem all the 
more paradoxical or even absurd. given that it runs counter to Nietzsche's now almost canonical attack on 
Christianity -which might very well be an unacknowledged attack on Kierkegaard- that is fundamentally 
premised on the claim that Christianity "needs sickness almost as much as Hellenism needs a superfluity of 
health- making sick is the true hidden objective of the Church's whole system of salvation procedures ... one 
must be sufficiently sick for it [i.e. Christianity] ... We others, who have the courage for health and also for 
contempt, what contempt we have for a religion ... " (Anti-Christ: 179). 
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Furthermore, if as already remarked anxiety makes its appearance in 
Kierkegaard's analysis before the moment of sin's emergence, whilst "the 
consciousness of sin" is considered to be a Christian70 category, then the 
manner in which the people living before the coming of Christ were 
subject to anxiety has to be deemed problematic. 
Furthermore how can we adequately conceptualize Adam's relation to 
the categories of anxiety, sin and despair? 
It seems that Kierkegaard makes a twofold distinction concerning the 
eras before and after the coming of Christ. 
Firstly, he draws a temporal line, distinguishing the two periods in a 
conventionally temporal sense. In this case the first period is called 
Pagan and the latter Christian age. Secondly, he focuses on the latter 
period making yet another distinction between true Christianity and a 
mode of paganism, which thinks of itself as a representative of 
Christianity. Needless to say that Kierkegaard on the one hand 
repUdiates the last form of paganism since he considers it responsible for 
70 One may wonder why Kierkegaard claims that the "consciousness of sin" is a Christian category instead 
of inscribing it to the wider context of ludaeo-Christianity. Interestingly enough, Nietzsche claims quite the 
opposite. Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss Nietzsche's account on ludaism -the 
"first period" of which he seems to appreciate- his understanding of ludaeo-Christianity and Christianity, it 
should be remarked that he finds that the concepts of guilt, punishment, and sin were pre-eminent concepts 
of the Old-Testament and they were abolished in the "entire psychology of the Gasper' (Anti-Christ: 157). 
As Nietzsche ironically points out this is because the Gospel. as already indicated by its very name, 
presents us with the "glad tidings" and as such any kind of relation (e.g. sin) that implies distance between 
God and man is excluded (loc. Cit). Contrary to Nietzsche, Kierkegaard affinns the existence of a 
qualitative abyss between human beings and God, an abyss that is furthennore based on sin (SUD: 155); 
moreover the specificity of the "consciousness of sin" is precisely that it signals the beginning of an inward 
movement where the human being, in a qualitative way, stands and sins before God. As Kierkegaard claims 
"what made sin so terrible was its being before God" (SUD: 112), that is before "god in time" (PF: Ill). 
Under this light, one can more clearly understand Kierkegaard's abovementioned remark, i.e. that only a 
Christian knows the true meaning of the sickness unto death. 
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the pseudo-Christianity71 of his days. On the other hand, he favours 
some aspects of ancient paganism, especially one of its most important 
exemplifications, that is the thought of Socrates. Thus, we can assume 
that for Kierkegaard sin, despair, anxiety were always present but only 
with Christianity they acquire their full and significant meaning; we 
could even say that until then they were only in the level of the 
unconscious, explaining thus the different forms they acquired 
throughout time. If we take despair and sin as an example, it could be 
argued that although the "consciousness of sin" had not yet fully 
developed, a form of sin manifested itself in Socrates72's age, mainly in 
the form of ignorance (SUD: 120). If we focus on anxiety, we have to say 
that Adam has to be seen, as we have already pOinted out, as an 
archetypal figure and in this sense one can understand better his 
connection with the whole of humanity and human history. Kierkegaard 
is not as naive as to believe that anxiety has the same manifestation in 
Adam and in every subsequent individual. This is why he spends a large 
71 Anti-Climacus even argues that the centrality that modem philosophy puts on cogito ergo sum that is on 
"thought" is mainly due to the fact that it follows paganism but it alleges that it is Christian. This is what he 
calls "the whole secret of modem philosophy" (SUD: 126). 
72 The problem that anti-Climacus with the Socratic definition of sin is that it does not examine the origins 
of ignorance. He thus asks: " ... even if sin is ignorance ... which is in a sense undeniable, are we take it to 
be original ignorance? Is the state of ignorance then that of someone who has not known, and has hithero 
been unable to know, anything about the truth? Or is it an acquired, a later ignorance?" The latter case 
presupposes an activity "whereby the person has worked at obscuring his knowledge" , and the question of 
the conscience of the person arises. Was slhe conscious of obscuring his/her knowledge? Ifnot, then the 
knowledge was already obscured and then sin cannot be ignorance. If yes, then the emphasis is put not on 
knowledge but on the will (SUD: 121). Although on the one hand anti-Climacus acknowledges that the 
Socratic definition of sin has little to do with such objections since Socrates was an ethicist and not an 
intellectualist, on the other hand he points out that the missing component in the Socratic definition is "the 
will, defiance". He also argues that the Greek mind "posits an intellectual categorical imperative", 
meaning that the Greeks consider understanding as the faculty responsible for the spontaneous conduct of 
human beings (SUD: 122; Hannay 1989: 175 n.64). 
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part of his book on anxiety "as the consequence of sin". Leaving aside the 
other fonns that anxiety takes on in different ages, we shall briefly 
discuss the fonn that anxiety takes in paganism. 
Accordingly, paganism is identified with sensuousness but it is a 
"sensuousness that has a relation to spirit, although spirit is not in the 
deepest sense posited as spirit" (CA: 96). Thus, this possibility, namely 
the possibility of a relation with spirit, is called anxiety. The object of 
anxiety is nothingness and the latter in paganism signifies fate (CA: 96). 
Fate 
Is a relation to spirit as external. It is a relation between spirit and something 
else that is not spirit and to which fate nevertheless stands in a spiritual 
relation. Fate may also signifY exactly the opposite, because it is a unity of 
necessity and the accidental (eA: 96-7) 
This unity of the accidental and necessity has not been, according to 
Kierkegaard conceptualized before, while the predominant73 conception 
of fate identified the latter solely with necessity. Indeed, as Kierkegaard 
argues, due to the previous conceptions of fate as necessity, "a vestige of 
this necessity has been pennitted to remain in the Christian view, in 
which it came to signify fate, i.e., the accidental, that which is 
incommensurable with providence" (CA: 97). Thus, for Kierkegaard the 
expression "fate is blind" is an ingenious one since it summarizes the 
aforementioned unity. According to him, someone who walks forward 
blindly "walks as much by necessity as by accident" (CA: 97). Fate, as 
the nothing of anxiety, is cancelled at the same time that anxiety is 
7.1 At this point Kierkegaard mainly attacks Hegel's paganism. 
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cancelled, that is when spirit is posited and providence takes over fate's 
place (loc. sit). Thus, fate and providence are conceived as 
incommensurable, especially under the light of Christianity. This is not 
to suggest the elimination of the element of fate, but mostly to pronounce 
that in effect fate has never existed. Kierkegaard suggests that in the 
case of fate one has to use the same words that 5t.Paul used in speaking 
about the idol: "there is no idol in the world; nevertheless, the idol is the 
object of the pagan's religiousness" (CA: 97) 
The problem of the pseudo-pagan-Christianity is of crucial 
importance for Kierkegaard and he consistently shows the danger that it 
entails. Thus, he even asserts the non-existence of true-Christians: 
In the beginning there was no Christian at all. Then everyone became a 
Christian - and that's why once again there is no Christian. That was the 
end. Now we are at the beginning again. (Papers and Journals 1854 xi i 
A505[23]) 
Kierkegaard offers us one of the most powerful critiques of his 
contemporary form of Christianity, accusing the so-called Christians in 
the most severe fashion, of not being Christians at all. Kierkegaard 
challenges his contemporaries, gives them the opportunity to exercise 
inwardness, but they were happy endorsing an external and formal 
Christian fa~ade and they "just laugh" at him (Papers and Journals 1851 
x 4 A 33). Quite interestingly, Johannes Climacus, in his book 
Philosophical Fragments, speaks of the historical appearance of God as 
being "the news of the day in the market square, in homes, in council 
meetings in the ruler's place". The news of the day "is the beginning oj 
etemity" (PF: 58). In a similar way Nietzsche in his parable of the 
madman in "The Gay science" speaks of a madman who run into a 
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market place and like a town crier brought to the people the news of the 
day: " ... God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him." (Gay 
Science 125: 185). There is a parallel between those two thinkers 
although in a form of an obvious opposition (Is it a sign of an indirect 
communication74 between them?). Kierkegaard speaks of the appearance 
of God in time perceiving this event as a tremendous one, since it is 
conceived as being both a historical point of departure and the beginning 
of eternity. At the same time Kierkegaard acknowledges the very fact 
that the objective knowledge of God's birth in time does not guarantee 
an internalisation of this event, while most of the time it is objective 
74 According to Jaspers, Nietzsche had not read any of Kierkegaard works although he intended to study the 
"psychological problem of Kierkegaard" after Brandes' instigation in 1888. Moreover, Jaspers argues that 
there is a unique relationship between those two thinkers although they never met or read each other's work 
(Jaspers 1956: 151 n.b). It is striking though, that in addition to a possible notional affinity between 
Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, one can also notice, as we have already seen, some hidden textual references in 
Kierkegaard's work by Nietzsche. Besides the already mentioned references, we can also pay attention to a 
phrase, written in italics, whereas one can discern a hidden reference to Kierkegaard's already mentioned 
claim that " ... there was no Christian at all". Thus, Nietzsche writes: "To reduce being a Christian, 
Christianness, to a holding something to be true, to a mere phenomenality of consciousness, means to 
negate Christianness. Infact there have been no Christians at all" (Anti-Christ: 163). Moreover, 
Kierkegaard is equally ironic and trenchant towards most of the clergy. Although Nietzsche's metaphor 
according to which the love that the priests show to their flock is similar to the love that the wolves show to 
the sheep seems unprecedented, one can find a very similar one in Kierkegaard's work. Indeed, 
Kierkegaard describes the pastors as cannibals "in the most abominable way". He shows in a detailed 
manner how the true cannibal is much better than the pastor since "the cannibal eats his enemies. Not so 
the pastor. He gives the appearance of being exceptionally devoted to those whom he eats. The pastor, 
specifically the pastor, is the most devoted friend of those glorious ones ... The pastor. .. hides as carefully 
as possible that he is a cannibaL .. "(Moment: 322-323). 
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knowledge which sets obstacles in the procedure of the appropriateness 
and internalisation of an event. As Johannes Climacus writes 
... [the book Philosophical Fragments] is far from being written for nonknowers. to 
give them something to know, that the person I engage in conversation in this 
book is always knowledgeable. which seems to indicate that the book is written 
for people in the known, whose trouble is that they know too much. Because 
everyone knows the Christian truth, it has gradually become such a triviality 
that a primitive impression of it is acquired only with difficulty (CUP: 275 n*). 
So, what is striking in the comparison of Nietzsche with Kierkegaard is 
that they both announce something not directly themselves but in an 
indirect way, under the name of a madman the first, under the name of 
Johannes Climacus the second. The madman addresses his "God is 
dead" to those who do not believe in God and J onannes announces the 
appearance of God to those who believe are Christians. But nobody 
understood the madman who after his announcement fell silent, only to 
comment: "I have come too early ... my time is not yet. This tremendous 
event is still on its way, still wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of 
... this deed is still more distant from them than the most distant stars ... 
and yet they have done it themselves" (Gay Science 125: 182). 
Johannes's answer to the objective announcement of the appearance of 
God is also a temporal one. One can only appropriate and internalise the 
event of the appearance of God when one decides to be contemporary75 
with the historical birth of God and it is exactly this moment of decision 
that "intends to be the condition of one's eternal happiness"(PHF : 58). 
75 We will deal later with the problem of contemporaneity and its relation with repetition. 
This movement towards the eternal cannot be urged, it is a unique 
moment, which for Johannes has a special name: "thefullness of time" 
(loc. Cit)). 
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Concluding remarks 
We have seen so far how anxiety - presented as "sympathetic antipathy 
and antipathetic sympathy" - expresses on the one hand the longing of 
the human being to become a self and as such to explore the infinite 
possibilities that are open to her, and on the other hand the dread and 
terror that accompany such an encounter with these possibilities. 
It seems that for Kierkegaard, if "nothing" in its various main disguises is 
the ultimate expression of this terror, then the possibility of the death of 
the spirit (Le. the ultimate form of despair) is already present as a 
possibility even before the emergence of spirit and the constitution of the 
self. Thus, if possibility is what the individual faces in the first place, 
then, according to Kierkegaard possibility is what could also save the 
individual, only this time it acquires the form of faith. Kierkegaard 
conceives both anxiety and possibility as playing an edifying role in the 
development of the spirit: 
Whoever is educated by anxiety is educated by possibility, and only he who is 
educated by possibility is educated according to his infinitude. Therefore 
possibility is the weightiest of all categories .. .in possibility all things are equally 
possible, and whoever has truly been brought up by possibility has grasped the 
terrible as well as the joyful...However, in order that an individual may thus be 
educated absolutely and infinitely by the possibility, he must be honest towards 
possibility and have faith (CA: 157). 
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Indeed, for Kierkegaard faith transfonns the individual and the world; 
faith is beyond temporal limitations 76 and was always present as a 
possibility, in all ages77 • The path that Kierkegaard suggests to his 
readers is full of dangers, the worst being suicide, as he readily admits. 
This happens because the individual may misunderstand anxiety "so 
that it does not lead him to faith but away from faith", which for 
Kierkegaard means that the individual is 'lost'. Indeed, it seems that the 
interaction of possibility and anxiety has effects similar to those of a 
whirlwind. We have already seen how anxiety is presented as dizziness; 
this is also the case with possibility: 
In actuality. no one ever sank so deep that he could not sink deeper. and there 
may be one or many who sank deeper. But he who sank in possibility- his eyes 
become dizzy, his eyes became confused ... his ear was closed so he could not 
hear what the market price of men was in his own day ... He sank absolutely. but 
then in turn he emerged from the depth of the abyss lighter than all the 
troublesome and terrible things in life ... (eA: 158). 
Thus, the close "cooperation" of possibility and anxiety is of tremendous 
importance. The role of possibility is to discover all the possible finitudes 
and then to idealize them "in the fonn of infinity", whilst anxiety has the 
capacity to "overwhelm the individual" until slhe "again overcomes them 
[Le. the finitudes] in the anticipation of faith" (loc. Cit). Moreover, 
Kierkegaard claims that the individual who is educated by possibility 
stays with anxiety since she does not allow herself to be tricked "by its 
76 Such as the time before and after Christ. 
77 We are going to see - in the last chapter- how the biblical figure of Abraham is the exemplification of the 
"knight of faith", 
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countless falsifications and accurately remembers the past" (CA: 157-
emphasis added). This past, which arguably takes the form of etemal 
past in Schelling's78 terminology, includes the whole journey of anxiety 
as recounted by Kierkegaard: 
Anxiety discovers fate, but just when the individual wants to put his trust in 
fate, anxiety turns around and takes fate away, because fate is like anxiety, and 
anxiety like possibility, is a magic picture ... (CA: 159) 
The next "nothing" that according to the philosopher anxiety encounters 
is "guilt", while it is postulated that when guilt is limited in the sphere of 
the finite then 
Whoever learns to know his guilt only from the finite is lost in the finite, and 
finitely the question of whether a man is guilty cannot be determined except in 
an external, juridical, and most imperfect sense (CA: 161) 
According to the author repetition and faith were always part of this 
journey, which in its unfolding reaches eventually the point where the 
"finitudes" begin to disappear. In what is described as the 'third stage' of 
this journey, freedom as possibility "breaks forth in its highest forms" 
and its supreme interest is "precisely to bring about repetition". Thus, 
the question for Constantius, the pseudonymous author of Repetition. 
arises: "Is repetition possible?' (Repetition: 302). 
Any attempt to answer this question should not fail to take into 
account anti-Climacus statement that "the question is whether he [Le. 
7X For a discussion of Schelling's account of eternal past see chapter three. 
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the individual) will believe that for God everything is possible, that is, 
whether he will have faith", so that freedom and possibility would acquire 
a new, this time infinite meaning. For God everything is possible and as 
Constantius emphasizes: 
If God himself had not willed repetition, the world would not have come into 
existence. Either he would have followed the superficial plans of hope or he 
would have retracted everything and preserved it in recollection. This he did not 
do. Therefore, the world continues, and it continues because it is repetition 
(Repetition: 133). 
If this is the case, then what is the relation of the will of God and the will 
of the human beings? This quite significant question should remain 
open until a proper discussion on repetition in Kierkegaard's oeuvre in 
the last chapter opens the path for its proper evaluation. 
The present chapter might well conclude with the citation of the last 
words of The Concept of Anxiety, offered here as a possible trace of the 
puzzling relationship between the human and the divine, of philosophy 
and theurgy, of the meeting point between human endeavours and divine 
creation: 
Yet the hypochondriac is only an imperfect autodidact when compared with the 
person who is educated by possibility ... The true autodidact is precisely in the 
same degree a theodidact. as another author has said, or to use another 
expression less reminiscent of the intellectual, he is 
cx'\.)'tOupY0<; 'tt<; TIl<; <!>tAocrO<!>tCX<; [one who in his own cultivates philosophy] and in the 
same degree 8EOUPYO<; [one who tends the things of God] ... (CA: 162) 
Indeed this passage is a quite 'strong' conception of the relationship 
between the human and the divine and compels us to 'take notice' of -
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and further explore- its dynamics. Thus, in the next chapter the 
postulation of a radical gap between the human and the divine is 
discussed and assessed through a reinterpretation of st. Augustine and 
Kant, while a more 'open' account of this relationship based on a radical 
conception of theurgy is given by Schelling and discussed in the third 
chapter of the present work. 
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Chapter Two 
Time, History & The Fall: St. Augustine & Kant 
Introductory remarks 
"Misconceptions like this are unavoidable", he 
said, "now that we've eaten of the Tree of 
Knowledge. But Paradise is locked and bolted, 
and the cherubium stands behind us. We have 
to go on and make the journey round the world 
to see if it is perhaps open somewhere at the 
back" ... "Does that mean ... we must eat again of 
the Tree of Knowledge in order to return to our 
state of innocence?" "Of course" he said, "but 
that's the last chapter in the history of the 
world" (Kleist: 5 & 10). 
The tree of knowledge, the alleged state of innocence, a postulated 
journey towards freedom, the knowledge of good and evil, etc, are the 
common representations that can be found in most narrations of the 
theme of the Fall of human beings. A hypothetical state of natural man 
is presupposed and is the shared underlying feature of all these 
narratives. What follows then, is an understandable urge to escape from 
such a 'confining79' state and a longing for freedom and knowledge, with 
all the consequences that this last entails. What is more, in the majority 
of these stories the inescapabilityBO of the Fall is treated as being almost 
79 Since at this state, the human being is seen as being deprived of freedom. 
so Fven Augustine- who did never come to speak of the inescapability of the fall but argued quite the 
contrary- leaves open the possibility- in our reading of him- of the "good aspect" of the fall. More 
specifically, when he speaks of the creation of the first man, arguing against those who claim that he would 
have been created either wise or folly, he proposes the existence of an intermediate state "which could be 
obvious, despite the vast amount of conceptual problems that this 
postulation brings to the fore and among which one could undoubtedly 
include the emergence of evil, the beginning of suffering, etc. In the 
course of the ages many explanations of the Fall have been given, and 
many attempts to "situate" and to adequately explain the origins of evil 
have emerged, all of them related not only to the philosophical and/ or 
theological background of each thinker but also to the historical period 
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s/he was born. The questions that arise are innumerable, and from this 
same story many completely different accounts have arisen; there are 
some that find the possibility of salvation in the progreSSive unfolding of 
history, others that see it as a return to the state of a lost Paradise. 
Kleist suggests, maybe in an ironic manner, a return to the state of 
innocence, but with one condition, that is to eat again of the ''Tree of 
Knowledge". How should we interpret this enigmatic vision? Is this an 
indication that the thinker accepts the inescapability of the unfolding of 
history, or is he suggesting the possibility of a return81 to a pre-fallen 
state for humanity? Moreover, if the latter is the case, then why do we 
have to eat again from the Tree of Knowledge? Is the repetition of the 
same act tantamount to a restoration of the former state? If Kleist 
wishes to refer here to a higher state, why does he name it "state of 
innocence"? It is beyond the scope of this chapter to attempt to "answer" 
called neither folly nor wisdom" (Free Choice: 229). Thus, the first man being not yet wise has, in a sense, 
the longing to become wise. 
XI Such a return would be seen as tantamount to what Kierkegaard calls "recollection" 
these questions, not only because of the chapter's more confined 
thematic horizon, but mainly due to the fact that they belong to 
questions that function as the always annulled -and perpetually 
renewed- pOints of departure for thought. 
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The Cherubiums -let us recall- stand in front of the gate of paradise, in 
order to prevent us eating from the Tree of Life, to prevent time from 
prematurely becoming eternity. Kleist's story proposes to his readers a 
journey round the world to "see if [the gate of paradise] is perhaps open 
somewhere at the back". In what follows we intend to follow his 
suggestion and start off for a journey where we would come across many 
'meeting points' of time and eternity. 
As part of this journey the aim of this chapter - as well as of the next one 
- will be to suspend for a while our direct analysis of Kierkegaard and to 
explore divergent accounts of the creation and the Fall, in order to "take 
notice" of the issues that Kierkegaard has opened up and consequently 
to deepen our understanding of their importance. 
In the last pages of the previous chapter, we came briefly across another 
concept than that of anxiety, namely the concept of repetition. 
Repetition will playa concomitant -although latent-role in our 
exploration, until the last chapter, where we will attempt a more 
complete analysis of it. The exemplary form of repetition is often 
described by Kierkegaard or/and his pseudonymous authors as the 
"religious leap". Thus, the religiOUS leap is for the individual the always-
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deferred telas and in this respect it might seem at first glance that the 
pseudonymous authors provide us with a linear conception of time and 
consequently with a conception of both the history of human race and of 
the human individual as tending towards an end. If this were the case 
though how could one explain the importance that Kierkegaard 
attributes to radically new beginnings? His choice and employment of 
the concept of repetition82 implies in itself a conception of cyc1ical83 time 
where the interplay between eternity and time84 is always present. 
Constantius defines repetition as a "transcendent, religious movement by 
virtue of the absurd-when the borderline of the wondrous is reached", 
eternity being true repetition" (Repetition: 305). 
Constantius then focuses his attention on the repetition as exemplified in 
the life of a human individual (ibid: 287), his main interest being its 
relation with freedom (ibid: 297), since for him repetition is "a task for 
freedom". In its individual manifestations, repetition is shown by the 
author to presuppose the consciousness of sin and in its higher form to 
signify atonement (ibid: 313). 
We have already cited before the following passage: 
X2 The development of the concept of repetition is elaborated in the book Repetition written by Constantin 
Constantius. 
H1To be more precise, one has to speak better of a both linear and cyclical conception of time since a 
progressive element is also implied in the conception of a new beginning. 
S4 The interplay between eternity/infinity and time/finitude is arguably discernible both in linear and 
cyclical conceptions of time. The aforementioned interplay is pivotal to Kierkegaard's. though~, as we have 
already seen. (e.g. in the Concept of anxiety where the person is presented as a syntheSIS of finItude and 
eternity (CA : 102). 
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If God himself had not willed repetition. the world would not have come into 
existence. Either he would have followed the superficial plans of hope or he 
would have retracted everything and preserved it in recollection. This he did not 
do. Therefore. the world continues. and it continues because it is repetition 
(Repetition: 133). 
This passage allows us to "take notice" of the almost inexhaustible 
variety of possible interpretations to which it may be subjected and 
which may furthermore lead to the development of radically different 
viewpOints. In addition to a whole sequence of questions that arise 
concerning the nature of God, of God's wi1l85, of God's power to will 
repetition, of existence, of continuation and conservation of the world, 
there is also a pivotal question that arguably provides the "ground" for all 
the others to emerge. This question is certainly the one concerning the 
proper meaning of Kierkegaard's phrase "if God had not willed 
repetition". How is this to be interpreted? Does Kierkegaard refer to the 
primordial act of the creation of the world or does he simply point to the 
human act of repetition that can save a human being after the Fall? Is 
repetition an act of God, a human act, or a combination of both? 
If, - as we have seen- the introduction of the "concept" of anxiety by 
Kierkegaard signifies a different understanding of the Fall according to 
which not only there is neither a rigid distinction between the "before" 
and "after" of the Fall, nor an abysmal difference between Adam and the 
postulated subsequent human beings, it would be of interest, in this 
S" The allusion to Leibniz is more than obvious at this passage; a more detailed discussion on this we will 
attempt in the last chapter of this thesis .. 
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chapter, to attempt a presentation of two accounts that in one way or 
another, implicitly or explicitly, favor the opposite interpretation of the 
Fall. The first account to be discussed in this context is that of St. 
Augustine, the second that of Kant. On the one hand, st. Augustine 
presents us with the conception of a radical split between the time before 
and after the Fall. On the other hand, Kant explores the issue of the Fall 
according to the rule of the "as if', that is according to the imaginary 
dimension that the "as if' conveys to such postulations as an allegedly 
pre-fallen state of humanity, etc. Thus, it seems to us that in the case of 
Kant, repetition acquires the form of functioning exclusively on the level 
of the individual's being-into-the world, whilst in the case of St. 
Augustine it is seen as functioning mainly -but not exclusively- on the 
level of cosmological time. Both thinkers can be seen as following, 
explicitly or implicitly, the strategy of attributing to history a merely 
hypothetical or "fantastic beginning", which made Kierkegaard wonder 
whether a condition such that of pre-fallen Adam had any actual 
currency for them. 
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2.1.1 St. Au~ustine & the possibility of time before the Fall 
st. Augustine's analysis of time and his radical separation of the 
time before and after the Fall, points to the extrapolation of a qualitative 
difference between Adam before the Fall and every subsequent 
individual. Thus, according to Kierkegaard, even a theological approach 
as such of st. Augustine86 , presupposes a "dialectical-fantastic" 
beginning: 
The history of the human race acquired a fantastic beginning. Adam was 
fantastically placed outside this history. Pious feeling and fantasy got what they 
demanded, a godly prelude, but thought got nothing."(CA: 25) 
Although Kierkegaard did not make at this point a direct reference to st. 
Augustine, quoting Aquinas's remark that "Adam lost donum divinitus 
datum supranaturale et admirable [a supernatural and wonderful gift 
bestowed by God],,(CA: 25), one has to remember that it was st. 
Augustine's analysis that brought forward what was to become later the 
cornerstone of Catholicism. Indeed, it was St. Augustine, in his attempt 
to oppose Pelagianism who stated that "in fallen man freedom to do good 
was completely annihilated; the grace of God is everything" (S. Rose 2000: 
601). In brief, Pelagians emphasise the importance and power of human 
K6 Kierkegaard characterises as "dialectical-fantastical presupposition" mainly Catholicism's 
presupposition. Although Augustine lived before the schism of the churches and as such we cannot 
consider him as a pure representative of Catholicism, we have to emphasise that he is considered among the 
Doctors of the Catholic Church and he was among the first to present us with a narrative like the one that 
Kierkegaard much later characterises as a dialectical-fantastical. 
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will. Thus, contrary to St. Augustine, Pelagianism starts "from a fiercely 
optimistic vision of our nature" since it recognises the possibility of 'good 
will' on the part of the human being (Cioran 1987: 108). Pelagius's 
fundamental claim concerns firstly the repudiation of the traditional 
doctrine of the original sin, arguing instead "[that) ... every man, like 
Adam before the Fall, is born without sin"B7. Secondly, it concerns the 
belief that the human being, unaided by the grace of God and by her 
pure free will, could comply to the commandments of God and "merit 
grace" (CA: 231 n.12 ; City: xiv). Moreover, the Pelagians, in St. 
Augustine's formulation, 
likewise assert that God's grace, given through faith in Christ, and which is 
neither the Law nor nature, has power only to remit past sins and does not help 
us avoid future sins or to overcome temptations (Grace: 279) 
Thus, the Pelagians are denying the help of God - except in the case of 
the remission of past sins- in the attempt of a human being to attain 
salvation. On the contrary, they put major emphasis on human will and 
on its sole journey towards redemption and salvation. Indeed, the centre 
X7 One has not to confuse Pelagius assertion regarding the pre-Adamic state of each human being and that 
of Kierkegaard's. We have already seen in the previous chapter that although Kierkegaard favours the 
notion of "qualitative difference" to the detriment of the quantitative one, he nevertheless does not forget to 
emphasise also the importance of the latter dimension of difference as well. If in qualitative difference the 
centre of gravity lies in the individual, then in quantitative difference it lies in the human race. This is 
evident in Kierkegaard's claim that "anxiety will be more reflective in a subsequent individual than in 
Adam, because the quantitative accumulation left behind by the race now makes itself felt in the 
individual" (CA: 52). Moreover, Kierkegaard has a clear stance against Pel agius, accusing him of leaving 
aside completely the dimension of "race" in his analysis: " ... man is individium and as such simultaneously 
himself and the whole race, and in such a way that the whole race participates in the individual and the 
individual in the whole race. If this is not heldfast, one will fall either into the Pelagian, Socinian, and 
philanthropic singular or into the fantastic" (CA: 28 -emphasis added). 
of their theology becomes the "human being" and its moral sufficiency. 
Although it is beyond our current interest to discuss in detail 5t. 
Augustine's controversy with Pelagius, we find quite interesting and 
useful for our further exploration to emphasise the importance that 5t. 
Augustine attributes to God's grace. 
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According to St. Augustine, grace is not given by God in proportion 
to human being's merit, as Pelagius has argued, since in that case it 
would no longer be called grace (Grace: 303). The cooperation of God in 
everyday human conduct is much more effective after the Fall. Thus, if 
before the Fall, there was in action a supernatural gift bestowed by God, 
then after the Fall everything radically changed and salvation was 
possible only through gratia cooperans. St. Augustine further 
distinguishes between gratia operans and gratia cooperans (Grace: 289, 
n.7). 
The former can be seen as the presupposition of the latter, or in 
other words, human being's will88 to act towards good is only possible in 
cooperation with God's89 grace, as the following passage makes plain: 
MH The problem of the origin of evil emerges at this point. How, is it possible for God to be responsible for 
every good act of our will, to give us the power to will and then not to be responsible for evil? Augustine 
replies in detail to this multidimensional and perplexing question. Augustine answers: "a perverse 
will. .. is the cause of evil". By "perverse will" he means a will that desires immoderately and as such it is 
synonymous with avarice and cupidity (Free Choice: 209-210). The relation of avarice with the Fall is 
evident, and makes Augustine speak of the avarice of the mind. As Alliez emphasises "it should be 
remembered ... that in Genesis original sin is that sin of the mind that consists in promoting the appetite for 
knowledge and, consequently, in turning away from God. It follows that according to the book of Genesis 
original sin is "avarice of the mind" (Alliez 1996: 269 n.1 00). 
M9 In order to overcome the issue of compatibility of freedom of the will and of God's intervention, 
Augustine claims that "the choice of the will, then, is genuinely free only when it is not subservient to 
faults and sins. God gave it that true freedom, and now that it has been lost, through its own fault, it can be 
restored only by him who had the power to give it at the beginning" (City XIV. c.ll: 569). This leads us to 
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God, then works in us, without our cooperation, the power to will, but once we 
Begin to will, and do so in a way that brings us to act, then it is that He 
cooperates with us. But if He does not work in us the power to will or does not 
cooperate in our act of willing, we are powerless to perform good works of a 
salutary nature (ibid: 289). 
The distinction between these two kinds of grace is analogous to the 
distinction that was made few sentences before by St. Augustine, namely 
the distinction of imperfect and perfect love (Grace: 289, n.7). By 
"imperfect" love he means the love that Peter showed to Christ when he 
denied him thrice, whilst "perfect" love is exemplified in John the 
Evangelist's saying that "there is no fear in love, but perfect love casts 
out fear" (ibid:288). QUite interestingly, St. Augustine considers the love 
that Peter expresses towards Christ when he declared "I will lay down my 
life for thee" as not yet "perfect love" but being still superior from 
"imperfect love" and indicating Peter's intention to "do what he had the 
will to do" (loc. Cit). Thus, the task to attain "perfect love" becomes for st. 
Augustine, almost impossible in the limits of the earthly city that is the 
the Augustinian concept of 'conversio'. Girard points to the peculiarity of the fact that Augustine did not 
use the tenn 'conversio' in his autobiographical text par excellence, that is his Confessions, but he used it 
only in The City of God, when he speaks about "Satan's efforts to prevent us from achieving our conversion 
to the true God" (Girard 1999: 37). Girard further shows that in the classical [Christian] view conversion 
"is not something of our doing but the personal intervention of God in our lives". Because of that Christian 
"conversio" is not a circular phenomenon as the latin etymology of the tenn and its pagan significations 
suggest, but it rather points to a 'linear open-ended phenomenon' that "is moving toward a totally 
unpredictable future" (ibid: 37). Leibniz converges with Augustine at this point, as it is evident in the 
following words: "For Conversion is purely the work of God's grace, wherein man co-operates only by 
resisting it", whilst he lives open the space for speaking of 'lesser' or 'greater' degree of co-operation when 
he clarifies that " ... human resistance is more or less great according to the persons and the occasions" 
(Theodicy: 69). We will see the affinities of Christian "conversio" and Pagan 'conversio" with 
Kierkegaard's 'repetition' and 'recollection' in our fourth chapter. 
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city of men. The origin of the earthly city is not to be found in Adam90 
and Eve, but in their son Cain, whilst Abel, who is considered by the 
author as a "pilgrim" did not find another91 earthly city, for "the City of 
the saints is up above, although it produces citizens here below, and in 
their persons the City is on pilgrimage until the time of its kingdom 
comes" (City XV ch.2: 596). Thus, for St. Augustine the attainment of 
"perfect" love and the consequent absolute abandonment of self-love92 is 
a tentative process, a pilgrimage that can not bring forth the 
reconciliation of those two Cities, and of cosmic and human time within 
the limits of temporality and historical existence. 
According to St. Augustine, the cosmic93 time of creation is not the same 
time in which the human beings exist and which they experience daily. 
The latter time is "not God's but humanity's since the latter rejects God's 
time as the time of the world" (Alliez 1996: 98). 
90 Although, if we want to be more precise, we have to notice also that for Augustine the human origin of 
the two cities is to be found in the first-man, that is Adam, since it is him that represents the beginning of 
all mankind. Thus, "in this first-created man we find something like the beginning, in the human race, of 
the two cities; their beginnings, that is, in the foreknowledge of God, though not in observable fact" (City 
XII ch.27: 508). 
91 As it is the case with the twin brothers Remus and Romulus. Augustine considers their quarell as being 
an exemplification of the division inside the earthly city. On the other hand, Abel and Cain "did not both 
entertain the same ambition for earthly gains." (City XV Ch 6: 600). 
<)2 The different kinds of love that correspond to the two cities is clear in the following: "The earthly city 
was created by self-love reaching the point of contempt for God, the Heavenly City by the love of God 
carried as far as contempt of self. In fact, the earthly city glories in itself, the Heavenly City glories in the 
Lord" (City XIV ch.28: 593). 
93 In the Citr of God Augustine refers to the simultaneous creation of cosmos and of time, emphasising that 
the cosmos was created with time and not in time for the latter implies a creation taking place in a specific 
point of time, that being measured in terms of before or after a length of time. (City XI ch.6 :296) 
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In other words, that time is 
that of human beings, who, since the fall of the angel and the twin sins of Adam 
and Cain at the origins of the earthly city, put self-love in opposition to the love 
of God, by turning [their will} away from immutable and universal good and 
towards [their own} particular good (Alliez 1996: 98). 
The introduction of sin into the world either in the form of the original 
sin as described by St. Augustine or as the almost inexplicable 
subsequent qualitative leaps following Adam's first leap as described by 
Kierkegaard, points towards the problem of the transition from cosmic 
time to historical94 time. In Alliez's formulation 
94 Mircea Eliade nicely elaborates the consequences of this split between history and cosmology in his 
study The Myth of the eternal return: Cosmos and history. What for Eliade 
is one of the fundamental concepts of the "archaic societies"( The question of whether Eliade's distinction 
between archaic and modem societies and more specifically his conception of a pre-Socratic(or traditional) 
man(Eliade 1991 : x) can be justified is beyond the scope of our presentation. It seems though that Eliade 
follows Nietzsche's perception of Socrates as the first "theoretical man") is their "revolt against concrete, 
historical time, their nostalgia for a periodical return to the mythical time of the beginning of things ... " 
(Eliade 1991: ix). One of the common features of most of these societies is that not only their rituals but 
everyday life situations are acts of recreation, of repetition of the primordial act, or in other words "[of] the 
transformation of chaos into cosmos by the divine act of creation"(ibid: 1 0). Through that act of repetition, 
these societies were "granted freedom each year to begin a new, a pure existence, with virgin possibilities" 
(ibid: 157). On the contrary, the modem man affords "the type neither of a free being nor of a creator of 
history"(loc.Cit). This is, according to Eliade, mainly because Christianity, the religion of modem man 
(that being the historical man), introduces not only a linear/continuous conception of time (instead of a 
cyclical one) but also a new category, that of faith. 
Consequently, "Since what is involved is a religious experience wholly different from the traditional 
experience, since what is involved is faith, Christianity translates the periodic regeneration of the world into 
a regeneration of the human individual (ibid: 128) ... for the Christian too, history can be regenerated, by and 
through each individual believer, even before the Saviour's second coming, when it will utterly cease for 
all Creation"(ibid: 130). 
Not only in Christianity but also in Judaism and in Iranian religion, there are still reminiscences of the 
archaic periodic regeneration of the world. The argument runs, that those religions share a common feature 
in that although they "have limited the duration of the cosmos to some specific number of millennia and 
affirm that history will finally cease in ilIo tempore, there still survive certain traces of the ancient doctrine 
of the periodic regeneration of history"(Eliade 1991 : 130). 
Specifically, in Christianity history can also be abolished and renewed numerous times "before the final 
eschaton is realized". In conclusion, the author states that: " ... the Christian liturgical year is based upon a 
periodic and real repetition of the Nativity, Passion, death, and Resurrection of Jesus, with all that this 
mystical drama implies for a Christian; that is, personal and cosmic regeneration through reactualization in 
concreto of the birth, death and resurrection of the Saviour" (Ioc. Cit). Nevertheless, one could point to 
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... with sin, time becomes the number of a "violent" motion, one that is forced 
and no longer natural, the movement of a will that moves away from God- and 
everything is as if carried away by the fleeting moment, and things flow like the 
rush of a torrent. .. The irreversibility of time, which turns sin into the engine of 
history, dates from the fall (Alliez 1996: 99). 
Thus, this perfect cosmos that God created does not exist anymore, and 
as Kierkegaard cries out in exasperation: 
Happy the person who saw the world in all its perfection when everything was 
still very good; happy the person who with God was witness to the glory of 
creation ... (EUD: 62) 
Thus, in the case of St. Augustine, one can possibly apply the category of 
repetition solely to God's95 creative activity, to the action of his free will 
as belonging solely to "his substance96" to create a perfect cosmos. At 
the end of Genesis we read: "And God saw everything that he had made, 
another form of repetition, which remains unnoticed by Eliade in his account of the forms that repetition 
acquires in Christianity, that being the repetition of the primordial act of creation in Genesis. 
95 Although the application of the categories of repetition, recollection and hope to God points to an 
anthropomorphic perception of divinity one can understand them via eminentiae (in a higher sense). Even 
in that case one has to perceive them not as being attributes of God but as aspects of his will's revelation. 
We have already seen that hope and recollection were the two choices that according to Kierkegaard God 
had if "he had not willed repetition". In Kierkegaard's thought, there are essentially two kinds of illusion 
that are hope and recollection. As he characteristically comments, "the adolescent's illusion is that of 
hope" and "that of the adult recollection" (SUD: 89). God would never have followed the path of hope, 
which for Kierkegaard is a superfluous path in which the "uneasy adventurousness of discovery" is pre-
eminent (ibid: 131). If one takes into consideration that independently of any approval of the doctrine of 
pre-destination, the Christian theologians seem to agree on God'sforesight then the possibility of hope is 
excluded for God has nothing new to discover. See for 
example St. Augustine's Confessions: "For ifin God any new development took place and any new 
intention, so as to make a creation which he had never made before, how then can there be a true eternity in 
which a will, not there previously, comes into existence? For God's will is not a creature, but is prior to 
the created order, since nothing would be created unless the Creator's will preceded it" ( Confessions: XI x 
(12) p. 228). For Kierkegaard, the possibility of recollection is also excluded, for recollection is a 
movement backwards towards the eternal which lies "behind as the past that can only be entered 
backwards" (CA: 90). But if one wishes to take seriously this consideration, one has to see it as being 
relevant to the question "What was God doing before he made heaven and earth? If he was 
unoccupied ... and doing nothing, why does he not always remain the same for ever, just as before creation 
he abstained from work?"( Confessions XI x (12): 228). But, even the utterance of this question implies the 
imposition of the categories of the infinite succession of time (past, present, future) to God, and this renders 
the question impossible both for Augustine( Confessions: xi( 13): 228ff) and Kierkegaard(CA: 81 ff). 
96 In his Confessions Augustine explicitly claims that God's will "belongs to his very substance" 
(Confessions XI x (12): 228). 
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and, behold, it was very good ... " It could be said of biblical time that it 
follows a repetitive pattern either in the form of the repetition97 of the day 
one of the creation or in the form of the repeated sequence "And the 
evening and the morning ... " that accompanies the days of the creation. 
I am using the term repetitive pattern in order to differentiate it from a 
purely cyclical98 pattern and consequently to avoid any possible 
confusion. 
In opposition to all accounts that consider Christianity as introducing a 
purely linear99 conception of time, one can juxtapose the possibility of an 
alternative account of the story of creation where the role of repetition 
could be pivotal. More specifically, this could be traced in one of st. 
Basil's writings entitled «E~aTHlf:poV » (the six days), which is a series of 
nine sermons on the day of creation. 
97 Although in Augustine one cannot find an explicit reference to the repetitive aspect of the biblical time, 
for he speaks of time as a variable movement of the arrangement of the days of the creation (City Xl.ch.6: 
296). It has also be argued that Augustine, in his book The literal meaning of Genesis, even suggests (but 
not insist on that suggestion) that" the days of creation were not periods of time but a literary device to 
describe the angels contemplating all the works of creation, which in reality occurred totally in one instant" 
(S. Rose 2000: 102 n *). On the contrary, St. Basil offers an elaborate analysis on the issue in question in 
his book Heaximeron. 
9~ Augustine repudiates any cyclical theory of time, especially, if it is to be seen as a "cyclical theory of the 
world's history" after the Fall. Augustine sees it as a burden of the soul that is almost obliged to alternate 
its state from misery to happiness and conversely. Indeed, the cycles of ages are unable, for Augustine, "to 
rescue the immortal soul from this merry-go-round, even when it has attained wisdom; it must proceed on 
an unremitting alternation between false bliss and genuine misery" (City XII ch.14: 487). Interestingly 
enough, the cyclical conception of time after the Fall, is not considered as the best possible path not only 
for the official Christianity but also for most of the Gnostics. As one can see in Hoeller's (2001) Jungian 
account of Gnosticism, the Gnostic soul is imprisoned by the aions in a cyclical wheel on earth that makes 
them inert and passive and make them forget their origin. 
99 For example, Mircea Eliade emphasises that the Christian conception of time is linear, and he points to 
its first being outlined by St. Irenaeus of Lyon (2nd century) and its being "taken up again by St. Basil and 
St. Gregory and be finally elaborated by St. Augustine"(Eliade 1991 : 144). Contrary to this assumption, 
one has to pay attention to the fact that it is exactly in St. Basil that one can find both a linear and a cyclical 
conception of time. 
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Just few pages before the end of the second speech, St.Basil is 
commenting on the day one lOD(ll-ta) of the creation, which is described in 
Genesis as follows: 
And God said. let there be light; and there was light. And God saw the light. that 
it was good; and God divided the light from the darkness. And God called the 
light Day and the darkness he called Night. And the evening and the morning 
were the first day [day one-THlEpCX ~lcxllOl. 
The question arises: Why is the text referring to the first day as day one 
(/lta) of the creation and not simply as the first (1tpco'TIl) day of an event 
which will be completed in seven days? Day one (ll-ta) , a unique day 
among the others, not simply the prior one in temporal or in hierarchical 
terms, but the day where time came into play, the day which repeats 
itself, which leaves and returns in itself seven times (Le. in a week's 
duration). And because of this cyclical (A vaKUKAoucr8at) movement, the 
day one, the head of time as St. Basil calls it, resembles eternity (aHova): 
0)<; ap a 0 TI1v 'tou Xpovou <l>UOlV Ka'tacrK£ucra<; 8£0<; !l£'tpa au'tO) Ka <JTl!l£la 'ta 'to)V ll!l£P 
O)v £1t£~aA£ ()lacrTI1/la'ta, Kal £~()o/la()l au'tov £K/l£'tpO)V, aa TI1v £~()o/la()a £1<; £auTI1v av 
al('\.)1(Aoucr9al. KEA£UH, 
£~ap19/loucrav 'tou Xpovou TI1v Klvll<JTlv. TllV £~()o/la()a ()£ 1taAlV £K1tAllPOUV TI1v TJf.1Epav 
IlIa, 
100 Philo of Alexandria also emphasises the pre-eminence of day one: " ... a measure of time was forthwith 
brought about, which its maker called Day, and not first day but one, an expression due to the uniqueness 
of the intelligible world, and to its having therefore a natural kinship to the number One"(Philo's On the 
creation IX 33-36: 27). Thus, as Philo claims, whilst the Creator assigned to each day "some of the portions 
of the whole", he names the very first day, day one for He "discerned in it and expressed by the title which 
He gives it the nature and appellation of the unit or the one" (ibid III 14-17: 15). Moreover, "day one" is 
conceived by Philo as the God-like prototype, or the "seal" in God's mind, according to which the rest of 
the days are brought into the fore (ibid: IV 16-17: 15). 
10lKat Et1tEV 0 eEOC; )'Ev1l8TrCW <\>wc; Kat E)'EVE'W <\>wc;. Kat £tbEV 0 eEOC; 'to <\>WC;. on KCXAOV, Kat blEXW 
plaE 0 eEOC; avcx ~EO'OV 'tou <\>W'tOC; Kat avcx ~Eaov 'tou O'KO'tOUC;. Kat EKcxAEaEv 0 eEOC; 'to <\>WC; TWEP 
av Kat 'to 
aKO'tOC; EKaAEaEV vuX'tcx. Kat E)'EV£'tO EanEpa Kat E)'EVE'tO TCpWl , 'lfiEpa fila 
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£1rraKlr; aVrTJr; £lr; £avrTJv avacyrp£(povcyav, rovro & l\V.10tZKOV £CYTI ro CYXllfla, a¢ £avrov 
apX£c:JBaz KaZ £zcy£avrov KaraAllY£zv. 0 t5ll KaZ rov aUOVOr; zt5Z0v, £lr; £avrov avacyrp£¢£l 
v KaZ flll t5af.10v 1C£parovCYBal. Ltza rovrov rTJV K£¢aAllv rov XPOVOV OVXl lfp{J)rTJV llfl£pa a 
A.Aa Jizav oV0f.1acy£ zva Kaz £K rTJ{j] lfpoCYlJyopzar; ro cyv'}%v£r; £~ll lfpOr; roy aZ{J)va. 102 
(St.Basil : Second speech 96 p.42-3) 
So, the prominence of the dayl03 one is evident, for it is exactly this 
image (£lKova)104 of eternity that moves the person into an experience of 
the future life, while this day will repeat itself eternally. What is more 
interesting is that 5t. Basil does not make a hint that this eternal 
repetition of this day will cease after "the final eschaton is realized 105". 
102 "God, the creator of the nature of time, put measures and signs of time's measurement the intervals 
(diastemata) of days. Measuring time by the week, he orders that the week should constantly recycle in 
itself, so as to count the movement of time. The week is fulfilled by the day one, for the latter returns to 
itself seven times; for the pattern (schema) is cyclical, starting from itself and leading to itself. This is also 
the characteristic of the aion, namely to return to itself and never come to an end [or alternatively - and 
have no limits]. For that reason, he called the head of time day one and not first day. So that even its name 
would denote its affinity to the aion" (my translation). 
103 On the contrary, St. Augustine dissociates the 'notion of day from any cosmological support" (Alliez 
1996: 11 1). 
104 There are two meanings of the Greek word EtKOVU. The one has its roots in the ancient greek language 
and the other in the biblical one as a translation of the Hebraic word celem. The first meaning is analogical 
and is etymologically deriving from the verb EtKW, WOtKU. It means image, copy, presentation, or 
analogical representation of the form. By contrast, the second meaning has different connotations. It means 
emergence, coming-into-being, representation, and equality in relationship orland substitution. So, it is 
argued that the second meaning preserves a living, active relationship, that it is a aXEcrTl Aoyrnvbetween the 
two parts while the first is more static and it more or less exhausts itself in a formal and logical correlation 
between the two terms (Yannaras 1988: 77 n.2; See also W. Eichord, Theologie des Alten Testaments. Teil 
2/3, Stuttgart 1961, p.79). This is all the more evident if one takes into account the word aUyyEvEtu that St. 
Basil uses in order to express this relationship. It is also of utmost importance to clarify that when St. Basil 
is referring to OOWV, he does not identify it with God who is eternal (UUOVto<;) but he means by this term 
the created mwvE<;(for an elaborated analysis on this issue see Matsoukas Dogmatics and Symbolic 
Theology 1985 : 180-193). One has also to consider with caution the similarities and dissimilarities 
between St. Basil's use of the term and Plato's one in Timaeus that reads: "The nature of the living Being 
was eternal, and it was not possible to bestow this attribute fully on the created universe; but he determined 
to make a moving image of eternity, and so when he ordered the heavens he made in that which we call 
time an eternal moving image of eternity which remains for ever at one (Timaeus 37de). 
105 He only names as the eighth day, the day of the kingdom of God which lies beyond the weekly 
measured time (ST.Basil : Exaimeros B44). It is interesting that Nicholas Berdyaev calls the "eighth day" 
"the Third Epoch". Berdyaev could see the coming of a time when our creative potential will be more 
developed. We will then be in a position to collaborate with God to re-create the world (Internet 
Berdyaev's home page; httpllmembers.xoom.comldirkklberdyaevlbp.htm). Thus, "in the religion of the 
Spirit, the religion of freedom, everything ... will be founded, not upon judgment and recompense, but on 
creative development and transfiguration, on likeness to God". (Berdyaev 1947: 222) 
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The final eschaton that is the second coming of Christ is the 
consequence of the Fall of Adaml06. But how could one say with 
certainty that an event which is posterior to the act of creation, can 
determine the future of the creation? Were one willing to admit this, one 
would face the danger of assuming that the life of a human person is pre-
destined from eternity, thereby annihilating any notion of human 
freedom. 
106 By this we do not mean to ask a question such as "What if Adam had not sinned?", a question that 
Kierkegaard himself would never want us to ask. Under one of his pseudonyms, Kierkegaard warns us: 
"Were I allowed to make a wish, then I would wish that no reader would be so profound to ask: What if 
Adam had not sinned? In the moment actuality is posited, possibility walks by its side as a nothing that 
entices every thoughtless man. If only science could make up its mind to keep men under discipline and to 
bride itselt~"(C A: 50). On the other hand, St. Augustine writes mercilessly "Ifhe had not been a man ... he 
[Christ] could not have been to death" (Alliez 1996:94). 
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2.1.2. Human or psychological time in St. Augustine 
After the Fall, God's activity is still present but has a different 
nature, or in other words, it alters - according to the theologians of the 
late Augustinian school- from gratia versatilis ("inefficacious grace) into 
gratia eificax107 ("efficacious grace"). The former "was sufficient for man 
in the state of innocence" whilst the latter "is necessary for man after the 
Fall" (Grace: 289, n.7). 
St. Augustine seems to deny any objective definition or measurement of 
time as it is exemplified in an ascription of time to "the movements of 
sun, moon, and stars" (Confessions XI xxiii (29): 237). He denies the 
connection between physical movement and time developed by Aristotle, 
according to whom "time is neither movement nor independent of 
movement ... For time is just this - number of motion in respect of before 
and after'(Physics 219a2&219b; Ricoeur 1988: 15-6). St. Augustine's108 
anxiety to distinguish between the time before the Fall and the 
subsequent time of the decay pOints to an exclusion of the physical 
reality concerning the analysis of time and to a development of a purely 
107 Augustine himself also uses similar terminology when he speaks of the "efficacious power" of God 
upon our will (Grace: 287). 
ION According to Ricoeur, Augustine's perception of time is aporetic and it does not exclude completely any 
notion of cosmology. As he points out: "Augustine has no other resource when it comes to the 
cosmological doctrines than to oppose them the time of a mind that distends itself. This mind has to be that 
of an individual soul but by no means that of a world soul. Yet his meditation on the beginning of Creation 
leads Augustine to confess that time itself had a beginning along with created things. This time must be 
that of every creature, therefore, in a sense that cannot be explicated within the framework of the doctrine 
in Book XI of the Confessions. a cosmological time ... In short, the physical definition of time by itself is 
incapable of accounting for the psychological conditions for the apprehension of this time" (Ricoeur 1988: 
244). For Alliez the Augustinian aporia as developed by Ricoeur vanishes as soon as "the split between 
original-Adamic time and the derived time of the Fall, between the time of creation and the time of the 
de('(/I' is taken into account"(Alliez 1996: 127). 
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psychological conception of it. In this account, past, present and future 
would not be admitted an objective reality in themselves. Neither the 
past can be for "it is not now present", nor the future can be since it "is 
not yet present" (Corifessions xiv (17): 230). In addition, although among 
them only the present can be, this is also an untenable position, for as 
long as you try to catch the present it has become already past, while 
what "remains to it is future". St. Augustine concludes that "If we can 
think of some bit of time which cannot be divided into even the smallest 
instantaneous moments, that alone is what we can call present"(ibid: xv 
(20): 232-emphasis added). He nevertheless, confesses that although he 
cannot give a definite answer to the question of time, at least he knows 
that wherever the past and the future are, "they are not there as future 
or past, but as present". Thus, the soul is considered to be endorsed 
with the three abovementioned aspects, which are then described in the 
following manner: " ... the present considering the past is the memory, the 
present considering the present is immediate awareness, the present 
considering the future is expectation"(ibid: XI xix (25): 235). 
Consequently, the perception of time becomes solely subject to personal 
experience, for the memory109 and the expectations llO of each person 
109 It has to be noted that Augustine does not provide us with a radical theory of memory as for example 
Philo (see next chapter), but he rather uses the term in its everyday usage. 
110 For Kierkegaard, the distinction between past, present and future cannot be possible if "it is considered 
to be implicit in time itself' (CA: 85). In his words: "Ifin the infinite succession of time a foothold could 
be found, i.e., a present, which was the dividing point, the division would be quite correct. However, 
precisely because every moment, as well as the sum of the moments, is a process (a passing by), no 
moment is a present, and accordingly there is in time neither present, nor past, nor future" (Ioc. cit). 
Kierkegaard seems also to disregard Augustine's solution of time as present past, present, and present 
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differ radically. Time is defined as a distentio1l1 of the soul, while this 
experience of "the spreading out of the soul in successiveness and in 
diverse directions is a painful and anxious experience, so that [one can 
speak] ... of salvation as deliverance of time" (Chadwick 1992: 240, n.27). 
Consequently, parallel to the perception of distentio as "the natural 
movement of the soul after the original sin", and its dialectical relation 
with intentiol12 and extentio, St. Augustine attributes to the latter two 
notions also spiritual/theological potentialities. 
future, with the help of memory and expectation. Accordingly: "Ifit is claimed that this division[past, 
present, future] can be maintained, it is because the moment is spatialized, but thereby the infinite 
succession comes to a halt, it is because representation is introduced that allows time to be represented 
instead of being thought. Even so, this is not correct procedure, for even as representation, the infinite 
succession of time is an infinitely contentless present (this is a parody of the eternal)."(ibid: 85-6). 
III The history ofdistentio is long but as Alliez argues, the originality of Augustine's contribution consists 
in that he offers us specifically a "psychological theory of time". On the contrary, accounts similar to St. 
Gregory of Nyssa's account of diastema, memory and time "can easily be found in all the great Greek 
philosophers, historians, or poets -who were not more ignorant of linear time than of the unique capacity of 
humans to project themselves into past and future" (Alliez 1996: Ill). Furthermore, Alliez- discussing St. 
Gregory - adds that it "should be remembered that the metaphysical time of universal distention would 
become psychological only in the sense that humans would become conscious of it" (Loc. Cit). St. 
Gregory of Nyssa perceived time as a "truly universal diastema that becomes self-conscious in man" and to 
some extent he perceives it "as the mark of the creation as creation". On the other hand, Alliez remarks 
that while the notion of diastema tends to be for St.Gregory of Nyssa "synonymous with the condition of 
being a creature, be it a spiritual one (perfection does not consist in escaping distention but in following a 
distention continuous with a high order), in his commentary on the Song of Songs Gregory is led to assert 
that the diastema is a consequence of the fall of man" (Alliez 1996: Ill). Although it has be suggested that 
St.Gregory of Nyssa collapses into an "unconscious lapse into Plotinian views"(loc.cit) or relapse to an 
Augustian conception of time, this is arguably not the case if one takes into account the distinction between 
God's ousia and God's energeia (for a detailed analysis on this distinction see Lossky's The Mystical 
theology of the Eastern church. Taking this into account, time and in St. Gregory's case diastema. can be 
seen as an exemplification of the relation between God's energeia and His creature. Then, one can 
understand time as a continuous questioning of the relation of a human being with God, that being similar 
to a "measurement" of human's existential failure or success in accomplishing this relationship (Yannaras 
1988:351-355). More explicitly, Staniloae argues in a similar vein that time should neither be seen as a 
fallen state, nor as he characteristically says "a sin against eternity". Quite to the contrary, time is set to 
carry "within itself the possibility of eternity which can be realised in communion with God by his grace". 
Eternity for Staniloae is Life, and "life is movement". Indeed, God is not to be seen as an unmoved being 
since in that case -and at this point Staniloae agrees with Karl Barth- "God is to be dead" (Staniloae 2001 : 
2-3). So, diastema or time is to be conceived as being for God "the interval of waiting between knocking at 
our door and the moment when we will open it to wide to him" (Staniloae 2001: 5). 
112 The dialectics of distentio (stretching out of the soul), intentio (as gathering together of past, future and 
present) and cx/cntio (soul's extension/ its ecstatic experience) points to a psychological analysis, that being 
to the thesis of "praesens intentio. of the present intention that makes the future pass into the past and 
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More specifically: 
The soul reaching toward God, fixing its attention-intention on the eternal, is 
unified and extended beyond itself; it grows larger and makes itself 
greater ... Only the purpose {intentioj that proceeds from faith is the right one; only 
the gathering together of the inner man identified with intentio allows the soul 
torn to shreds by distentio to be reunited by bringing it back to God (Alliez 1996: 
109; De Trinitate IX, 1, l). 
Thus, for st. Augustine there is hope for the human being to return to 
God, and this hope is projected in the future. Intentio and Extentio are 
the vehicles of this conversion and the future is not seen as synonymous 
with distentio, that being solely as expectatiojuturorum, but as extentio 
ad superiora. It follows that the future is not conceived in accordance 
with its common everyday perception of it, but simultaneously as a hope 
of liberation of the human being from the burdens of time and a 
disruption of time in time. 
The impossibility of reconciling biblical with fallen time even with the 
introduction of theological time ( in the guise of intentio, extentio, hope of 
return to god, etc) is nonetheless evident provided that theological and 
fallen time are seen as interconnected ontologically after the Fall and 
therefore it is impossible to separate them completely. 
This explains why, as Alliez argues, there was "but one way of attaining 
the supreme ecstasy: by separating, once and for all, these two axes of 
confers onto the present an enlarged sense" (Alliez 1996: 1 09; Confessions xxii(28)&xxviii(38): 
.236&243). But intentio and extentio have also theological connotations as the following passage shows: 
H ••• leaving behind the old days I might be gathered to follow the One,forgetting the past and moving not 
towards those future things which are transitory but to the things that are before me, not stretched out 
[distentio] in distraction but extended [extentio] in reach, not by being pulled apart but by concentration 
[intentio r (Confessions XI xxix (39): 244). 
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time, so as to leave only the totally pure; and that was by death" (Alliez 
1996 : 107). 
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2.2 Kant. History & The Fall 
Kant famously wrote his essay Conjectures on the Beginning of Human 
History in an attempt to attack Herder's view on the same matter, namely 
on the interpretation of the book of Genesis. Although an explicit 
reference to Herder is poignantly missing, Kant still manages to show in 
an ironic manner that by interpreting "the origins of mankind as a 
narration along biblical lines, it is possible to arrive at the opposite 
conclusion from that drawn by Herder in the tenth book of the Ideas" 
(ReiSS 1991: 196). 
Kant sketches a hypothetical narrative of human history, a narrative that 
pays certain attention to the very first steps of human beings on earth. 
Although Kant offers an adequate -in logical terms- account of Adam's 
fall, he arguably fails to expand it beyond the boundaries of ethics. 
Furthermore, Kant dares to admit that his narrative is a hypotheticaP13 
one, implying that the biblical story of the Fall can be simply seen as an 
educative myth. 
He justifies his choice to ascribe a conjectural character to this narrative 
by argUing that such a history, namely one encapsulating the "first 
development of freedom from its origin as a predisposition in human 
113 It seems that according to Haufniensis, Kant is among those thinkers that solved the difficulties that 
thought met in its encounter with the problem of the relation between Adam's sin and hereditary sin in a 
peculiar way. Thus, as Haufniensis explains, thought "in order to explain at least something, a fantastic 
presupposition was introduced, the loss of which constituted the fall as the consequence. The advantage 
gained thereby was that everyone willingly admitted that a condition such as the one described was not 
found anywhere in the world, but that they forgot that as a result the doubt became a different one. namely, 
whether such a condition ever had existed, something that was quite necessary in order to lose it" (CA: 25). 
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nature" is something different from history based on historical records 
and facts (CBH: 221). Thus, in this "mere pleasure trip", Kant is offering 
his version of the biblical myth of the Fall from Paradise, using for this 
purpose "the wings of imagination - although not without the gUidance of 
experience as mediated by reason" (CBH: 222). The employment of 
Reason is of crucial importance since with its help the narration would 
not only amount to a mere invention 114 but it could additionally be 
deduced by experience under the assumption that "what was 
experienced at the beginning of history was no better or worse than what 
is experienced now" (ibid:221). Furthermore, the very beginning of 
human history is not conceived in terms of "an origin in time" but rather 
in terms of an "origin in reason". According to Kant, if it had been 
conceived as an origin in time, that is if we focused on its "occurrence" 
and hence on its relation "as an event to its first cause in time", then we 
would have ascribed to ourselves the contradictory task to "seek the 
temporal origin of free acts as such". Kant formulates more explicitly the 
contradictory status of this conception in the following manner: 
114 Although Kant insists that his narrative, as a conjecture, should not be seen as a "serious activity but 
merely as an exercise in which the imagination, supported by reason, may be allowed to indulge as a 
healthy mental reaction"(CBH:221) and because of this it cannot be compared with a genuine historical 
account. Philo of Alexandria, one ofthe eminent proponents of the allegorical interpretation of the Bible, 
proposes a different account, one that in our opinion falls under the category of "myth" proper in 
Kierkegaard's distinction(see previous chapter) whilst the Kantian one is to be seen as a "myth of 
understanding". Philo, in his book On the Account of the World's creation given my Moses, reinforces 
Plato's account on Timaeus of "Et KrU't a ~u8o", arguing that although only God knows the true cause 
(aA1l8£<J'tcHllv at'ttav) behind the creation, one has not to conceal the cause "which by probable 
conjecture seems plausible and reasonable 
(tTJv () £lKO'tt <J'toxa<J~.u:u m8avTlv Kat EUAOYOV EtVat ()OKOU<Jav OUK (X1WKPU1t'tEOV)" (Philo On the 
crcation XXIV 72-73). 
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It is also a contradiction to seek the temporal origin of man's moral character, so 
far as it is considered as contingent, since this character signifies the ground of 
the exercise of freedom; this ground (like the determining ground of the free will 
generally) must be sought in purely rational representations (Religion:35) 
Thus, it becomes evident that history's origin in time does not playa great 
role in Kant's narrative, whilst its origin in reason115 focusing on the 
"existence of the effect" is vested with utmost significance. (Religion: 34). 
Kant, in an effort to avoid an excess of imagination that could lead his 
thought into "wild conjectures", begins his venture with "something 
which human reason cannot deduce from prior natural causes-that is, 
with the existence of human beings" (CBH: 222). 
Kant's approach of the very beginning of human history as not having an 
"origin in time" reminds us of a similar account by Aquinas, although the 
latter thinker refers mainly to the creation of the world and not 
specifically to the first beginning of human history. Whilst it is not our 
intention to undermine the important difference in scope between the 
two thinkers, we would like to express our feeling that Aquinas's 
introduction of the "imaginary" element in the understanding of creation 
squares with Kant's emphasis on the dimension of "as if' (as we have 
already seen) and to the centrality he attributes to reason against time in 
his account. This is more evident if we look at the first antinomy in the 
Critique of Pure Reason. where Kant shows the conflict that arises if a 
115 Kant argues that even the manner of presentation in the Scriptures agrees with his line of tho~g~t: "Th~ 
foregoing agrees well with that manner of presentation which the Scriptures use, whereby the ongm of evtl 
in the human race is depicted as having a [temporal] beginning, this beginning being presented in a 
narrative, wherein what in its essence must be considered as primary (without regard to the element of 
time) appears as coming first in time" (Religion :37). 
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transcendental idea is conceived not as a regulative principle but as a 
constitutive principle. Thus, the idea of "absolute completeness of the 
composition of the given whole of all appearances", if it is treated as a 
"constitutive" principle results to the following antinomy: "The world has 
a beginning in time, and is also limited as regards space" versus 'The 
world has no beginning, and no limits in space; it is infinite as regards 
both time and space" (CPR: B443&A426/B454: 390&396). Interestingly 
enough, Aquinas in his attempted refutation of the argument that 
opposes the Christian understanding of "creation ex nihila" and which 
sees creation as a sort of change, argues that such a position cannot be 
maintained since Aristotle does not include creation among the six kinds 
of change and also because a baSic feature of change is that the extremes 
"have to have something in common" and this does not happen in the 
case of creation. He further explains the different ways in which two 
extremes can have something in common, i.e. a) to have an actually 
existent common subject, b) to have a potentially existent common 
SUbject, c) when there is no common subject but 
only a single continuous time in the first part of which one opposite exists and 
in the second part another, as when one thing is said to come after the other in 
the sense of coming after it like afternoon from morning and this is change not 
properly but metaphOrically .... (Aquinas: 258) 
Aquinas does not conceive creation to belong to any of these kinds of 
change, although, he opens up the space for an interesting imaginary 
conception of creation as change as the following passage indicates: 
... there is no common time, since before the world there was not time. The only 
thing in common is imaginary; a single common time imagined to exist before 
and after the world was made ... and for this reason creation truly and properly 
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speaking is not a change, though it can be imagined to be one, not properly but 
metaphorically'" (Aquinas : 258). 
This is best understood, if we look at the same text by Aquinas, where he 
makes a distinction between real and imaginary time, the latter being the 
time before the creation, the former the time after. In thinking the 
postulated transition of imaginary to real time, he furthermore argues 
that "the two moments [the first moment of being and the last moment of 
non-being] don't exist in the same time, since real and imaginary time 
are not continuous with one another" (ibid: 256). Although the problem 
of speaking of "time" before the creation occupied the mind of many 
Fathers of the Church, theologians or philosophers, who most of the time 
conclude that one has better not touch upon this issue since one can 
never know the answer, Aquinas, proposing "imaginary time', takes a 
step further. In the same way as Kant centurtes later, Aquinas refuses to 
leave the question regarding the time preceding creation open since he 
senses that this would inevitably lead reason into antinomies. In a sense 
then, the proposition of an imaginary time can be said to have a similar 
function to that of the Kantian antinomies, namely the delimitation of the 
range of questions to be 'legitimately' ascrtbed to the jurisdiction of 
reason. Consequently, the attrtbution of an imaginary character to a 
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period, event, etc, the urgency to "name1l6" the unknown, arguably 
conceals a tendency to hinder a further investigation of the question. 
Returning to the Kantian problematique concerning the 'existence 
of human beings', it has to be remarked that the first human being is 
conceived as being fully developed l17, and further as not being alone but 
having a partner 118. So, the first human beings forming a pair, are 
conceived by the philosopher as having the abilities to stand, move and 
speak "with the help of coherent concepts" that is to think (CBH: 222). It 
is important to note that Kant does not conceive those abilities, as being 
innate to the first human beings, for this would be tantamount to 
argUing that the abilities were inherited, which would not square with 
experience. Contrary to his understanding of Herder'S argument, that 
sees mankind as "had been given language and reason by a 
transcendental power", Kant claims that the first human beings acquire 
those abilities and skills by themselves (Reiss 1991: 196; CBH: 222). 
Nevertheless, it has to be clarified that Herder does not endorse the point 
of view according to which language has a divine origin. On the contrary, 
Herder insists that "it was not God who invented a language for man, but 
that man himself had to find a language by operating his own power" 
giving also as an example the same text (Le. Genesis) invoked by the 
supporters of the "divine origin" thesis (Herder 1986: 138). Thus, Adam 
116 Is this kind of naming that Benjamin, as we are going to see shortly, conceives as "naming" after the 
fall? 
117 • 
The reason bemg that they do not have any parents to support them (CBH: 222). 
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us, procreation has been secured. 
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and not God names l19 the animals, placing thus in Herder's view .. the 
origin of language in the human mind". It has to be remarked in this 
context that Herder follows here a long tradition pre d· g h· ce In 1m, 
exemplified for example by Philo120 of Alexandria and many others. 
119 Walter Benjamin emphasises also the importance of "naming". According to him, naming is 
characteristic of the human language (in its pre-Fallen state), although one has to bear in mind that "the true 
speculative condition of the discrete languages is the creative word of God which establishes the languages 
of things and animals as well as human language" (Caygill 1998: 19). Thus, in the first book of Genesis, 
God's word manifested itself: " ... the rhythm by which the creation of nature (in Genesis 1) is 
accomplished is: Let there be- He made (created) - He named ... language is therefore both creative and the 
finished creation, it is word and name. In God name is creative because it is word, and God's word is 
cognizant because it is name". So, Benjamin concludes that although "God made things knowable in their 
names ... man, however, names them according to knowledge" (Benjamin 1986: 322-323). Iflanguage 
denotes a communication of mental activity, in the case of a human being this happens in naming: "It is 
therefore the linguistic being of man to name things" (ibid: 317). Moreover, one has to be very careful 
since such a communication is reciprocal. The animals also communicate themselves since otherwise 
Adam could not communicate with them by naming them (loc. Cit). Thus, as Caygill claims, human 
language in Benjamin's understanding is not identical with language as such but 'remains ... a particular 
infinite linguistic surface whose limits are determined by translation". If the human being tries to exceed 
(as it is the case after the Fall) the limits that allow him either to translate "other languages into itself, or 
transform them by translating itself into other languages" and attempt to create names (after the Fal1, 
human language creates "spiritual essences"), then it denies "the otherness of different languages" and 
" ... introduces a damaging division between itself and the language of nature and God, as wel1 as one 
within itself'(Caygil1 1998: 19). 
120 In brief, for Philo, Adam who symbolises the mind, names the animals and this consists the beginning of 
language. According to him, the act of naming was widely conceived as the origin of language: " ... Greek 
philosophers said that those who first assigned names to things were wise men" (Philo Allegorical II.14-16: 
235). The prevalence of Moses' account over the ones that speak of wise men in general is that Adam 
symbolises the "one man" that was to bring about "harmony between name and thing ... as Adam was 
formed to be the beginning from which all others drew their birth, so too no other than he should be 
regarded as the beginning of the use of speech; for even language would not have existed, if there had not 
been names ... " (Philo Allegorical 11.14-16: 235). 
The symbolism of Philo seems to us really interesting. According to him, Adam symbolises the mind 
(nous) and Eve 'sense perception". In his interpretation of Genesis, Philo points out that God firstly 
announced to Adam that He was going to create a helper (~OlleO<;), to accompany him, and then before He 
created Eve, He asked Adam to name the animals. Why is it asks Philo that Moses inserts the paragraph 
presenting the naming of the animal, between God's announcement of the creation of Eve and the actual act 
of it? The answer is, according to Philo, that there are two species of a helper: "the one has its sphere in the 
passions, the other in the sense perception", wild beasts and Eve respectively. Both of them are helpers that 
"correspond" to Adam, and "sense-perception and passions are parts and offspring of one soul with it" 
(Philo Allegorical 11.8-11: 231). Although passions may well become the enemies of the mind, Philo points 
also to the good use of them; it may be the case that the naming of animals indicates a control of them by 
the mind (ibid: II 16-19:237). What seems strange to us is that although Philo uses the naming of the 
animals as representing a "helper" he did not emphasise language itself as such a helper. It might well be 
the case that Moses puts the emphasis on "language" when he speaks of the helpers of the first man and not 
to the animals. 
The second helper, the woman, representing sense-perception is a proper helper since according to Philo 
"heasts ... are not properly called our helpers, but by a straining of language" (ibid: 11.8-11: 231) .. Thus, 
after the naming of the animals God repeats the same phrase he said immediately before the nammg: 
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Thus, for Herder the development of language in the case of the human 
beings is "both essential and natural" (Herder 1986: 161) although the 
thinker admits that one cannot philosophise on "the first moments of 
reasoning and self-direction" since they must "have been governed 121 by 
creative Providence". He furthermore explains that 
It is ... not the task of philosophy to explain the supernatural of these moments, 
just as philosophy is not in a position to explain man's creation; it accepts him 
in the state in which he can first act voluntarily, when he enjoys for the first 
time the exuberance of a healthy existence; and it thus interprets these 
situations on a purely human basis (Herder 1986: 155). 
Indeed, both Herder and Kant start their analysis "with the existence of 
human beings" but they have different perspectives as regard the skills 
that the first human beings have. 
Since Kant is mainly interested in the development of the human 
being "from the ethical point of view", he is not really keen in providing 
us with an explanation concerning the path that the first human beings 
followed in order to acquire those skills, that furthermore presuppose the 
presence of reason122 (ibid: 223). He only assumes that in the very 
..... but for Adam there was not found an help meet for him" (Genesis H.20) and He created the woman 
(whose name was given by Adam once again). God put Adam in a sleeping state (is it not reminiscent of 
Kierkegaard's reference to the dreaming state of Adam), and then He took one of Adam's sides and created 
the woman. Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the close connection and cooperation 
of mind and sense-perception, it seems important to refer to Philo's remark that in the everyday usage 
(~tO~)of the language, side was synonymous with "strength", indicating in a sense the unbreakable unity of 
mind and sense-perception (ibid: 11.25-28: 243). 
121 Maybe at this statement lies Kant's objection. 
122 If for Kant there is a progressive movement leading to the acquirement of reason, for Herder reason is 
neither a special gift in "preference to the animal" nor a disconnected power. Herder harshly criticizes any 
attempt to speak of reason in this manner- he even characterises those attempts as "philosophical 
nonsense". Let us follow his thought, which seems as directed against Kant's conception of reason: "It 
matters not what one may call the entire disposition of his powers: reason, intellect, consciousness, etc, as 
long as these names are not to denote disconnected powers or merely a higher degree of animal powers. It 
is the rorl/firr of the organisation of all human powers. the entire economy of man's perceptive. cognitive 
and volitional nature. or rather, it is the sole positive power of thinking which, combined with a certain 
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beginning the whole life of the human being must have been guided by 
instincts 123, "that voice of God which all animals obey" (loc. Cit). As long 
as the first human beings were solely under the laws of nature, Kant 
extrapolates, their fate was a happy one, a state radically altered once 
they became aware of their reason 124. Kant notices that the peculiarity of 
reason consists in the fact that it is able "with the help of imagination, to 
invent desires125 which not only lack any corresponding natural impulse, 
organisation of the body, is called mind in man just as it becomes natural aptitude in animals: in man it 
gives rise to freedom, with animals it constitutes instinct. The difference, however, is not one of degree or 
of a more or less of given faculties or powers, but rather that of a wholly dissimilar direction and 
development of all powers ... " (Herder 1986: 131). 
123 The identification of instincts with "that voice of God" seems really striking. Few lines later in the text, 
Kant, referring to the battle of instincts with reason, says: "nevertheless this [i.e. reason's ability to extend 
beyond the confinement of instincts] was enough to give reason the initial inducement to quibble with the 
voice of nature (III. 1), and despite the latter's objection, to make the first experiment in free choice-an 
experiment which, since it was the first, probably did not tum out as expected"(CBH: 224). 
It seems to us that what Kant suggests is a provisional identification of God's voice and consequently of 
God's prohibition with the so-called "voice of nature" and furthermore with "natural" instincts. The 
designation of this identification as provisional points first to the already emphasised fact that a purely 
natural state is not to be conceived in temporal terms, and secondly to a complementary identification of 
God's prohibition with "the moral law", which according to the philosopher human beings failed to 
incorporate as their maxim therefore provoking their Fall (Religion: 37). Leaving aside for the time being a 
further discussion of the second point, we can only suggest that Kant may be pointing to a more "inward" 
endorsement of God's prohibition and to a disapproval of a merely instinctual compliance with the "moral 
law". What is of tantamount importance in the passage concerning the "voice of nature" is that Kant's 
background reference is the first verse, third chapter of Genesis that reads: "Now the serpent was more 
subtil than any beast of the field which the Lord God had made. And he said unto woman, Yea, hath God 
said, Ye shall not eat of every tree of the garden ?"( Genesis III.l), where it is arguably di fficult to observe a 
direct correspondence between Eve and the serpent -the agents of the biblical narrative- and the two 
conflicting elements in Kant's interpretation, namely instinct and reason. Is it then feasible to identify the 
serpent with the voice of nature or, on the contrary it has to be interpreted as representing the voice of 
reason? It has to be remarked that despite appearances the latter interpretation could stand true, since in the 
biblical context the serpent is considered the more subtle and clever animal in the Garden of Eden. It 
repeats God's prohibition in an attempt to persuade Eve to disobey. Thus, the serpent may symbolise in 
Kant's eyes, the "non-yet purified" reason, which instead of focusing completely on the "severity of the 
commandment", includes "the influence of other incentives" (Religion: 37). Also, the choice of the serpent 
as a representative of the animals may point to that part of human beings that is confined to the senses, to 
instincts, etc, although, as we are going to see later, in Kant's thought animality in itself cannot been 
conceived as a source of evil. 
1~.j It is interesting that Kant describes this further step in the following wo~ds: " ... but ~eason soo~ made its 
presence felt..." (CBH:223). The almost gradual emergence of reason remmds us of Klerkegaard s 
conception of the dreaming state of the emergence of spirit just before the Fall. 
125 Those desires, primarily known as "lasciviousness, gradually engender a whole host of superfluous or 
even unnatural inclinations to which the term luxuriousness applies" (CBH: 223). In order to bette! 
understand the function of the desires known as lasci\·jollsl1css. \\e have to tum our gale to Kant's book 
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but which are even at variance with the latter" (CBH:223). 
Adam and Eve made their first experiment in using their ability of choice, 
only to discover that the process they triggered was thereby irreversible. 
According to Kant, once they had tasted this new state of freedom, it was 
inconceivable 126 for them "to return to a previous state of servitude under 
the rule of instinct" (CBH: 224). 
Eating from the tree of knowledge, the first human beings discovered in 
themselves the ability of choosing their own way of living and 
they became capable of anticipating the future. 
Furthermore, according to Kant, the last step that "reason took" in 
order to complete its task to raise the human being from her animality is 
by allowing her to realise that she is the true end of nature and to look 
on every non rational being as a means (CBH: 222-225 ; Jaspers, 1962 
: 104). Additionally, the philosopher clarifies that this realisation was 
"obscure", thus indicating to the thenceforth-narrow path that human 
beings ought to follow if an elevation of their reason to the state Kant 
Religion within the limits of Reason alone. In this book, whilst speaking about the first division of the 
"original predisposition to Good in Human Nature", he characterises this division as "the predisposition to 
animality in mankind, taken as a living being" which as such "may be brought under the general title of 
physical and purely mechanical self-love, wherein no reason is demanded". Consequently it can be inferred 
that this predisposition is present even in animals. Certainly, what one cannot apply to animals, are certain 
vices - beastly vices in Kant's terminology- among them lasciviousness, that come into the fore when 
human beings use their predisposition to animality contrary to its real end. This does not mean that those 
vices "spring themselves from this predisposition itself as a root" but that they can be grafted from the 
three main stems of the predisposition to animality, i.e. self-preservation, propagation of the species, 
community with other human beings (Religion: 22). In a more emphatic formulation Kant argues that " ... 
as reason grew more cultivated, vices emerged which were quite foreign to the state of ignorance and hence 
of innocence" (CBH: 225). 
I ~h So, a return to the "state of nature" seems impossible and even disastrous in Kant's eyes. Albeit the 
gradual cultivation of reason may lead the individual to certain vices and be therefore responsible for 
se\'cral calamities, this state of lost innocence urges the mankind to unfold all its abilities (Jaspers 
1962:105) 
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calls a "reason, which dictates laws unconditionally 127" is to be 
accomplished (Religion: 225). 
In Arendt's interpretation of Kant, the Fall from Paradise was not God's 
revenge for the sin of the human being, but rather the release of her by 
nature, which drives her "away from the garden", in order for history to 
unfold, the historical process being thence called either culture or 
freedom (Arendt 1982:8). Kant considers the dawn of history as 
beneficial for the human species, namely a progression to the better, 
while this is not the case as regards the individual, for whom such a 
change represents a loss. Thus, 
The history of nature begins with goodness. for it is the work oj God; but the 
history of Jreedom begins with evil. for it is the work oj man. For the individual. 
who looks only to himself in the exercise of his freedom, a change of this kind 
represented a loss; for nature whose end in relation to man concerns the 
species, it represented a gain. The individual therefore has cause to blame 
himself for all the ills which he endures and for all the evil which he perpetrates 
(CBH: 227). 
The tension between the specific human being and humanity as a whole 
permeates the whole oeuvre of Kant and shows the importance of 
drawing a line between the final purpose of creation, which has the 
individual as its object and the ultimate purpose of nature, which applies 
to the destiny of the whole human race, and therefore pOSits explicitly 
127 Although the suggested path is a narrow one, one should not forget that for Kant, the capacity "for 
respect for the moral law as in itself incentive of the will" is designated as "the predisposition to 
personalitr". The latter is ranked as the highest of the three divisions of the Original Predi.\position to 
Good in Human Nature'- the tenn original signifying that "they are bound up with the possibility of human 
nature"{Religion: 23). 
119 
the problem of history. The former concerns the development of the 
individual considered primarily as a moral being, whereas the latter 
refers to what Kelly includes under the concept of culture, Le. "the 
maximal accomplishment of man's phenomenal or historical purpose 
viewed from the perspective of education and legal organisation"(Kelly 
1969: 142; Yovel 1974: 118-119; CJ: 317-323). Kant's usage of the term 
"ultimate purpose of nature" pOints to "all the natural capacities of a 
creature [that] are destined sooner or later to be developed completely", 
keeping in mind that all these capacities "could be fully developed only in 
species, but not in the individual" (IUE: 42-43). Thus, Kant argues that 
due to the short length of human life it is really impossible for an 
individual to learn how to use completely all her natural capacities. This 
will require innumerable generations, each communicating its 
enlightenment to the next, in order for the human species to achieve 
"nature's original intention". Moreover, the thinker conceives of the 
rational beings to be "mortal as individuals but immortals as a species" 
(IUH: 42-3). If we are going to speak about the ultimate purpose of 
nature we should first try to make clear what Kant means when he uses 
the term natural purpose. In order to Judge' a thing as a natural purpose, 
we should do it on account of its intrinsic form, moreover it must "relate 
to itself in such a way that is both cause and effect of itself' and 
therefore we can call it an organized being, or more specifically a self-
organizing being . This concept of natural purpose guides us to consider 
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the whole of nature as a system in terms of the rules of purposes and 
therefore we must subordinate the mechanism of nature to this 
consideration that means to a system that functions according to the 
principles of reason. In that point it is important to clarify that the 
aforementioned principles apply to the latter idea only subjectively, under 
the maxim "Everything in the world is good for something or other; nothing 
in it is gratuitous". This means that we cannot judge nature according to 
these principles (judging teleologically12B), without having in mind that 
we can apply them only to reflective but not to detenninative jUdgment, 
which means that they are regulative and not constitutive principles129 
(CJ: 258-59; McFarland 1970: 112-113). It is important to clarify at this 
point, that when Kant speaks about the ultimate purpose of nature he 
does not refer to a principle of blind, natural teleology (which may be 
called the cunning of nature) as it is the case with some of his 
interpreters who take into account solely Kant's articles Idea for a 
Universal History and Perpetual Peace. Consequently, those interpreters, 
are led astray, ignoring the methodology that Kant develops in his third 
critique, concluding that such a purposiveness seems dogmatic and 
"incompatible with Kant's critical philosophy" (Yovel 1974: 119). 
12M According to Kant, "a judgment about the [kind of] purposiveness in things of nature that we consider 
the basis for their possibility (as natural purposes) is called a teleological judgment (CJ,421) 
129 Kant uses the term determinative judgment as the judgment which subsumes the particular under the 
universal where the latter is given, while when only the particular is given and the universal is to be ~ound 
then this judgment is a reflective one. (CJ: 18-19 ) Reflective judgment, beginning from the partIcular 
"never slipping into the abyss of the insensible and unintelligible", acts under the guidance of the Ideas and 
consequently it serves principles of thought to us ,but not new objects.(Jaspers: 1962 :62). ., 
Hence, according to Kant "the purposiveness of nature is a special a priori concept that has Its ongm solely 
in reflective jUdgment. (CJ: 20) 
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According to Kant there are certain types of phenomena (organized 
beings, development of culture), which cannot be perceivable for us if we 
fail to consider that there are causal laws (those of final causes), different 
in kind from mechanical laws, that means that there are also teleological 
laws, which according to Kant exist subjectively, and due to their 
subjective existence their causality is not contradictory with the causality 
derived from mechanical laws (CJ: 267; Yovel 1974: 119). It follows that 
the idea of considering nature in that way cannot be proved or disproved 
by scientific examination, but it is an idea which is indispensable to us, 
so as to understand nature (Collingwood 1994: 94-95). 
Returning to the ultimate purpose of nature and having already 
seen that human being, as the only creature on earth which has 
understanding and as a result an ability to set himself purposes, we can 
add that among the other organized beings on earth, we judge him 
(reflectively) to be the ultimate purpose of nature, the "purpose by 
reference to which all other natural things constitute a system of 
purposes" (CJ: 317). Furthermore, if we are to consider nature as a 
teleological system, his vocation to be the ultimate purpose of nature is 
under the condition to have the understanding and the will to refer 
himself and nature to a higher purpose which can be independent of 
nature and self-suffICient, namely to a final purpose (CJ: 318) 
In order to further our analysis, let us try to examine Kant's 
question "But where in man must we posit at least that ultimate purpose 
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of nature?" Kant's answer to this question is to posit culture as the only 
alternative, in stark contrast to happiness, which cannot be considered 
as the ultimate purpose. This is due firstly to the fact that man himself 
draws the concept of happiness so diversely and changes its concept so 
often that nature could not adopt a fixed universal law in harmony with 
that unsteady concept. Secondly because man's absurd predispositions 
place him in further troubles, to such a degree that he often turns 
against his own species (CJ: 317-19). 
The second dimension of the historical unfolding is freedom, which opens 
the space for a discussion of the "final purpose of creation". We can see 
now more clearly how in Kant there is a simultaneous existence of two 
different kinds of perceiving the historical process, the first having the 
whole of humanity as its subject, the second focusing on the individual 
and consequently referring to the moral aspect of possible developments 
of the human being. 
The latter development is essential though not necessary for the 
fulfilment of the former. If the final purpose of creation is to be 
understood as the existence of man under moral laws, that is man 
conSidered as noumenon and as far as we suppose a purposiveness in 
creation (Korsgaard 1996: 242; CJ: 338), then we come across the main 
meeting place of the two dimensions of human existence. 
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This idea of purposiveness is compatible with the idea of progress that 
orients history towards the attainment of a goal implied by the very idea 
of purposiveness as such. 
According to Kant we have to consider the final purpose as "a purpose 
that requires no other purpose as a condition of its possibility ... [and] 
nature would therefore be incapable of achieving it and producing it in 
accordance with the idea of this purpose " ( CJ: 322 ). 
Man, is considered to be the only creature in nature that is endowed with 
the supersensible ability of freedom and has a teleological causality, that 
means that he is able to determine his purposes, independently of 
natural conditions, so that he can be cognized as the law and the object 
of this causality, that means as "the object that this being can set before 
itself as its higher purpose (the highest good in the world) "(CJ: 323). 
But if we follow Deleuze's assumption that a natural purpose is "a 
foundation for possibility" an ultimate purpose is to be understood as " a 
reason for existence "and a final purpose is "a being which possesses the 
reason for existence in itself', then we will also have to follow him in the 
recognition of a paradox: "How can man who is only final end [purpose] 
in his suprasensible existence and as a noumenon, be the last [ultimate] 
end of sensible nature ?"(Deleuze 1984: 71-73). In order for that to be 
possible, we must assume that there is a kind of connection between the 
supersensible and the sensible world, which is mediated by the concept 
of freedom Thus, man as the only potentially free agent in the sensible 
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world is to be considered as the link between the final purpose of the 
intelligible world and the ultimate purpose of nature. Without his 
existence on earth, "all creation would be a mere desert, gratuitous and 
without final purpose" (Jaspers 1962: 109). 
Accordingly, if we consider historical progress from the perspective of the 
ultimate purpose of nature, and even if we apply only reflective 
judgement to it, we are nonetheless limiting our scope to the external 
field of legality that is to the accomplishment of political and juridical 
order, ideally realisable in the context of civil society and cosmopolitan 
unity. But, as Y.Yovel claims, the crucial aspect of history for Kant is the 
creation of an "ethical community, defined by the quality of the inner 
attitudes of its members to each other" (Yovel 1974: 119) 
It seems then that natural purposiveness cannot provide us with 
adequate explanation as regards the final purpose that the supersensible 
as its substratum, imposes on it. This difficulty reveals the importance of 
human being, as well as the importance of what Deleuze calls, the ruse of 
supersensible nature. If the latter had a direct effect on the sensible 
world, human history would have to be determined by reason; and since 
the latter exists also individually in man as noumenon , the events of the 
world would be then reduced to a mere manifestation of .. individual 
rational purpose of men themselves"( Deleuze 1984: 74-75). This does 
not seem to be the case though, since far from being a manifestation of 
reason. history is disclosed to our eyes as its opposite, an endless series 
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of irrational conflicts. The human being is therefore disclosed as 
possessing a two dimensional mode of existence, both noumenal and 
phenomenal existence, as being simultaneously the ultimate purpose of 
nature (a goal attainable through the history of the species) and the final 
purpose of the supersensible (a rather unattainable goal which serves as 
an Idea of perfection). 
Furthermore, the final purpose is unattainable due to the nature of its 
components, namely happiness and morality. As regards the former, it is 
permissible that we consider it as final purpose, "subject to the objective 
condition that man be in hannony with a law of morality, [since] our 
worthiness to be happy consists in that harmony" (CJ: 339). 
Morality anyhow, is not to be realised on earth, not even in the ideal case 
where the cosmopolitan order has brought about the ultimate purpose of 
nature, since Kant himself posits that 
Such developments [ i.e. cosmopolitan society] do not mean, however 
that the basic moral capacity of mankind will increase in the slightest, 
for this would require a kind of new creation or supernatural influence" 
(CF: 188) 
Does Kant's last statement about a "new creation" or a 
"supernatural influence" is an indirect allusion to St. Augustine's notion 
of efficacious grace? Moreover, what is the place that Kant attributes to 
evil? 
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For Kant, "moral evil" is connected with free-choice, and as such cannot 
have as its underlying basis "the Propensity to Evil in Human Nature" 
but rather "it [does] start from sin (by which is meant the transgressing 
of the moral law as a divine command)" (Religion: 23 & 37). Thus, the role 
of the propensity130 to evil is restricted to its being "the subjective ground 
of the possibility of an inclination (habitual craving, concupiscentia) so far 
as mankind is liable to it" (Religion: 24). In his attempt to secure 
human freedom of choice, Kant places the root of sin not on the influence 
of desires and inclinations on the original exercise of human 
will131 (willkur) , which questioned the severity of the divine 
130 Kant distinguishes between propensity and predisposition when he names the human inclination to good 
and to evil predisposition and propensity respectively. Thus, propensity is distinguished from 
predisposition "by the fact that although it can indeed be innate, it ought no to be represented merely thus; 
for it can also be regarded as having been acquired (if it is good) , or brought by man upon himself(if it is 
evi 1),,(Religion:24). 
131 Once more the term original points to the "original predisposition to good in human nature". We have 
already briefly discussed the predisposition to animality and the predisposition to personality - what is left 
is the predisposition to humanity, namely the one grounded on a non-pure practical reason that is a "reason 
.... subservient to other incentives" (Religion: 23). Thus, the usage of the term Willkur instead of Wille can 
now be explained. Caygill distinguishes between the usage of the terms Wille and Willkur in Kant's text, in 
the sense that the latter signifies mainly the "capacity for choice", whilst the former consists the ground for 
"determining choice to action" and, as such it is "practical reason itself' (Caygill 1995: 414). 
The tremendous importance of such a distinction is obvious in the discussion of moral evil. When Kant 
speaks about the corruption of 'the ground of all maxims" by radical evil, he does not refer to the pure 
ground of all maxims, but to the subjective Willkur , indicating consequently the reversibility of the human 
situation. What is interesting in the aforementioned distinction between Wille and Willkur is its similarity 
to Augustine's distinction between the "power to will" and the "will" and the placement of the root of sin 
unto subjective will. Although both thinkers start from a seemingly similar presupposition, they reach a 
di fferent conclusion regarding the possibility of human freedom of choice. I f for Augustine, God is the one 
that made the "power to will" and also the only one that can save, through his grace, the human being and 
to change her will, for Kant pure practical reason substitutes for God. 
Furthermore, returning to Kant, in order to better grasp the relation between the so-called "predisposition to 
humani(v" and what we can term the "non-yet pure" practical reason, we have to look at Kant's definition 
of the former, namely that "the predisposition to humanity can be brought under the general title of self-
love which is physical and yet compares (for which reason is required)" (Religion: 22). According to 
Kierkegaard's reading of Kant and Hegel, both philosophers found the root of evil and sin in self-love, 
which can also be seen as an allusion to Augustine's earthly city. Kierkegaard disagrees with such a 
position mainly due to the fact that the category of the self is strongly connected with the "single . 
individual" and as such cannot be put and explained under universal categories. For him the meanmg of 
self is elusive, the real self being "posited only by the qualitative leap" (CA: 78-9). 
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commandment "which excludes the influences of other incentives" 
(Religion: 37). 
At this point, Kant's thought converges with that of Kierkegaard. 
Kierkegaard strongly emphasises that concupiscentia cannot introduce 
sin and guilt, whilst it can be conceived as "a determinant of guilt and sin 
antecedent to guilt and sin" (eA: 40). Kierkegaard strongly opposes any 
approach to sin that distinguishes between Adam and every subsequent 
person, having in mind mainly the protestant doctrine which in 
presupposing "an essential distinction between the innocence of the 
subsequent person ... and that of Adam" claims that "all men begotten in 
a natural way are born with sin, i.e., without the fear of God, without 
trust in God, and without concupiscence" (ibid: 41). He notices further 
that if one regards "evil desire" or "concupiscence" as innate to human 
beings, then one removes "the ambiguity in which the individual 
becomes both guilty and innocent" (ibid: 73). It seems that both 
Kierkegaard and Kant reach an agreement not only concerning the power 
of concupiscentia but also regarding the fact that Adam is not placed 
outside humanity as a whole. This is evident in Kant's belief " ... that we 
daily act in the same way [as Adam] and that therefore in Adam all have 
sinned and still sin" (Religion: 37). It has to be remarked though that the 
differences between the two thinkers have to be also acknowledged 
especially in regard of Kant's refusal to accept for the first human being a 
state of being originated in time, while on the contrary attempting to 
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reinterpret the biblical narrative in a "logical" manner, as the 
continuation of the previous quote suggests: 
... except that in us there is presupposed an innate propensity to transgression, 
whereas in the first man, from the point of view of time, there is presupposed no 
such propensity but rather innocence; hence transgression on his part is called 
aJall into sin; but with us sin is represented as resulting from an already innate 
wickedness in our nature (Religion: 37-8). 
Thus, Kant presents us with a more linear perception of Adam's fall 
based mainly on a logical succession of events, while Kierkegaard focuses 
on the dizziness and dreaminess that signify and determine the 
qualitative leap that breaks any concept of temporal succession. 
In conclusion, one can argue that although Kant's conception of 
evil and sin leaves open the possibility of a conceptualisation of history in 
terms of progress from the worse to the better, through "the culturing of 
the will" (CaygilI1995: 182), one still has to admit that this "progress" 
should be seen as always inconclusive. The emergence of reason signifies 
a shift in the course of human affairs, since it orients humanity towards 
the attainment of a higher goal (Le. moral and physical perfection), 
compared to which, any stage of its spatio-temporal existence will remain 
forever an evil, as Kant spells explicitly out in an article entitled 'The End 
of all things": 
If we accept the moral-physical condition of man here in life even on the best 
terms, that is to say, of a perpetual progression ... to the highest good ... he still 
cannot. .. unite contentment with the prospect of his condition ... For the condition 
in which man now exists remains ever an evil. in comparison to the better 
condition into which he stands ready to proceed ... (as quoted in Arendt: 1982 :9) 
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We have seen so far that, that albeit Kant was not very interested in 
history in its strict sense (as a part of nature, that means as the history 
of human species in contrast to the history of man as a moral being), he 
refers to it in an attempt to show us that the aforementioned history 
serves the final purpose of creation, a purpose which although being 
inconceivable and unattainable for us, also urges human agents to seek 
for its accomplishment. Kant hinges in all his work on the distinction 
between how things are ( "radical evil", "unsocial-sociability, etc) and 
how they ought to be ( "civil society", "kingdom of ends", etc.) , a 
distinction that leads to contradictions that seem almost irreconcilable 
on earth, since it is beyond any hope that a person would cease to have 
desires, to express antagonisms, etc. , or to put it in other words, it is 
impossible for the human creature to belong solely to the world of 
noumena (Kelly 1969: 146). This unachievable and inconceivable 
demand, the final purpose of creation which purportedly urges us to act, 
is bound with the establishment of a pure Kingdom of ends on earth, the 
union of the spectator and the actor, the place where "the maxim of the 
actor and the maxim, the standard, according to which the spectator 
judges the spectacle of the world, become one" (Arendt 1992:75; Riley 
1992:311). As Riley observes, concerning the history of mankind as 
much as the history of the individual human being, "a purely moral 
kingdom of ends will not be raised on earth -though it ought to be - but 
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one can reasonably hope for a legal order that is closer to morality than 
are present arrangements" (Riley 1992:312). 
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concluding remarks 
If we attempt to 'translate' the Kantian problematique in 
Augustinian terms, we can claim that even though Kant does not speak 
explicitly about time in the texts discussed above, it can nevertheless be 
inferred that he dismisses the possibility of a cosmic time, hoping for a 
proper "existence" in theological time, whilst accepting at the same time 
the inescapability of historical time. It can be argued that the meeting 
point of Kant and St. Augustine is that they both 'culminate' in 
advocating an inescapable ontological separation between cosmic and 
historical time, and consequently an ontological breach between God and 
human beings. More specifically, it has been shown that St. Augustine's 
account of time could lead to the adoption of a philosophical position 
advocating the existence of an impassable abyss between God and 
human beings after the Fall, while one cannot but agree with Alliez that 
St. Augustine's topic 
is not that of a sage, but that of a saint, separated from the world because God 
separates him from it, because Unity is the subversion of revelation. What it is 
exactly is an abstract God who forbids religion in the etyrrwlogical sense of a 
living link with God (Alliez 1996:92). 
We have argued that in the heart of St. Augustine's theology lie his 
conception of time and its correlative notions of intentio, distentio and 
extentio. In Alliez's account, St. Augustine is presented as playing an 
important part in the process of "a secularisation of a religious idea" 
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(Alliez 1996: 112). According to him, this is due to St. Augustine's 
conception of time as "the profound instance of the decision" (Alliez 
1996: 112). Decision is furthermore intertwined with choice and in this 
respect it has to be remarked that it is in Schelling's treatise on Human 
Freedom that a genuine definition of religiosity could be arguably 
uncovered. As we are going to see in the next chapter, this definition 
captures the "original. .. meaning of the word", its being "the highest 
commitment to the right without choice" (OHF: 71). 
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Chapter Three 
Schelling on Freedom, Time & Eternity 
"It is equally deadly for the system 
to have a system and not to have a 
system. It must therefore resolve 
itself to combine both" (Schlegep32). 
Introductory remarks 
"Everything divine is human and 
everything human is divine" 
(Schelling133) 
We have seen in the previous chapter how Kant and St. 
Augustine's perceptions of God are instrumental in representing God as 
an abstract entity that moreover forbids "religion in the etymological 
sense" of the term. It was argued that the view - endorsed by both 
thinkers- that the time before the Fall is radically and irretrievably 
different from the time after the Fall makes such an abstraction almost 
inevitable. This is mainly due to the fact that with such conceptions of 
the deity, God ceases to be seen as a living Being relating himself with 
human beings and becomes instead an impersonal and lifeless being. It 
is not an accident that the philosophical God, that is first and foremost 
the abstract God, is for Heidegger, perhaps less close to the divine God 
than god -less thinking: "god -less thinking is more open to Him than 
onto-theo-logic would like to admit" (Heidegger 1974: 72). 
\12 As quoted by Wirth (2000: xxiv) 
IH In Schelling's fonnulation of the old saying by Hypocrites (AGW 1815: 67). 
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The proper name of the god of philosophy is for Heidegger 'causa 
sui': "Man can neither pray, nor sacrifice to this god. Before the causa 
sui, man can neither fall to his knees in awe nor can he play music and 
dance before this god" (loc. Cit). Although in Heidegger's view not even 
Schelling entirely escapes the trap of the ontotheologic, one could argue 
that his approach is much closer to a primordial relation with the divine 
and that therefore his God is not the abstract philosophical god. 
Schelling wonderfully posits the issue of the abstract God when he 
discusses Kant's Critique, as indicated by Kierkegaard's notes of 
Schelling's Berlin Lectures cited below: 
If one so deSired, this system could be called an emanation system, if one keeps 
in mind that it is reversed, since God is the final logical emanation of the 
system; here the God-concept has only regulative role, not constitutive. In this 
science, one cannot begin with God (NSBL: 341- emphasis added) 
Schelling's account offers us an alternative narrative that focuses both 
on a different account of time and its dimensions, namely of the past, the 
future and the present, and on the importance of a living link between 
the human beings and a living God. Religiosity thus acquires for 
Schelling a dynamic meaning, involving thus the highest fonn of 
commitment, namely one that excludes choice: 
We understand religiosity in the original, practical meaning of the word. It is 
conscientiousness, or acting in accordance with one's knowledge, and not acting 
contrary to the light of understanding. A man to whom this latter is impossible, 
not in a human, physical or psychological way but in a divine way, one calls 
religious, conscientious in the highest sense of the word. He is not 
conscientious who, in a given case, must first hold the command of duty before 
himself in order to decide to do right because of his respect for it. By the very 
meaning of the word, religiosity allows no choice between alternatives no 
aequilibrium arbitrii (the bane of all morality) but only the highest commitment to 
the right without choice (OHF:71). 
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Therefore, the expulsion of choosing between alternatives elevates 
religiosity into a higher plane where one of the classic -and up to the time 
of Schelling's writing unchallenged- oppositions of philosophy, namely 
the opposition between necessity and freedom is overcome. 
Religiosity is for Schelling "the exercise of true freedom that operates in 
consonance with a holy necessity" (Wirth 2000: xxix). In the course of 
this chapter we are going to discuss Schelling's reformulation of the 
definition of those concepts, which in their higher form are seen by the 
thinker as united but not collapsed to each other. 
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3.1 Identity and the conception of Freedom 
In the opening pages of his treatise on freedom, Schelling sets as 
his task 134 first to define the concept of freedom, if the latter can be 
regarded as a concept at all and secondly to relate this concept "to a 
whole scientific world view"(OHF: 7). This is because, the concept of 
freedom in Schelling, in the same way as the concept of anxiety 135 in 
Kierkegaard, eludes any definition, acquiring a primordial meaning, in 
the sense that it can also be seen as the "pivot upon which everything 
turns" (CA: 43). Indeed, as we can see in the following passage, freedom 
is a central concept in Schelling's philosophy, or, in Heidegger's 
interpretation of Schelling's work, freedom is "the centre of Being as a 
whole" (Heidegger 1985: 20). Thus, it is for this reason that for Schelling, 
... no conception can be defined in isolation and depends for its systematic 
completion on the demonstration of its connection with the whole. This is 
especially the case in the conception of freedom, for if it has any reality at all it 
cannot be a merely subordinate or incidental conception but must be one of the 
dominant central pOints of the system (OHF: 7). 
Thus, freedom is perceived as the dominant central point of Schelling's 
system We come across the term 'system' many times in Schelling's text, 
whilst towards the end of his treatise the philosopher, insists - as 
Kierkegaard would repeat many years later although significantly in a 
134 As Heidegger puts it (Heidegger 1985: 14). 
U5 We have already seen the close relation of anxiety and freedom in Kierkegaard's thought. Shortly we 
see that in Schelling, anxiety and freedom have a similar relation. In Wirth's reading of Schelling "the 
origin of human evil is anxiety before the Good, that is, anxiety before freedom as the source of one's life 
and the source of one's destruction" (Wirth 2000: xxviii). 
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different way-on the importance of attributing to each concept a definite 
place: "in a philosophic system every concept has its definite place where 
alone it is valid and which determines its significance and circumscribes 
it" (OHF: 93). Why does Schelling speak about system? Are the notions 
of freedom and system really incompatible - as philosophy before 
Schelling perceives them? 
Heidegger warns us against any attempt to give to the terms 'science' and 
'system' (as they were used in the context of German idealism), 
contemporary meaning. Indeed, according to him, in Schelling's 
philosophy both of these terms retain their primordial meaning. Firstly, 
'science' or Wissenschaft in German was synonymous- at Schelling's 
time- with philosophy, 'that knowledge which knows the last and first 
grounds, and in accordance with this fundamental knowledge presents 
us what is essential in everything knowable in a reasoned-out essential 
connection" (Heidegger 1985: 16). Thus, for Schelling 'science' means 
philosophical knowledge, and in wider scope it also means history, as it 
is stated in the second draft of his Ages of the World. 
Science [Wissenschaft], according to the very meaning of the word, is history 
[Historie](tcrwpta). It was not able to be [history] as long as it was intended as a 
mere succession or development of one's own thoughts or ideas. It is a merit of 
our times that the essence has been returned to science; indeed, this essence 
has been returned in such a manner as to assure us that science will not easily 
be able to lose it again. From now on, science will present the development of 
an actual. living essence (AGW 1813: 113) 
The statement regarding science as 'history' may be omitted in the same 
paragraph of the third version of the same book 
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that knowledge is the simple consequence and development of its own concepts 
was a valid representation [Vorstellung] until now. Its true representation is 
that it is the development of a living, actual being [Wesen] which presents itself 
in it. It is an advantage of our time that this being has been given back to 
science and, indeed, it may be asserted, in such a way that it may not be easily 
lost again. It is not too severe to have judged that, in the wake of the now 
awoken dynamic spirit, all philosophy that does not take its power from it can 
still only be regarded as an empty misuse of the noble gift of speaking and 
thinking (AGW 1815: xxxv). 
but the close relation between a historian and a philosopher penneates 
the whole introduction of the third draft where Schelling constantly 
describes the philosopher as a certain kind of historian 136 who narrates 
'what is known', namely the 'past' : "the past is known, the present is 
discerned ... the known is narrated, the discerned is presented ... "(AGW 
1815: xxxv). Thus, science or knowledge is for Schelling something 
living and internal 137 , it is "the striving towards anamnesis 
[Wiederbewusstwerden] and hence more of a striving toward knowledge 
than knowledge itself' (ibid: xxxviii). It is interesting to note that 
Kierkegaard quotes a similar position by Daub 138 concerning the relation 
of the past, the historian and the philosopher. Accordingly, in 
Kierkegaard's interpretation of Daub, the past "that has come into 
existence", is eo ipso historical, and the one that apprehends the past 
1.1/1 We have seen briefly in our first chapter how the philosopher in Schelling is also a historian and a 
psycho logist. 
137 In his discussion on the possibility of a system, Schelling argues against those who are unsympathetic 
towards science because they "regard it as a kind of knowledge which is quite external and lifeless like 
conventional geometry" (OHF: 8). 
13K Daub's passage, published in 1836, shows many similarities with Schelling's text: "The act oflooking 
backwards is, just like that of looking into the future, an act of divination; and if the prophet is well called a 
historian of the future, the historian is just as well called, or even better, a prophet of the past, of the 
historical" (PF:309 n.33). 
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a historico-philosophicus, is therefore a prophet in reverse (Daub). That he is a 
prophet simply indicates that the basis of the certainty of the past is the 
uncertainty reg~r~i.ng it in th~ s~e sense as ~here is uncertainty regarding the 
future, the posslblhty ... The hlstonan once agaIn stands beside the past, stirred 
by the passion that is the passionate sense for coming into existence, that is, 
wonder (PF: 80) 
Secondly, the origin of the word 'system' goes back to the Greek 
word synistemi which means 'putting together'. The word systema can 
signify a host of things; it can mean 'a mere external accumulation' or an 
orderly gathering, or 'a framework' that is neither an 'inner order' nor an 
'external manipulation' (Heidegger 1985: 26). Heidegger, in his reading of 
Schelling, does not argue in favour of an external system that is 
tantamount to " the mere arrangement of a finished body of doctrine for 
the purpose of simply teaching beginners in the sciences", but on the 
contrary he sees- in Schelling's text- the possibility of a system that is 
the inner jOinture of what is comprehensible itself, its founding development and 
ordering. Even more, system is the conscious joining of the jointure and 
coherence of Being itself (Heidegger 1985: 28). 
More importantly, as Heidegger emphasises, the system is not to be seen 
as the absolute task of philosophy. Greek philosophy for example 
although it would not constitute a system, yet, 
or rather especially for that reason, this philosophising was thoroughly 
systematic, that is directed and supported by a quite definite inner jointure and 
order of questioning, that questioning which in general created the essential 
presupposition for all systematics and a possible system (ibid: 27). 
Thus, one can argue that for Schelling the importance lies mainly in the 
journey towards a possible system rather than in its accomplishment, 
which seems impossible. The process of questioning and answering is an 
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integral part of this journey. If science, seen as the striving towards 
anamnesis, is the presupposition of a possible system, then what is 
required is what Schelling calls "an internal cision and liberation" in 
order for the light of knowledge to rise (AGW 1815: xxxvii). This cision, 
this doubling of ourselves, this secret circulation in which there are two beings, 
a questioning being and an answering being, an unknowing being that seeks 
knowledge and an unknowing being that does not know its knowledge, this 
silent dialogue, this inner art of conversation, is the authentic mystery of 
philosophy (ibid: xxxvi) 
In both his books Of human freedom and The Ages of the world, Schelling 
attempts an exploration of 'what is known', but in this case the known is 
not something finished, completed, "at hand since the beginning" (AGW 
1815:xx:xvii), and ready to be discovered and revealed. "Past" is not 
something fixed and dead but is still in the process of becoming, namely 
it is 'eternal past'. Also, knowledge is not synonymous with completion, 
but it means questioning, discovery, longing, desire, etc. 
Indeed, what Schelling attempts to show, is exactly the 'inevitability of 
the question about the system of freedom' since he regards the 
"connection between the concept of freedom and a total world view" as 
the subject-matter of an inevitable problem which 
If it is not solved, will leave the concept of freedom ambiguous and philosophy 
indeed, totally without value. For this great problem alone constitutes the 
unconscious and invisible mainspring of all striving for knowledge from the 
lowest to the highest ... (OHF: 9). 
The philosopher is well aware of the long tradition preceding him 
according to which system and freedom are incompatible notions, and 
this despite the fact that 
... according to an ancient but by no means forgotten tradition, the idea of 
freedom is said to be entirely inconsistent with the idea of system, and every 
philosophy which makes claim to unity and completeness is said to end in 
denying freedom (OHF: 7). 
Schelling considers this statement as belonging to the category of 
"general affirmations", meaning that there were many unknowable 
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restricting notions that were attached to the word system itself "so that 
the assertion declares something which, to be sure, is very true but also 
very commonplace" (loc. Cit). Indeed, what is meant by this 'general 
affirmation' is the commonplace statement that since system is 
something concrete, rigid, and complete then it is almost synonymous 
with necessity, excluding thus any notion of freedom, for the latter 
cannot survive within the limits of unity and completeness139 but on the 
contrary freedom needs expansion and infinity. If one goes a step further 
in the same line of thought, then one could argue against the 
139 Completeness and unity- as they are commonly understood- are not for Schelling necessarily the 
presuppositions of a system. We will see shortly how Schelling's redefinition of the law of identity 
excludes such misinterpretations and allows the co-exploration of the so far antithetical couples, e.g. unity 
and freedom, etc. Kierkegaard also thinks of the notions of system and conclusiveness as being one and the 
same, arguing that "if the system is not finished, there is not any system"(CUP: I 07). Although 
Kierkegaard's position is targeting all the 'systematicians' one has to point out that his main target is 
Hegel's system, which arguably strives for union and completeness. It has been argued that Kierkegaard's 
view against any kind of 'system' should not be confused with Nietzsche's repudiation of 'system'. 
Accordingly. in Heidegger's words, "Kierkegaard does completely reject the system, but (I) by system he 
means only the Hegelian system and misunderstands it at that; (2) Kierkegaard' s rejection of system is not 
a philosophical one, with philosophical intention, but a religious one. What Kierkegaard brings against the 
'system' from the standpoint ofa Christian believer is ingenious ... but unimportant philosophically because 
the 'system', especially in Hegel's supposed version of it, is dogmatically taken as something self-
explanatory in philosophy" (Heidegger 1985: 24). 
compatibility of the concept of freedom and the concept of system 
"altogether and inherently" (OHF: 7). It this case, Schelling pOints out, 
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there are two possible options, the first being to deny the possibility of a 
system even in the mind of the primal being, and the second being to 
explain the extraordinary fact that "some sort of system must be present 
and coexist with freedom at least in the divine understanding140" (OHF: 
8). Those who adopt the first view and therefore only accept the 
existence of individual wills "each being a centre for itself', are 141 
nevertheless urged, by reason's inevitable striving towards unity, to 
succumb to a kind of inadequate form of unity that leads them to many 
contradictions. 
Thus, in the first pages of his treatise, Schelling sets the 'grounds' 
of his further analysis. He explores mainly the second view and through 
its shortcomings, questioning once again the possibility of the 
compatibility of freedom with system even in human understanding. The 
question of the contradiction between the notions of freedom and system, 
or freedom and necessity as it would read later, is a higher formulation of 
140 In an interesting passage, Kierkegaard discusses and repudiates the possibility of a system of existence, 
arguing that such a system exists only in the mind of God: "a system of existence cannot be given. Is there, 
then, not such a system? That is not at all the case. Neither is this implied in what has been said. Existence 
itself is a system- for God, but it cannot be a system for any existing spirit. System and conclusiveness 
correspond to each other, but existence is the very opposite. Abstractly viewed, system and existence 
cannot be thought conjointly, because in order to think existence, systematic thought must think it as 
annulled and consequently as not existing. Existing is the spacing that holds apart; the systematic is the 
conclusiveness that combines" (CUP: 118). The metaphors that Kierkegaard uses in order to describe the 
"existing" and the "systematic" remind us of the similar metaphors that Schelling uses- as we are going to 
see later in this chapter- in his description of cosmogony, theogony, etc, namely a/the coming into 
existence. 
141 Having in mind mainly Fichte, Schelling argues that even Fichte's attempt to conceive of each ego as an 
absolute substance did not help him escape the longing for unity and thus he developed a- inadequate in 
Schelling's eyes- form of moral order that was full of problems and contradictions (OHF: 9). 
the earlier contradiction between nature and freedom. Freedom, as a 
qualification of spirit, has been traditionally142 conceived as being in 
opposition with nature, the latter mainly perceived as 'mechanical 
nature': 
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This way of looking at the matter was adequately justified by the finn belief that 
reason is found only in man, the conviction that all thought and knowledge are 
completely subjective and that Nature altogether lacks reason and thought, and 
also by the universally prevalent mechanistic attitude, -even the dynamic factor 
which Kant revived having passed over into a higher mechanism and being in no 
sense recognised in its identity with the spiritual (OHF: 3). 
Schelling questions the nature of the term 'contradiction' as well as that 
of the term of 'identity'. He also questions the de-spiritualization of 
nature and provides us with a radical conception of the 'law of identity' , 
and consequently of a new dynamic definition regarding the nature of the 
copula is in judgement. Accordingly, when we utter the proposition that 
"this body is blue 143", this does not mean "that the body in and by reason 
of its being a body is also a blue body, but only that the object 
deSignated as this body is also blue though not in the same sense"(OHF: 
13). Moreover, Schelling argues, if the law of identity is even 
142 For example, Descartes's distinction between res extensa and res cogitans is a fonnulation of the 
distinction between nature, seen as mechanical nature and freedom, seen as spirit or as the 'thinking 
"(Heidegger 1985: 59). 
143 Heidegger's fonnulation ofthe same proposition is the following: When we say that 'this body is blue" 
it does not mean that body and blue are the same thing (as traditional thought would have it) but that 
although body and blue are two different things, their identity shows "their belonging together of what is 
different in one; still more generally expressed, the unity of a unity and an opposition"(Heidegger 1985: 
77). Although, the thought of 'belonging together' in the customary way puts the emphasis on 'together' in 
order to highlight the 'unity' and the placing 'into the order of together' , Heidegger on the contrary, puts 
the emphasis on 'belonging', indicating, in the case of the encounter of Man as being with Bein~, the 
reciprocal response to each other and the event of appropriation taking place in the context of thIs 
reciprocal relation (Heidegger 1974: 31). 
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misinterpreted when it is applied into empirical concepts, then it is 
inevitable that it will be also misinterpreted with respect to its higher 
application. Thus, if we take for example the couple of opposite words 
'Imperfect' and "Perfect' and we argue that 'the Imperfect is the Perfect' 
then the common interpretation of the law of identity would be that 
Perfection and Imperfection are equivalent and identical, that is that 
"everything is one and the same, the worst and the best, folly and 
wisdom" (ibid: 13). On the contrary, in Schelling's formulation, a proper 
application of the law of identity would read: "the Imperfect exists not by 
means of those attributes in and through which it is imperfect, but by 
means of the perfection which it contains" (loc. Cit). Similarly, the 
proposition "the Good is the Evil" that means "evil has no power to exist 
in itself; that which is real in it, conSidered in itself, is good" is usually 
interpreted as meaning that "the eternal difference between right and 
wrong, between virtue and sin, is being denied" and consequently as 
being "from the point of view of logic ... the same" (loc. Cit). The same in 
the case of the proposition 'necessity and freedom are one', which is 
interpreted so as to mean that "freedom is nothing but a force of nature, 
a mainspring which like all others is subordinate to mechanism" instead 
of being rightly understood as meaning that "in the last instance the 
essence of the moral world is also the essence of the world of nature" 
(loc. Cit). 
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One of the examples that Schelling uses in order not only to illuminate 
the law of identity and its many misinterpretations but also to further 
explore the main task of his treatise, is the argument according to which 
"pantheism is the only possible system of reason but is inevitably 
fatalism" (ibid: 10), implying thus that 'system' is incompatible with 
'freedom' but compatible with 'necessity144'. 
Although one cannot deny that some trends of pantheism can be 
connected with fatalism, this is not always the case, since, as Schelling 
points out, there are many people that are driven to pantheism because 
of "the liveliest sense of freedom" (loc. Cit). 
This is because most of the people find human freedom and the 
attributes (e.g. omnipotence) of the Highest Being as incompatible 
notions. Thus, in order to secure human freedom without restricting 
God's omnipotence or without arguing that it is God that permits 
freedom, they are instead "placing man and his freedom in the divine 
being, by saying that man exists not outside God but in God ... " (loc. Cit). 
This is the point where mystics, religious thinkers or lovers of the 
unknown contravene, namely the unity of God with man, which-
according to Schelling- is a belief that "seems to appeal to our inmost 
feelings as much as, or even more than, it does to reason and 
speculation" (OHF: 11). 
144 This is an exemplification of the contradiction of 'freedom and necessity', which is also an advancement 
of the previous contradiction between 'nature' and 'freedom'. 
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There is also another interpretation of pantheism, i.e. that of Spinoza, 
that although it is generally considered to be the classic example of 
pantheism, by constituting "a total identification of God with all things, a 
confusion of creature and creator", for Schelling on the contrary, it posits 
a complete differentiation between things and God (loc. Cit). Thus, in 
Spinoza, 
God is that which is in itself and is conceived solely through itself; whereas the 
finite necessarily exists in another being and can only be conceived with 
reference to it. Manifestly, in consequence of this distinction, things are not 
different fonn God merely in degree or because of their limitations ... but they 
differ from God toto genere (OHF: 12). 
Even when Spinoza claims that "each object is a modified God145" this is 
not an indication of a possible identification of God with an object, 
because a "modified, that is to say a derived God, is not God in the real. 
distinctive sense" (loc. Cit). What is responsible again for such 
confusions and accusations is the misapplication of the law of identity. 
Thus. if we have a closer look at the statement of pantheism according to 
which "God is everything" (Heidegger 1985: 72), then we can also venture 
the statement that "God is man". Consequently, this does not mean that 
man and God are identical but on the contrary it reads: 
145 This Spinoza's statement is to be seen as an exemplification of the second possible interpretation of 
pantheism according to Heidegger's classification of Schelling's discussion on pantheism: More 
specifically, Heidegger argues that there are three interpretations of the central 'sentence' of pantheism 
"God is everything", that are as following: "}) everything is God 2) every individual thing is God 3) all 
things are nothing". None of the three interpretations are permissible since they falsely interpret pantheism. 
The first two "dissolve the concept of God so that there is no longer any support left to speak of pantheism 
in any sense, that is, of theism in general". Regarding the third interpretation, it "removes all beings 
outside of God so that again, but from the reverse side, pantheism is impossible since everything is after all 
nothing" (Heidegger 1985:72-3). 
147 
God is man, God as ground allows man to be consequence. But man is then 
after all something dependent and not at all what is required, something free 
and self-contained. But dependence initially means only that what is dependent 
is dependent on its ground in that it is at all, but not in what it is. That a son is. 
for this a father is necessary. But what is dependent, the son, need not, 
therefore, be what the ground is, a father (Heidegger 1985: 87). 
Dependence, thus, acquires a different meaning and one can possibly 
read Spinoza's following remark accordingly: 
Whatever their [i.e things's] relation to God may be, they are absolutely 
differentiated from God through the fact that they can exist only in and 
dependent upon another being (namely himself), and that their concept is a 
derivative one which would not even be possible without the concept of God 
(OHF: 12) 
Indeed, Schelling argues, the problem with Spinoza's pantheism, that 
does not allow it to be considered as pantheism par excellence. is not to 
be found in an alleged identification of things with God, neither in his 
position that 'all things are posited in God" but solely in his conception of 
the "things" that brings forth a lifeless, rigid and mechanistic system 
that, can be also be defined as fatalism. When the encounter with the 
Other. either God or human beings, or nature etc, takes the form of an 
encounter with 'things' then, for Schelling, the unity of the law of identity 
loses its "intrinsically creative kind"(ibid: 18): 
Spinoza must then be a fatalist for another reason ... the error of his system is by 
no means due to the fact that he posits all things in God, but to the fact that 
they are things- to the abstract conception of the world and its creatures, indeed 
of eternal Substance itself, which is also a thing for him. Thus his arguments 
against freedom are altogether deterministic, and in no wise pantheistic (OHF: 
22) 
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In the course of this chapter, we will come across the interplay between 
different couples of two seemingly opposite poles exploring thus 'identity' 
and 'freedom' in their human, divine and cosmic dimensions. Schelling's 
solution to admit that there is some sort of a system at least in the divine 
understanding should be seen neither as a relapse to onto-theology146 as 
in Heidegger's argument, nor as a claim 
to have this knowledge [Which] arises from boastfulness and a sense of 
superiority towards others, qualities which should be foreign to anyone who has 
had even a slightest training in philosophy (OHF: 8). 
The latter claim is based on a misinterpretation of Schelling's claim 
according to which an argument that would say that such a "system can 
never be revealed to human insight" means nothing at all. This is 
because this argument may as well be true or wrong depending "on the 
146 Although a proper discussion of the issue of onto-theology is huge and beyond the scope of this chapter, 
we will briefly explain Heidegger's definition of it. Accordingly, in the case of Schelling, the 
philosopher's recourse to the divine understanding as a possible source of a system is for Heidegger 'a 
theological tu~'. 0EoAoyta, or theology, Heidegger reminds us, is not firstly used within the framework 
of ecclesiastical faith, but within philosophy, including thus also "the mytho-poetic utterance about the 
gods" (Heidegger 1985:50; Heidegger 1974: 54). Indeed, the entrance of God into philosophy and 
metaphysics makes any philosophy to be also a theology (Heidegger 1974: 55) that "questions beings as a 
whole" (Heidegger 1985:51). At the same time, the questioning of beings as a whole has as its counterpart 
the question of beings as such, the latter being ontology (loc. Cit). Consequently, Heidegger concludes, the 
questioning of philosophy is always and "in itself both onto-logical and theo-Iogical in the very broad 
sense. Philosophy is On to theo logy. The more originally it is both in one, the more truly it is philosophy, 
and Schelling's treatise is thus one of the most profound works of philosophy because it is in a unique 
sense ontological and theological at the same time" (Heidegger 1985: 51). What is lacking in ontotheology 
is the oblivion of the difference between beings and Being, and consequently the unity of the "essential 
nature of metaphysics" , that is the unity of theology and ontology is still unthought, that means, it is taken 
for granted (Heidegger 1974: 50&55): "The problem here is obviously not a union of two independent 
disciplines of metaphysics, but the unity of what is in question, and in thought, in ontologie and theologic: 
beings as such in the universal and primal at one with beings as such in the highest and ultimate. The unity 
of this One is of such a kind that the ultimate in its own way accounts for the primal, and the primal in its 
own way accounts for the ultimate. The difference between the two ways of accounting belongs to the still-
unthought difference we mentioned" (Heidegger 1974: 61). If Heidegger's is right in considering also 
Schelling among those who did not think about this difference, is to be decided towards the end of this 
chapter. 
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definition of the principle by virtue of which man in any wise attain 
knowledge" (loc. Cit). 
Schelling acutely recognises the incompleteness of our knowledge and 
consequently our inability to capture the whole at once: 
We do not live in intuitions. Our knowledge is incomplete [Stuckwerk]: that is. it 
must be produced piecemeal [stuckweiss] in sections and degrees. and this 
cannot occur in the absence of reflection (AGW 1813: 117). 
Thus, one should not interpret Schelling's attitude towards knowledge as 
overoptimistical. Even when Schelling endorses the metaphor that sees 
man as microtheos147, this is not in order to elevate man into the place of 
God. Quite on the contrary, Schelling uses this analogy in order to trace 
this longing that urges the philosopher to maintain "the existence of this 
(divine) knowledge, because he alone comprehends the god outside him 
through the god within himself by keeping his mind pure and unclouded 
by evil" (OHF: 8). This is not to say that God in Schelling is something 
static and lifeless. Most importantly Schelling argues that the journey 
that philosophy longs for is not to be completed since it is not a lifeless 
one. 
147 This metaphor, that means literarily "little god" is borrowed not only from Boehme but also from t~e 
long mystic and Gnostic tradition preceding Schelling. More specifically, Boehme sees the human bemg as 
microcosmos and microtheos , emphasising thus that a person is the metaphysical point of conn~ction 
between God and the world. Accordingly, the human being "comprises in himself all the constItuents of 
the creation, and reflects in his own structure the structure of God" (Brown 1977: 40). 
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The philosopher, when he speaks of the possibility of evil in relation to 
God, emphasises the difference between system and life, or existing: 
In the divine understanding there is a system; God himself, however, is not a 
system but a life, and this alone constitutes the answer to the question as to the 
possibility of evil in relation to God ... all existence must be conditioned in order 
that it may be actual, that is personal, existence. God's existence, too, ... (OHF: 
79). 
Thus, Identity becomes in Schelling synonymous with 
the becoming of creation out of the contrary intercourse between a will that 
strives for infinite expansion and the will that tries to form longing and to 
incorporate it in the nexus of beings. Identity also stands for the rrwment of 
formation of the longing, a moment of transient fulfilment. The copula is then 
signifies both the process of expression and the moment of actualisation. This 
double significance of Identity refers also to God's double meaning. Accordingly, 
God is conceived both as the becoming of the oppositional vital powers in him 
and as the moment of the celebration of love (Goudeli 2002: Ill). 
Let us follow Schelling's journey back to the cosmogonic process which 
as an eternal past never passes away. Let us also keep in mind the 
tentative character of this journey that could never be completed in 
temporal terms and consequently never properly148 narrated, as the 
following passage indicates: 
We must not misjudge our time. Heralds of this time, we do not want to pick its 
fruit before it is ripe nor do we want to misjudge what is ours. It is still a time of 
struggle. The goal of this investigation has still not been reached. We cannot be 
narrators, only explorers, weighing the pros and cons of all views until the right 
one has been settled, indubitably rooted forever (AGW 1815: xl). 
14X Although one has not to underestimate the importance of Schelling's statement according to which, 
there is the hope that someone will come that could sing heroically the poem of past, f~t~re and p:esent: 
"Perhaps the one is still coming who will sing the greatest heroic poem, grasping in spmt somethmg for 
which the seers of old were famous: what was, what is, what will be" (AGW 1815: xl). 
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3.2 Theo-cosmo-gonic process & the conception of the eternal past 
3.2.1 The nature of God in Schelling's Ages of the World 
If for Kant the discussion of the two alleged kinds of causality, viz. 
of nature and freedom, is destined to lead thought into antinomical 
assertions even when it is limited to the realm of phenomena (CPR: 409), 
then Schelling's attempt to place nature, necessity and freedom in God is 
a breakthrough movement, since in a sense it places this antinomical 
relation in the realm of noumena. God, as we are going to see, is both 
original nature and original freedom. The human being can be free as 
well and human freedom is seen as the possibility149 of good and evil. 
The importance of Schelling's definition lies on this "and" that adds evil 
to the definition of freedom. Heidegger points out the radical change that 
Schelling effects to the traditional definition of freedom. 
Indeed, Descartes' statement that "libertas est propensio in bonum' 
encapsulates the definition of freedom that most of the thinkers before 
and after him endorse, according to which freedom is the capability of 
good. The addition of evil into the aforementioned proposition 
inaugurates a new horizon for thought. Evil is not seen as a simple 
supplement to the concept of freedom but rather "freedom is freedom for 
good and evil"(Heidegger 1985: 97). Thus, the discussion of evil eludes 
the boundaries of mere morality and acquires a metaphysical, ontological 
and even theological meaning. Before discussing more specifically the 
149 We have seen in the first chapter Kierkegaard's similar definition of freedom. 
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case of human freedom and the possibility of evil in detail, we will explore 
Schelling's account of theogony in order to address the question of how 
God permits evil to come forth. The old and recurrent question of the 
compatibility of evil with goodness and God takes a new form in 
Schelling's thought. By argUing that "freedom ... as ... a power of 
evil. .. must have a root independent of God", Schelling does not find 
recourse- as it may seem at first glance- to the common claim of dualism, 
according to which there are two opposite and equal powers, namely 
Good and Evil being in continuous conflict with each other. The problem 
with dualism is according to Schelling, that by accepting the existence of 
"two absolutely different and mutually independent principles, it is only a 
system of self-destruction and the despair of reason" (OHF: 28). Even if 
one considers evil as being in a sense dependent on good, so as to 
concentrate one's thought into a single being, the difficulty is not 
diminished but rather increased. Furthermore, Schelling does not 
endorse either the view according to which God is conceived as actus 
pwissiTTUlS150, that is God devoid of possibility. 
Possibility is part of God's becoming and in a sense Schelling has to 
explore the contradiction that evil must have its root independent of God 
but in God: 
150 According to Berdyaev, the conception of God as actus purus, is an attempt to secure God's actuality 
against any intermingling with the natural world. Accordingly, God is conceived as being without 
potential ity "for potential ity is an imperfection of created being, a proof of its confusion with non-
being"(Berdyaev 1935: 50). Thus, God's action upon the world "operates by means of grace and ~y the 
official channels which have been established by the Church" (loc. Cit). The only case that Schellmg uses 
and endorses the Godhead's definition as actus purus is when he wants to describe the Godhead as being 
only 'pure freedom'(see AGW 1815: 26). 
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But if freedom as the capability of evil must have a root independent of God, and 
if God, on the other hand is to remain the one and sole root of beings, then this 
ground of evil independent of God can only be in God. There must be in God 
something which God himself 'is' not. God must be conceived more primordially 
(Heidegger 1985: 103). 
To face a contradiction is for Schelling a task 151 that is usually neglected 
by most of people 
Although men- in both living and knowing- seem to shy away from nothing so 
much as contradiction, they still must confront it, because life itself is in 
contradiction. Without contradiction there would be no life, no movement, no 
progress; a deadly slumber of all forces. Only contradiction drives us- indeed 
forces us to action. Contradiction is in fact the venom of all life, and all vital 
motion is nothing but the attempt to overcome this poisoning (AGW 1813: 124). 
Thus, contradiction, although in an implicit and not always active way, is 
even to be found in the Highest being since God, for Schelling, is also life, 
participating thus in becoming. A counterpart of contradiction is 
noncontradiction, and only through the acting of the unity of 
contradiction and noncontradiction, contradiction becomes intelligible. 
More explicitly, noncontradiction is the permanent background behind 
all life and all living things "were ... attended by an immediate 
presentiment of this background, driving them to demand a return to 
it"(ibid: 125). Schelling argues that if contradiction is seen as 'motion in 
time' then noncontradiction is 'the essence of eternity' and consequently 
151 As we have seen in the first chapter, Kierkegaard also endorses this point of view. 
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"if all of life is truly only a movement to raise itself up from contradiction, 
then time itself is nothing but a constant yearning for eternity" (loc. Cit). 
Moreover, Schelling asks, how can contradiction be resolved in the case 
of the Highest Being? 
Everything longs for eternity. But how can there be something without 
contradiction, and hence Eternal? Is it not the case that the Highest is 
necessarily a thing-that-is, and yet can we deny it being? But if it is a thing-
that-is, then that contradiction which we have shown to exist in everything that 
is will necessarily exist in it as well. The same holds true if the Highest is a 
being, or has a being, and is thus both [a being and a thing-that-is] at the same 
time (AGW 1813: 125). 
Thus, the Highest, or the Unconditioned as Schelling would name it a 
few lines later, is necessarily a 'thing-that-is' and a 'being' and thus it 
can be thought at the same time 'as what posits' and as 'what is posited'. 
Schelling uses the term 'necessary' for he acknowledges both necessity 
and freedom in God. 
Necessity is already recognised when a necessary existence is ascribed to God. 
To speak naturally, there is necessity insofar as it is before freedom, because a 
being must first exist before it could act freely. Necessity lies at the foundation 
of freedom and is in God itself what is first and oldest, insofar as such a 
distinction can take place in God, which will have to be cleared up through 
further consideration. Even though the God who is necessary is the God who is 
free, both are still one and the same (AGW 1815: 5). 
The relationship of freedom and necessity in God is not easily captured 
in words due to its complexity. In the course of this chapter this 
paradoxical relationship will unfold gradually but we can indicate some 
preliminary features of it. 
Before discussing further God as freedom and as necessity, it is 
important to make some preliminary comments concerning Schelling's 
account of time and eternity in order to avoid any confusion regarding 
God's actualisation, God's birth, etc. 
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Indeed, what God is primordially is not to be thought in sequential and 
temporal terms. First, it is important to clarify that Schelling speaks 
about the internal life of God who although has no actual beginning 
outside itself, It152 nevertheless has a beginning within itself. This will 
enable us to understand firstly how something independent of God can 
be in God and secondly to comprehend the so-called birth of God as an 
internal process that is still happening. Schelling emphasises the 
difference between an internal and an external beginning 
The beginning that a being has outside of itself and the beginning that a being 
has within itself are different. A beginning from which it can be alienated and 
from which it can distance itself is different than a beginning in which it 
eternally remains because it itself is the beginning (AGW 1815: 17). 
Consequently, the theogonic process is to be understood as being 
internal to the divine being. In Schelling's account, we therefore come 
across many different beginnings, Le. first, the 'absolute first beginning' 
that is 'pure freedom', second, the 'eternal beginning' that is the negating 
will commencing the wheel of birth within the limits of 'nature' or third, 
the eternal birth of God (AGW 1815: 78) that is the beginning of God's 
actualisation and revelations, etc. Indeed, one can easily confuse and 
152 We are now speaking about the complete idea of God and thus, we are not yet able to speak about God 
as a He (that is a personal God) but rather we have to restrict ourselves to God as an If (see AGW 
1815:39). 
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conflate the different 'beginnings' if one fails to see them as internal 
processes. This observation moves us to the second pOint we wish to 
make. Accordingly, the eternal birth of God- for example- is not to be 
taken as an absolute although internal act that happened once and for 
all. QUite on the contrary, Schelling postulates the existence of a 'system 
of times' (AGW 1813: 123) while he elaborates in an interesting way not 
only on the intermingling of time with eternity but also on the very 
nature of eternity. Thus, Schelling, trying to explain both the succession 
of the potencies that exclude each other with respect to time, he argues 
that 
We express it intentionally in this way for the relationship cannot be of the kind 
such that if the posterior, say A, has being, then the posterior, hence. B. would 
be sublimated. or simply ceased to have being. Rather. is always and 
necessarily abides as having the being of its time. If A is posited, then B must 
simply still persist as the prior, and hence in such a way. that they are 
nonetheless. at the same time. in different times. For different times ... can 
certainly be. as different. at the same time. nay, to speak more accurately. they 
are necessarily at the same time. Past time is not sublimated time. What has 
past certainly cannot be as something present. but it must be as something past 
at the same time with the present. What is future is certainly not something that 
has being now. but it is a future being at the same time with the 
present ... Hence. the contradiction only breaks with eternity when it is in its 
highest intensity and. instead of a single eternity. posits a succession of 
eternities (eons) or times. Hence. eternity opens up into time in this decision 
(AGW 1815: 76). 
Thus, eternal past, eternal present and eternal future are parallel aeons 
that 'necessarily' exist simultaneously. The inauguration of time 'begins' -
in the sense that time becomes actual- with the 'eternal birth' of God, for 
this is the moment where God is posited as Yes and separates Himself 
from No, positing thus nature as His 'eternal past'. Before exploring 
further this, a more detailed presentation of the "Past" is needed, and 
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consequently of the relationship between God's nature and Godhead as 
freedom. 
For Schelling, what is necessary in God is also called 'the nature of God". 
Freedom is not a distinct principle of God in addition to 'being' and to the 
'thing-that-is". Schelling compares the relationship of the nature of God 
with freedom to the relationship between the natural and the spiritual 
life of the person according to the Scriptures 
What is understood here by 'natural' is not simply the by and large 'physical', 
that is, the corporeal. The soul and the spirit. as well as the body, if not born 
again, that is elevated to a different and a higher life, belong to the 'natural' 
(AGW 1815: 5). 
Indeed, freedom can be seen in Schelling's thought as the element that 
energises, breaths life to the whole of cosmos, to God and eventually to 
the human being, elevating them into a higher plane. Without freedom, 
Schelling argues, there would be no creation, for God 
would not be able to create beings outside of itself from a blind necessity in 
God's nature, but rather with the higher voluntarism. To speak even more 
exactly, if it were left to the mere capacity of God's necessity, then there would 
be no creatures because necessity refers only to God's existence as God's own 
existence. Therefore, in creation, God overcomes the necessity of its nature 
through freedom and it is freedom that comes above necessity not necessity that 
comes above freedom (loc. Cit). 
Without freedom, God would be only what is by necessity that is God as 
neceSSarily a thing-that-is and a being. 
Schelling acknowledges the difficulty not only to affirm but also to deny 
these features of the Highest. for we cannot argue that the Highest 
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"cannot possibly be what-is-not [ein Nichtseyendes], [and] cannot 
possibly not be" (AGW 1813: 125). The solution that Schelling proposes to 
the seeming difficulty of the placing of contradiction in the Highest is in 
the same line with the one that he used regarding the law of identity. 
Now, he applies this law in the primordial theo-cosmo-gonic becoming. 
Concerning the nature of God, Schelling reformulates Leibniz's remarks 
on the falsity of the commonly perceived rule according to which 
"disparate things can neither be predicated of each other nor of a third 
thing"(AGW 1813: 128). Leibniz uses the example of body and soul in 
order to clarify this 
One = X is soul and body, which is to say one is the expressing of both, and to 
the extent that it actually expresses them, it is actually both as well. But to the 
extent that it is only their expressing -without taking into account the fact that 
it actually expresses them- it is neither the one nor the other (AGW 1813: 128). 
Schelling, accordingly, applies this conclusion in the nature of the 
primordial being: 
The same thing holds true here. One and the same = X is the expressing of 
both, of what-is and of being. As such, it is neither the one nor the other; it is 
therefore simply one. But if it actually expresses them both then it is both. 
though not as the expressing but rather with respect to the expressed, just as it 
was both before as well, not as the expressing but indeed with respect <to the 
expressible> [dem Aussprechlichen] (ibid: 128). 
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In the stage of pure necessity both the principles153, that are 'being' and 
a 'thing-that-is' have not yet overcome the state of blind opposition and 
blind necessity where all the forces were captured into the wheel l54 of 
birth. This wheel of birth is conceived as "a life that eternally circulates 
within itself, a kind of circle because the lowest always runs into the 
highest, and the highest again into the lowest" (AGW 1815: 20). The 
forces, which are "reciprocally repressing and excluding each other in an 
incessant circulation" within the limits of the wheel of birth are to be 
brought "from succession into simultaneity"155 (ibid: 76). In the state of 
succession of the two opposite forces 156, 'being' (Le. the negating will, the 
"equivalently eternal force of selfhood, of retreat into itself, of Being in 
itself') and 'what-is' (Le. the affirming will, "the outpouring, 
153 It is important to say that one cannot conceive of this stage as absolutely independent of God as 
freedom, so such an analysis will inevitably be incomplete and one-dimensional. The two principles, and 
also a third as their unity, are already present "in what is necessary of God" (AGW 1815: 6). 
154 The 'wheel of birth " or the 'sanctuary' or 'the hearth of life', or the Heraclitean 'tireless fire', are for 
Schelling possible descriptions of the necessary incessant repetitive movement of the forces. Even in the 
Old Testament there is a similar image: "For the LORD your god is a devouring fire, a jealous 
god"(Deuteronomy 4:24: AGW 1815: 20 & 138 n.22). This perpetual movement resembles diastole and 
systole. A visible remainder of this movement is the example of visible nature. Schelling offers as an 
example the tree: "the tree, for example, constantly drives form the root to the fruit, and when it has arrived 
at the pinnacle, it again sheds everything and retreats to the state of fruitlessness, and makes itself back into 
a root, only in order again to ascend ... Yet all of visible nature appears unable to attain settledness and 
seems to transmute tirelessly in a similar circle" (ibid: 21). Thus, the repetitive movement of nature, the 
succession of forces is not the movement of freedom. On the contrary, as we are going to see shortly, 
Schelling narrates the transfiguration of forces from succession into simultaneity and the opposite although 
in a higher form with the intervention of freedom. Freedom is what makes qualitatively different the first 
kind of succession and the last one. In the last chapter, we will encounter a similar account by 
Kierkegaard. He also uses the example of nature in order to indicate the differences between repetition as a 
necessary movement and true repetition as a movement of freedom. 
155 We will see shortly how the movement from simultaneity to succession, that follows the movement of 
inert opposition, opens up the space for a radical discussion of the dimensions of time. 
156 Schelling uses the terms powers, potencies, principles, forces, etc in order to describe the function of the 
affirming will, of the negating will and of their union. Although he clarifies that he uses the term principles 
when he speaks about the steadfast Being characterised by simultaneity and the absence of contradiction, 
whereas he uses the term potencies when he refers to contradiction, opposition and succession, the case is 
that most of the time he is inconsistent with the usage of the words. In the paragraph under consideration 
for example, he terms the affirming and negating wills both principles and powers. 
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outstretching, self-giving being") both exclude each other with respect to 
time (AGW 1813: 143; AGW 1815: 6). Both these powers, in addition to 
the third power that is their unity are equally primordial beginnings and 
struggle to subjugate each other. 
Each of these powers can be for itself. Hence the unity is a unity for itself and 
each of the opposite powers is a whole and complete being. Yet no one of them 
can be without the others also being and hence, only together do they fulfil the 
whole concept of the Godhead and only that God is necessary. Not one of them 
is necessary and by nature subordinate to the others. The negating principle is 
with regard to that inseparable primordial being, as essential as the affirming 
potency. And the unity is in turn, not more essential than each of the opposites 
are for themselves. Therefore each also has fully the same claim to be the being, 
to be that which has being. Not one of them can bring itself by nature only to 
Being or not to be that which has being (AGW 1815: 11). 
Thus, God is both the eternal N0157 that longs for retreat to itself, the 
eternal Yes158 that longs for expansion and communication, and also the 
union of Yes and No. In the course of Schelling's account we have not yet 
reached the point where all the three powers remain inactive and 
therefore "the contradiction itself could remain in concealment" and 
consequently the three powers can be simultaneous. Rather at this point 
we still concern ourselves with the succession of the potenCies. How 
then, is it decided which potency will initiate the cycle and which will 
follow? 
But precisely that one commences and one of them is the first, must result from 
a decision that certainly has not been made consciously or through deliberation 
but can happen rather only when a violent power blindly breaks the unity in t~e 
jostling between the necessity and the impossibility to be. But the only place III 
which a ground of determination can be sought for the precedence of one of 
them and the succession of the other is the particular nature of each of the 
157 God as the eternal No is the indispensable principle of individuation and personhood for otherwise, God 
as a personal God would not be possible. 
15X Although God as No is the ground of existence, God as eternal Yes is the principle of love that makes 
God's revelation actual. 
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principles, which is different from their general nature which consists in each 
being equally originally and equally independent and each have the same claim 
to be that which has being. This is not like saying that one of the principles 
would absolutely have to be the one that proceeds or the one that succeeds. 
Rather, just that, because it is allowed by its particular nature, the possibility is 
given to be the first, the second or the third (AGW 1815: 13) 
Thus, although each of the potencies is co-primordial and CO-original, in 
the state of necessity, each of them, is subject to its own features that 
enable it to posit and be posited. Indeed, the negating will comes first 
and is the 'eternal beginning', followed by the affirming and 
complemented finally by their union, that is 'the eternal end' (ibid: 19). 
We are still discussing primordial being from the perspective of pure 
necessity and therefore the three powers constitute "the necessary 
nature, the being that is not allowed not to be, that absolutely must 
be"(AGW 1815: 11). At this stage of pure necessity, the goal has been 
achieved, and "there is nothing higher to be produced in this course" 
(ibid: 19). How then, could the incessant wheel of birth be broken in 
order for actual existence to come to the fore? Schelling points out that 
an end must be brought into this state of necessity where 
They [Le. potencies] must all strive to be in one and the same locus, namely, in 
the locus of that which have being and hence, so to speak, to be in a single 
point. A reciprocal inexistence is demanded because they are incompatible and 
when one has being, then the others must be without being (AGW 1815: 22). 
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Thus, if this incessant motion is represented as a single pOint159, what is 
needed for a space to open up? There is only one solution according to 
Schelling; if all the principles strive to be 'that which has being for itself 
then 
No other solution is thinkable other than that they all communally and 
voluntarily (then by what would they be coerced?) sacrifice being that which has 
being and hence, debase themselves into a simple Being (AGW 1815: 22). 
All the principles must sacrifice being then in order for space to open up 
and for the blind necessity of 'reciprocal existence' to metamorphose 
"into a relationship of a free belonging together" (loc. Cit). Indeed, a 
transfiguration has taken place and there was a movement from 
"succession into simultaneity". How is this possible, or in other words, 
why did all the prinCiples sacrifice being what "has being" and "sank 
together to the expressible" (ibid: 77)? This voluntary sacrifice can only 
be possible with respect to something higher, an Other 
that is outside of it and wholly independent of it and exalted above it. Since it 
ought therefore to acknowledge itself as mere Being and not as having being 
before that other, this is not possible without recognising at the same time its 
truly having being in that Other (ibid: 23). 
This Other cannot be posited as a potency by this eternally commencing 
nature/necessity. It has to be outside and above all potency, or in other 
words it is a lack of potency. The potencies of the primordial Being in 
the state of necessity suffer from anxiety when facing pure and eternal 
159 The introduction of space reveals the movement from the One to All (or Many) that i~ the re.sul~ of th.e 
cision. This cision "is primarily based on the relationship of that steadfast but inexpreSSIble umty In whIch 
each potency, which should be that which has being, that is, that which should be t~e same and. th.~refore, 
so to speak, should be in one place and one point, is transfonned into the relationshIp of a totalIty (AGW 
1815: 29). 
freedom and its possibility160. The encounter with the Other gave the 
wheel of birth a possibility, that is "either to accept this cision and 
thereby redeem itself from the annual drive or not to accept it and 
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thereby again fall prey to that blind obsession and craving" (AGW 1815: 
23). Needless to say that such a possibility is not a conscious choice 
between alternatives not only because consciousness has not yet arisen 
but also because this decision is one that is beyond choice. It is exactly 
this cision that will inaugurate the dawning of the consciousness and the 
consequent positing of the unconsciousness as the eternal past. 
The question arises regarding the nature of this Other, the mere Presence 
of which makes the necessary wheel of nature to pause, to move from the 
One to All/Many. In other words what is it that makes the potenCies to 
sacrifice their struggle to become the one and urges them to separate, or 
to use Schelling's terminology, to divorce? What is this 'pure freedom' 
that even in its Indifference magically rouses in that incessant wheel of 
life "the yearning for freedom" (AGW 1815: 28)? 
160 In a similar way that human beings suffer from anxiety when they face the possibility o.f freedo~ in 
Kierkegaard, although the latter dismisses Schelling's account on the basis that he put an~Iet~ e~en In God, 
whereas Kierkegaard finds this unacceptable. More explicitly, Kierkegaard, speakIng of obJectIve. 
anxiety', argues that Schelling's usage of the terms anxiety, anguish and anger shou~d be treated With 
suspicion since he confuses "the consequence of sin in creation" with "[what SchellIng calls] the states and 
moods in God (C A: 59 n*). 
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3.2.2 Pure Freedom, Inexpressibility and the emergence of God 
This cision, "this inner divergence, the work of true yearning is the 
first condition of every rapport with the divine" (AGW 1815: 28). 
Schelling recalls the mystic teaching preceding him, the 'higher and finer 
teaching' as he calls it, in order to emphasise that this Other, the 
Highest, 
is exclusively above all Being. The feeling is present in all of us that necessity 
follows from all existence as its grim fate. The only thing actual or the only 
thing that strives to be actual is precisely thereby in contradiction and 
contradiction is the cause of all necessity. An inner feeling tells us that the 
true, eternal, freedom only dwells above Being (AGW 1815: 23). 
In other words, the Other, that is the expressing (das Aussprechende) or 
the Highest is to be identified neither with the 'being' nor with the 'thing-
that-is' since it is none of them in particular, it cannot be both at the 
same time and furthermore it "is above both" (ibid: 126). The expressing 
can be also seen as the copula, namely the 'is' that links the subject and 
the predicate in judgement 161. Thus, the 'is' attains a cosmological 
meaning and it becomes the 'ungrounded ground' that unites and 
gathers the different principles in God but also in cosmos and in all the 
creatures (AGW 1815:8). Thus, the expressing is what underlies the two 
principles viz. 'being' and the 'thing-that-is'. At this moment, both these 
forces and their unity are in a state of inert opposition and are both 
inactive, meaning that in their unity it is not yet the case that one of 
161 In the Ages of the World, Schelling many times interchanges the words cision and crisis (e.g 68-69, etc.) 
and taken into account that in his treatise on freedom, he speaks of judgement in its greek etymology that IS 
as J(ptm~ (crisis) that is as the separation and differentiation that freedom brings into the basis (OHF: 85). 
one wonders about the cosmological dimensions of judgment and its primordiality. 
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these two is inactive and the other active. In other words, their unity162 
is one "in which the opposites are indifferent to each other" (AGW 1813: 
128-9). The expressing is indifferent towards the initial opposition 
between the two potencies, and is called in Schelling's terminology the 
'absolutely First' 
The expressing is present as well, but it does not attend to the opposition; it is 
indifferent towards it. This indifference that we have also considered elsewhere 
under the name of absolute IndiJferenz of subject and object, we call the 
absolutely First (AGW 1813: 131). 
Since the expressing does not attend the opposition it is not yet actual. 
This means that the expressing is not 'what-is' and 'being' with respect 
"to itself or in deed" but with respect to "the expressible, to the possible". 
In other words, both 'being' and a 'thing-that-is' are expressibles of the 
expressing, they only exist as possibilities but at this moment they are 
not yet expressed, they do not actually exist. Schelling investigates 
further the nature of the Highest by asking what could be something that 
can both express itself as 'what is' and as 'being' and refrain from 
expressing itself as both? The philosopher replies that the only thing 
that can both freely exist and not exist, 'by itself and with respect to its 
essence, can only be will". 
For only pure will is free to become active (that is, to exist) or to remain inactive 
(that is, not to exist). It alone is allowed to stand in the middle as it were, 
between being and nonbeing. Thus, that expressing which is free (with res~ect 
to its essence) to attend or not to attend to opposition, to affirm or not to affIrm 
itself as what is and as being- this can only be pure, unmitigated will (AGW 
1813: 132). 
11>2 Schelling warns us against any attempt to conceive of this opposition/unity in Heg~lian te~s, as "if one 
wishes to think all duality as sublated". On the contrary, Schelling repeatedly emphaSIses that one and the 
same thing is both what-is and being" (AGW 1813: 131). 
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Now, the expressing is 'the will that wills nothing'. It is not to be identified 
with the 'negating will' that opposes the 'affirming will', for the 'negating 
will' is a will that wills a 'determinate nothing whilst the expressing 
it is indeed nothing, but in the same way that pure freedom is nothing. It is 
nothing in the same way as the will that wills nothing, that desires no object, to 
which all things are equal, and which is therefore moved by none. Such a will is 
nothing, and yet it is everything. It is nothing to the extent that it neither 
desires to become active nor craves any actuality. It is everything, because all 
strength comes from it alone as the eternal freedom; because it has all things 
under it, and because it rules all things and is ruled by none (AGW 1813: 133-
emphasis added) 
Interestingly enough, Schelling claims that- contrary to what is often 
argued- the First 163 is not a deed, 'an unconditioned activity or action'. If 
this was the case, then contradiction would be eternal, but according to 
Schelling, "all movement is only for the sake of rest" and thus 
Only an immovable, divine- indeed, we would better to say supradivine-
indifference is absolutely First; it is the beginning that is also at the same time 
the end ... For the absolutely First can only be that which the absolutely Last can 
be as well (AGW 1813: 132-3). 
Thus, if we want to speak more rigidly, the 'will that wills nothing' is 
above God, for it is "neither this nor that, neither good nor evil, neither 
what-is nor being, neither affection nor aversion, neither love nor wrath, 
and yet the strength to be all of them" (AGW 1813: 135). The 
characterisation 'above God' is not to be taken literally, that is as 
meaning that there is another being that 'precedes' God or is 
11>3 And thus is not to be confused with the 'eternal beginning'. 
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hierarchically above Him and consequently absolutely distinguished from 
God. On the contrary, this proposition is an urge, a call to 'think' of 
Godhead beyond and 'above' any names, preconceptions etc. It is an 
indication of the inexpressible, the eternally mysterious and the never-to-
be revealed side of the divine nature that is beyond any name, 
description, predicate, etc. However, it is not a rejection of any possibility 
of naming the divine nature. Dionysious the Aeropagite for example, the 
great apophatic theologian, before approaching the apophatic nature of 
God, gives us an account of the 'names' of God. Those names are the 
best possible descriptions 164 of the revealed parts of God, but they 
164 This does not mean that the divine names are simple approximations of the divine nature, implying thus 
that either the human understanding is so limited that could never grasp deity or that in the passing of time 
someone may reveal God in a better and more complete way. 
In contradistinction to the commonly perceived 'apophaticism of the essence', St. Dionysius points towards 
a different kind of apophaticism. Interestingly enough, most of the western theologians and philosophers 
interpret the texts of St. Dionysius under the light of the first kind of apophaticism. In brief, the 
apophaticism of the essence or being is based on the assumption that God is essentially unknowable and 
inapproachable, and consequently, one can secure, via apophatic propositions, His unknownability. 
Anselm(+1109) and Aquinas(+1274) are commonly believed to be the 'founders' of the apophaticism of 
the essence but according to Yannaras, not only scholastics but also most of the great mystics such as 
Eckhart, Duns Scotus, Cusanus, etc, did not manage to escape the trap of this kind of apophaticism. In the 
theology of St. Dionysius, the divine names are not imperfect predicates that should be corrected by the 
negative theology in a dialectical way, as St.Thomas would assert. The latter claims (and his interpretation 
would shape also Derrida's reading of St. Dionysius) that "theology is characterized by its positive 
statements about God; negative theology is required only to draw attention to the imperfections in the 
predicates we attach to God. In the vocabulary we have developed, negative theology supplements positive 
theology; it comes to fill a lack in positive theology, a lack which results from the use of improper 
predicates" (Hart 1989: 200-1 & 193). On the contrary, in the apophaticism of St. Dionysius, the divine 
names are the names of the divine energies and consequently they are perfect descriptions of the ways that 
the Holy Trinity communicates itself to human beings. Nonetheless, apophaticism is a wa}' and because of 
this it is quite distinct from descriptions and names, explaining thus why St. Dionysius gives a higher place 
to apophaticism rather that to positive theology. The danger of the 'apophaticism of the essence' is that it 
creates an insurmountable gap between God and human beings. As we have already mentioned in the 
previous chapter, in Aquinas for example, the problem starts from the suggested identity of the divi~~ 
essence and divine energies. On the contrary, what the theology of the East proposes is the apophatlclsm of 
the person. This kind of apophaticism focuses on the personal God that communicates, that is presents and 
relates his Three Persons to the human persons. Yannaras argues that in the Eastern Church, when one 
speaks of God, he speaks specifically of the God of Abraham Isaac, of the God of the Je~us. ~hrist, of the 
Trinity of the Three Persons that is ofa personal God etc. On the contrary, when one pnontlzes the 
common essence that the Three Persons share (as it is the case with the' apophaticism of the essence') 
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nevertheless do not exhaust his unfathomable depths and heights. In a 
beautiful passage in his Mystical theology, St. Dionysius writes: 
Au8t<; 8£ avWV1£<; AEyOJ.1EV, w<; OU1£ 'VUXTl £O"UV, OU1£ voU<; ... OU1£ olloto1Tl<; Tl avollow1Tl<;; 
OU1£ £0"1TlKEV OU1£ KtV£t1Ut, OU1£ TlO"uXtav uyn, OU1£ £XEt 8uVUlltv, OU1£ 8uVUllt<; £O"nv ... ; 
OU1£ ~Tl, OU1£ ~Wl1 £O"UV; ou8£ oumu £0"1tV, OU1£ atwv, OU1£ xpovo<; ... ou8£ AOyO<; UU1Tl<; EO" 
nY, OU1£ OVOIlU, OU1£ yvwm<;; ou8£ O"K010<; £O"UV, ou8£ <l>ro<;; OU1£ 1tAaYTl, OU1£ aATl8£tU I65 ... 
(Mystical theology Ch. E: 253) 
Indeed, in his discussion of the names of God in the Old Testament, 
Schelling distinguishes between Jehovah, that is the inexpressible name 
of the God, the name of the essence, the expressing 1, that can say of 
itself "I am the alpha and the omega, the beginning and the end" (AGW 
1813: 135&164n.4; AGW 1815: 52), and Elohim that is the name of the 
instead of the reality of the Three Persons themselves (as in the 'apophaticism of the person') one restricts 
his relation to God into a limited place (Yannaras 1992: 38-40). Thus, even Eckhart's attempt to approach 
the "divine abyss", the Gottheit, is seen by Yannaras as a positing of essence before the Persons, or in other 
words, it is an impersonal apophaticism of God in the sense that God's definition as nothing precedes 
God's definition as Trinity (ibid: 41). Under this light, one has to approach Schelling's apophaticism with 
caution in order not to confuse it with either the' apophaticism of the essence' or with the 'apophaticism of 
the person". Much of Schelling's tenninology could confuse us and his philosophy could be easily 
interpreted as being an example of the second kind of apophaticism, mainly because he makes a similar 
distinction between divine essence and divine effects, considering both of them as being of equal 
importance but distinct from each other. It is not our intention to rush into hasty conclusions regarding 
Schelling's apophaticism, but only to pinpoint and 'take notice' of some tricky and interesting points that 
he makes. What makes us believe that Schelling is closer to the 'apophaticism of the essence' rather than 
to the 'apophaticism of the person' is mainly his admission that Godhead as pure freedom is purus actus 
(AGW 1815: 26) ,that means that this God is an It and not a He, or in other words He is not yet a living 
God. On the contrary, the apophaticism of the person deals with the living God. Moreover, we have 
already seen Schelling'S detestation of the conceptions that present God as being solely pure actuality 
(purus actus) and that makes us believe that although he retains pure freedom or the ungrounded in an 
attempt to save the 'transcendent', nevertheless he fails to overcome the problems that it generates. 
1('5 "Whilst we are ascending we utter: He is neither soul nor nous ... neither equality nor inequality ... He is 
neither standing, nor moving, nor resting ... He is neither potentiality (or strength, or power), He is nor 
potential. .. He is not alive, He is not Life; He is neither essence, nor eternity, nor time ... There is neither 
account (logos) for Him, no name, no knowledge. He is neither darkness, nor light. nor delusion, nor 
truth ... "(my translation). 
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'divine effects'. Jehovah is not a common name, since in the primordial 
language He is the name: 
Jehovah was i.n an equally originary way posited as Elohim in this relationship 
of the expressIng, of the name or the word. "What should I answer the children 
of Israel," asks Moses, "when I say to them, 'The Elohim of your fathers sends 
me to you' and they ask me: 'What is his name?'" And Jehovah answered, 
"hence, you should say, 'Jehovah, the Elohim of your fathers, sends me to you. 
That is my name for eternity. "'{Exodus 3:15) ... It was always noticed how this 
name, whose true pronunciation is unknown, consists of pure breath. From 
this it was concluded that it indicated that the Godhead was pure breath, pure 
spirit (AGW 1815: 52). 
At this point we have already moved into another stage of Schelling's 
exploration of the past. Accordingly, the 'will that wills nothing' that 
necessary is 'what-is' and 'being' expresses itself and both 'what-is' and 
being are no more expressibles but are rather expressed, that is they 
have moved from the realm of possibility into the realm of actuality. The 
history of revelations has eternally started. In this transformation a part 
. of the expressing. remains inexpressible, and this is Jehovah 
We can therefore see that in the very moment when the Highest is supposed to 
express itself, it becomes the inexpressible. Let no one be mistaken about this, 
or waste time in debate against those who deny it. One must in fact insist on 
this very inexpressibility, because it is necessary for the highest life. If what 
wills to express itself in all life were not inexpressible by nature ... how could 
there be an absolutely Highest that never becomes the expressible, but eternally 
remains only the expressing? (AGW 1813: 170). 
Indeed, the expressing as the pure I of divinity cannot be fully expressed 
but remains as the groundless ground of all existence that no language 
can ever grasp. But language cannot also grasp nature's dimension as 
the dark and inscrutable being, which is also the mother and receptacle 
of all. Indeed, God's resolution166 to reveal Himself is simultaneous with 
the decision, according to which He as the eternal No should be "the 
ground of the existence of the eternal Yes" (ibid: 77). The living God, is 
the Godhead both as a pure spirit/pure freedom and as its Other (in this 
case Schelling means the nature of God), and this explains how 
something can be in God but being distinct from Him, 
For since God is not the cause of the Other through a special volition but through God's 
mere essence, the Other is certainly not the essence of God, but it belongs to God's 
essence, indeed in a natural and inseparable way. It therefore follows that if the pure 
Godhead=A, and that the Other=B, then the full concept of the living God which has 
being is not merely A, but is A+B. (AGW 1815: 42). 
At this moment, His nature is posited as 'eternal past', in a cision that is 
still happening: " ... that dark, inscrutable, and inexpressible being 
becomes the All in a subjugation and cision that does not happen once 
and for all, but in a moment that is eternally, always, and still 
happening" (ibid: 29). 
The eternal past is not a fleeting moment but has duration, the latter 
being the meeting point of eternity with time (ibid: 80). This is the 
duration of the unconsciousness where the two simultaneous but also 
successive creations have taken place. Two simultaneous creations have 
happened, the first being the separation of darkness from light and the 
second the separation of nature from spirit. In the first, the three 
11>6 This resolution, for Schelling, is only comparable with the similar act of a human being that we will 
explore in the last part of this chapter: "This resolution [Ent-Schliessung], coming out of the innerm?st 
unity. is only comparable to that incomprehensible primordial act in which the freedom of a person IS 
decided for the first time"(AGW 1815: 77). 
I"l 
potencies, voluntarily, in the face of pure freedom, sank into the 
expressible and then moved from simultaneity into succession once more 
although now in a different form. The cision, inaugurating the spatial 
dimension where a true over and a true under emerges for the potencies, 
did not happen once and for all. After the positing of a true over and a 
true under, each potency acquires its proper topos and there is a mutual 
nurturing of each other. The first potency is the possible substratum of 
external nature, the second potency is the substratum of the spiritual 
world and the third potency is the link between the Godhead and nature, 
for although it was captured in the wheel of birth, in its freedom it is the 
closest to God and is the universal soul. The wheel of life still continues 
to rotate but enriched with freedom's energy that transforms it into an 
incessant theurgy: 
... this constantly repeated movement of eternal nature, always beginning again, 
can be regarded as an incessant theurgy. The meaning and goal of all theurgy is 
nothing other than to draw the Godhead down to what is lower. .. , to produce the 
gUiding concatenation, so to speak, through which the Godhead would be able 
to act in nature (AGW 1815: 72). 
The second creation is the emergence of God as spirit and his 
positedness as Yes, which is Love. If we want to present it schematically, 
in the eternal moment of first creation the dark side of nature voluntarily 
withdraws, refrains from being actualised, becomes what it was 167 , the 
167 In the sense that even before the separation of forces and the first realisation of the divine being it was 
again chara. the receptacle of all things. For example, Schelling compares the primallongi~g of the depths 
with the Platonic chora that 'follows some dark, uncertain law, incapable of forming anythIng that can 
endure. In Timaeus. the name chara means space, implying thus that in a sense chara provides the needed 
172 
Platonic chora, "the mother and receptacle of all visible things"(AGW 
l8l3:3l}, and light emerges. At this moment the realm of nature opens 
up for Schelling, which in external fashion could be seen as being best 
presented in the Old Testament where the law168 was pre-eminent (OHF: 
92). God's revelation is continuous and at this moment He is both 
Elohim and Jehovah169, the latter being his inexpressible side. In the 
second creation, where the will of depths, or in other words the will that 
denies expansion and is seen as the eternal force of selfhood that longs 
particularity retreats in front of the will of love that longs expansion and 
universality and God as spirit and love emerges. He reveals himself as a 
personal170 God, as a He instead of an It (AGW 1815:39), uniting in 
himself selfhood and expansion, elevating thus particularity into spirit. 
In order for this to happen, He has to say Nota his eternal ground, and 
thus a side of the pure I of divinity (i. e. pure freedom) remains 
inexpressible and unspeakable. Thus, the eternal past, that is the 
unconsciousness, incorporates both (viz. pure freedom and pure 
necessity) the unspeakable sides of God that are united and function 
together. The express ib les , or in other words the archetypes, continue 
space for the things to come, or in Plato's words "a situation of all the things that come into being" 
(Timaeus B: 49a&50de). Chora is graspable neither with a 'rational account' nor with a 'likely one'. 
Chora, is characterless, invisible, all-receiving and can be understood only by a bastard reasoning 
(AOytO'/-lW vo9w), that Plato compares it with a dream where we 'see' the imaginary topos of all the things 
that are coming into existence (ibid: 52bc). If space for Schelling opens up after the divorce of forces, then 
chora is for him the condition that makes space possible. 
16~ This is why in a similar fashion, in the first creation every potency is described as following its own 
inner law (see AGW 1815: 30ff) 
169 This is why Jehovah is presented as consuming fire, etc. 
170 The example of personal God is for Schelling Christ, the God-Man that inaugura~es the ne~ covenant. 
We will see in our next chapter the importance that Kierkegaard gives to the revelatIOn of Chnst. 
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incessantly their theurgic transmutation and inform any creative act that 
springs from the unconsciousness (AGW 1815: 66-68). Even perceived in 
their blindness, as the necessary wheel of birth, the incessant movement 
of the potenCies is seen by Schelling as a source of inspiration and 
creativity, or as divine and holy madness 
When inspiration appears in poetic and other kinds of works, a blind force must 
also appear in them. For only a blind force is capable of inspiration. All 
conscious creation presupposes an unconscious creating. Conscious creating is 
just the unfolding and setting into opposition of unconscious creating (AGW 
1815: 102). 
Indeed, God's ground that is separate from Him but in Him is the ground 
of the creation of cosmos, of external nature and inevitably of human 
beings. Surprisingly enough, Schelling names this 'ungrounded ground' 
of God that comprises nature and 'pure freedom', His personality, his 
ipseity (AGW 1815:107). On Of Human Freedom, Schelling calls God the 
highest personality, meaning that within him there is the perfect 
connection of the ideal principle with the independent ground, implying 
thus that God's personality should be seen as relational, that is as 
expressing both the relation of ground and existence and the 
inexpressibility of the divine. His personality is what differentiates 
Himself from the other creatures 
... already in the language of ancient philosophy, personality is .expl~ned. as the 
ultimate act or the ultimate potency by which an intelligent beIng eXl~ts m an 
incommunicable fashion. This is the principle that instead, of confUSIng God 
with the creature, as was believed. eternally divides God from the creature. 
Everything can be communicated to the creature except for one thing. The 
creature cannot have the immortal ground of life in itself. The creature cannot 
be of and through itself (AGW 1815: 107). 
17.+ 
Only the human beings are somehow exempted from this rule, through 
their special relation with God's ground not only as spirits, but also as 
having this essence that attributes to them the possibility of 
inexpressibility as well 
Man must be granted an essence outside and above the world; for how could he 
alone, of all creatures, retrace the long path of developments from the present 
back into the deepest night of the past, how could he alone rise up to the 
beginning of things unless there were in him an essence from the beginning of 
times? Drawn from the source of things and akin to it, what is eternal of the 
soul has a co-science/consciousness [Mitt-Wissenschaftj of creation (AGW 1813: 
114). 
Thus, if -as we have seen- science is for Schelling the striving towards 
anamnesis, then co-science or con-sciousness could be seen as the 
restoration of memory that needs anamnesis (recollection) as its 
presupposition. This recalls Philo's wonderful account on the function of 
memory. Philo, describing the way the mind is set in motion, explains 
that this happens "by occasion of that which is not present as well, if 
past, by way of memory, if future, by building hopes and expectations" 
(Allegorical II ch.XII 43-46 : 253). Although, it seems that Philo has a 
very similar account to that of St. Augustine, it transpires that his 
conception of memory opens up the space for a radical theory of time. 
Thus, when he discusses the difference between memory and 
recollection, he argues that memory possesses the superior position. This 
happens because recollection presupposes forgetfulness, the latter being 
described as a "maimed and blind affair". On the contrary, memory is 
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represented as "unbroken and uninterrupted", keeping everything "that it 
has apprehended fresh and distinct" (ibid III Ch. XXX 90-93:363). 
Consequently, recollection, although being inferior, can also be seen as 
older than memory, since it is its presupposition. As Philo 
characteristically claims, " ... as the result of repeated forgetting and 
repeated recollecting an unfailing memory shall subsequently win the 
day" (loc. Cit). Thus, one can argue that for Schelling, memory would be 
the retrieval of the relationship with the duration of the 'eternal past' 
through anaTTUlesis. 
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3.3 Human freedom & the possibility of good and evil 
Human freedom is defined by Schelling as the 'possibility of good and 
evil' and we have already emphasised the importance of the 'and' in the 
above definition. Before exploring the dimensions of human freedom, an 
inevitable question arises: Is also divine freedom a 'possibility of good 
and evil'? Or put differently, what is the relationship of God with evil, 
taking into account that the root of evil, that is freedom, is independent 
of God but nevertheless in God? In the description of the theogonic 
process we came across a two-faced resolution: firstly, the potencies 
decided to sacrifice themselves, that is to accept the cision instead of 
falling again in "blind obsession and craving" (AGW 1815: 23). Secondly, 
the same decision means that God resolves that He wants to give birth to 
Himself, uttering consequently No to His nature. We have seen that this 
act is repeated eternally, within the duration of eternal past. Although, 
the abyss171 freely decides to retreat and allows God's revelation to 
happen there is still in the abyss the will of depths that longs for 
realisation. This reaction that comes from the depths is said to be the 
root of universal evil 
There is, therefore, a universal evil, even if it is not active from the beginning but 
is only aroused in God's revelation through the reaction of the basis, and indeed 
never reaches realization, but is nonetheless constantly striving towards it. 
Only after recognising evil in its universal character is it possible to comprehend 
good and evil in man too (OHF: 58). 
171 This is another name for the abysmal side of God's nature (AGW 1815: 31). 
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This is not to mean that God consists of two opposite equal powers that 
are in constant fight with each other until one finally prevails. On the 
contrary, Schelling insists, the succession and concatenation of 
potencies is "indissoluble in divine life" although it is "dissoluble in 
human life" and that makes evil possible in human life but impossible in 
the divine life (AGW 1815: 43). Similarly enough, as Schelling argues in 
his treatise on freedom, the unity of the potencies, or in other words of 
the 'will of love' and of the 'will of depths' is indissoluble in God and 
dissoluble in man 
If, now, the identity of both principles were just as indissoluble in man as in 
God, then there would be no difference - that is, God, as spirit would not be 
revealed. Therefore that unity, which is indissoluble in God must be dissoluble 
in man- and this constitutes the possibility of good and evil (OHF: 39). 
As Schelling characteristically argues, among the visible creatures only 
the human beings are in God, and via this 'very being-in-God' are 
capable of freedom. In this sense, the human being is also the 'redeemer 
of nature', meaning that by her connection with God, "God ... also accepts 
nature and takes it to him' (OHF: 92). The importance that Schelling 
ascribes to human beings is striking. The dissolubility of the forces in 
the human beings proves their freedom and the independent relation 
they have with God and with His ground. Even with respect to God, the 
human being is free and thus she is primordially capable of evil. For 
Schelling, in the human being there are also two principles, namely the 
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principle of light and the principle of darkness, and consequently two 
centres, "the deepest pit and the highest heaven"{ibid: 38). The principle 
of darkness, if it is taken separately, is the negating will or the self-will 
whilst the principle of light is the affirming will or the universal l72 and 
expanding will. Similarly to the theogonic creation, although the selj- will 
opposes reason as the universal will, the latter "makes use of the former 
and subordinates it to itself as a mere tool" and consequently, through 
the "progressive transformations and division of all forces", the self-will 
unites with the universal will, without losing its individuality. In the 
same way as in God, in the human being the elevation of the self-will and 
its union with the universal will is described as the "the elevation of the 
most abysmal centre into light". Indeed, the will of the human being 
... to the extent to which it is individual, is also a particular will, though in itself 
or as the centre of all other particular wills it is one with the primal will or 
reason (OHF: 38) 
Human being's rise from the depths makes her contain a principle 
"relatively independent of God" but since this principle is transfigured 
172 Reason as universal will is the expression that Schelling uses in his treatise on freedom. It is quite 
interesting that in his description of the cosmo-anthropo-gonic process in this book, Schelling claims that 
because of the longing of the depths, there was born in God an imaginative response to it and through this 
response, "God sees himself in his own image, since his imagination can have no other object than 
himself'. This image, Schelling calls reason or the logic of that longing. He furthermore emphasises that 
the first "effect of reason in nature is the separation of forces" or in other words" ... reason, in the light 
which has appeared in the beginnings of nature, rouses longing ... to divide the forces ... and this very 
division brings out the unity enclosed in what was divided, the hidden light" (OHF: 36). The function of 
reason reminds us the function of pure freedom in the Ages of the World, making us think the possibility of 
a different approach of reason as including also the unconsciousness, the divine and human madness, etc .. 
Furthermore, in the Ages of the World, in an indirect reference to the first verse of the first book of Genesl,s, 
Schelling describes the power that pacifies the potencies not only as 'pure freedom' but also. as the 'word: 
"The forces of that consuming fire still slumber in life, only pacified and, so to speak, exorcised by that 
word by which the one became the all" (AGW 1815: 49). 
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into light then the 'spirit' arises in human being. The union of the two 
principles brings forth 'spirit' and the very relationship of the human 
being with God constitutes her personality 
That principle which rises up from the depths of nature and by which man is 
divided from God, is the selfhood in him; but by reason of its unity with the ideal 
principle, this becomes spirit. Selfhood, as such, is spirit; or man as an 
egocentric, particularised being (divorced from God) is spirit- the very relation [to 
God] constitutes personality (OHF: 39-emphasis added). 
As far as the two principles are in union, and in a similar way with that 
of God, the human being utters Yes to light and No to her dark depths, 
that is insofar as the self-will remains subordinate to the universal will, 
then the principles are indissoluble, and evil has not yet appeared. 
However, seljhood as spirit is beyond the two principles and free from 
them and thus selfhood can separate itself from light and consequently 
dissolution of the principles is possible where the self-will demands to be 
in itself what it was in its union with the universal will. Indeed, the 
emergence of spirit is what differentiates the human beings from the 
other visible creatures. For example the animals, by not having spirit, 
can never escape from the unity of forces whilst "man can deliberately 
cut the eternal nexus of forces" (OHF: 49). This last observation makes 
Baader to utter that "unfortunately man can only stand above or beneath 
animals" (loc. Cit). The consequence of the elevation of self-will into an 
autonomous position inaugurates the reality of a false life, of disease and 
of sin. If, Schelling says "a genuine life could only exist in the original 
relationship, there thus arises a life which is indeed a life, but is false, a 
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life of lies ... " (OHF: 41). The most "appropriate comparison" is disease, 
which for Schelling is a disorder that entered nature through a misuse of 
freedom, and this is why it is a counterpart of sin and evil. Sickness is a 
false life that longs for its elevation from not-being into being, it is a 
"nothing that endeavours to be something" (AGW 1815: 48), or in other 
words it endeavours to be God in place of God. More specifically, 
Schelling claims that in the second creation that is the creation of spirit, 
there were also two principles that were acting, in a similar fashion with 
the creation of light out of darkness. Indeed, in the second creation, the 
spirit of evil has been awakened through the arousing of 'the dark 
natural basis' and has as its opposition the spirit of love, that arises in 
the centre and in a similar way as did light before, it controls and 
subjugates the spirit of evil (OHF: 54). But when the two principles, that 
are light and darkness are at strife in a human being and their unity has 
been dissolved, then 
Another spirit occupies the place where God should be. This is namely the 
reverse of God, a being which was roused to actualisation by God's revelation 
but which can never attain to actuality from potentiality, a being which never 
exists but always wishes to be, and which like the matter of the ancients, can 
thus never be grasped as real (actualised) by perfect reason but only by false 
imagination (AOyt<Jf.1ID v08w) which is exactly what sin is (OHF: 68). 
Schelling's comparison of the 'spirit of evil' with chora or matter is 
indicative of his intention to emphasise the fallacy of the 'false 
imagination', although it should not be interpreted as an identification of 
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chora173 or matter with evil. Schelling refrains from identifying evil with 
the 'initial blind life' in itself whose "nature is nothing but conflict, 
anxiety, and contradiction". If this initial life 
were ever for itself or were it not engulfed since eternity by something higher and 
placed back into potentiality, it could neither be called a sick nor an evil life. 
Fo~ these concepts firs~ bec?me. possible after life is subjugated by the mollifying 
umty but at the same tIme IS stIll free to emerge, to withdraw itself from the 
unity and enter into its own nature (AGW 1815: 48). 
Thus, Schelling emphasises once more, evil does not spring forth either 
from the depths or from God because evil is a spiritual issue and thus 
connected with the emergence of selfhood. Evil can only arise "in the 
innermost will of one's own deed" and in the same way as religiosity174, it 
requires highest commitment. Selfhood - that comes from the depths- is 
not evil in itself, in the sense that "in the good the reaction of the depths 
works towards goodness, in the bad towards evil" (OHF: 80). Indeed, 
using the law of analogy, in a similar way to God's resolution to say Yes, 
positing thus His eternal past, the human being is called to a similar 
primordial resolution that is beyond time. The relationship between 
God's personality and human being's personality plays an important role 
to the direction (Le. Yes or No) of this primordial resolution in the sense 
173 It has to be remarked that in Timaeus, Plato never identifies chora with matter. Aristotle was the first to 
propose such identification and since then the neo-platonic school endorses his terminology although 
without endorsing his analysis. Moreover, Plato never identifies chora with evil for the former is the 
complete privation of all qualities and thus we cannot attribute to it the quality of being evil. Although 
Plotinus follows the platonic tradition he has concluded that since matter (endorsing the Aristotelian 
terminology) is having no content then it must "necessary be evil" (Enneades ii.4.16: 149). But even in 
Plotinus this does not mean that the receptacle is a source of evil affecting the things that are in it. . 
Nevertheless, since chora neither affects the things that are in it, nor it is affected by the things that are I.n 
it and which are good in virtue of their likeness to the Ideas, then chora, in Plotinus, is identified with evIl 
b,ecause it does not participate in good (ibid iii.6.11: 255). 
1,4 As we have seen in the beginning of this chapter. 
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that both God and the human being reveal themselves in a relational 
way. It is relational in the sense that both the human and divine beings 
meet and relate to each other in their comportment. At this point it is 
important to emphasise that Godhead's depictions as Yes, No and their 
union are not to be seen as a characterisation of His essence but rather 
as "distinctions ... only of the comportment, [that is] of the relationship of 
the one essence with respect to Being", and this is a feature of God as 
eternal freedom (AGW 1815: 74). Human being's exercise of freedom is 
revealed in her comportment that forms her existence. 
The human being is a creature, but nevertheless a creature of the 
'centrum', and thus she is placed outside time 
Man, even though born in time, is nonetheless a creature of creation's beginning 
(the centrum). The act, which determines man's life in time, does not itself 
belong in time but in eternity. Moreover it does not precede life in time ... but as 
an act eternal by its own nature. Through it man's life extends to the beginning 
of creation, since by means of it he is also ... free and himself eternal beginning 
(OHF: 63-4-emphasis added). 
This means that the human being, among the other visible creatures, is 
the one that partiCipates both in God's eternal past and her own eternal 
past, or in other words we can say that her 'resolution' in relation to 
God's eternal past, that is to His abyss175, constitutes her personality and 
moreover her eternal past. The human being participates in God's 
eternal past due to her presence in the centre in the moment of creation 
and to her special affinity with the third potency that is the "universal 
175 One can also argue that the distinction between God's 'eternal past' and human being's 'eternal past' is 
similar to the Jungian distinction between personal and collective unconsciousness. 
183 
soul". It can also be argued that the third potency, the union of love and 
selfhood, is the human being because this potency, in the same way as 
the person, provides the link between God and the world (AGW 1815:37). 
Thus, the human being primordially acts both at the level of universal 
soul and at the level of her individual soul, in collective and in personal 
eternal past. Indeed, Schelling conceives the human being as playing a 
'central' role in creation and this is why the 'histories' of God, cosmos 
and person are intermingled. Fackenheim claims that in Schelling's 
positive philosophy the third potency, by virtue of being the only one 
among the three potencies that is free to will or not to will is the 'original 
man' or in other words 'man-in-God' in the sense that the human being's 
primordial freedom "consists in the bare choice between willing and not-
willing. For any particular decision presupposes the decision to will at 
all" (Fackenheim 1996: 119). The proper meaning of religiosity that we 
have encountered in the beginning of this chapter becomes now more 
transparent and the identity of a higher form of necessity with that of a 
higher form of freedom- not only in the case of God but also in the case 
of the human being- is now explicable. Faith, in a similar way with 
Kierkegaard's conception of it as we will explore in the next chapter, 
means "confidence in what is divine, which excludes all choice" (OHF: 
73). 
Furthermore, in the same line of thought, Schelling suggests an 
interesting and radical account of the doctrine of predestination, where 
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the responsibility lies in the aforementioned human being's primordial 
resolution, introducing at the same time his notion of 'contemporaneity' 
which was destined later to inform Kierkegaard's homonymous notion: 
The greatest obstacles to the doctrine of freedom has ever been the relation of 
the assumed accidental nature of human conduct to the unity of the world-
whole as previously planned in divine reason. Thus there came the assumption 
of predestination, since neither God's prescience nor actual providence could be 
relinquished. The authors of the doctrine of predestination felt that human 
conduct must have been determined from eternity. However they did not seek 
this determination in the eternal act contemporaneous with creation, which 
constitutes the being of man itself, but in an absolute (Le. wholly unfounded) 
decision of God through which one individual was predetermined to damnation, 
the other to blessedness; and thus they destroyed the root of freedom (OHF: 65-6-
emphasis added). 
On the contrary, for Schelling, each human, in its contemporaneity with 
the primordial act of creation, breaks the limits of time, and repeatedly 
"participates" and "acts" in the 'eternal past' which is simultaneous with 
the 'eternal present' and the 'eternal future'. Thus, every human being 
'determines' herself in its contemporaneity with the act of creation and in 
a sense it takes its 'stance' before time but in etemity. 
It seems that Schelling's conceptions of 'highest commitment', 'eternal 
resolution', and 'predetermination' provide us with a really strong 
account of the person's responsibility and of her deed 'beyond time' that 
determines her further life. Thus one can argue that in Schelling there is 
no possibility of conversion from evil to good after the primordial 
resolution where the human being herself determines her life. But if we 
have a closer look at Schelling's text, we come across a different account. 
Accordingly, Schelling claims that through the dissolubility of potenCies 
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that is always possible in the human being, evil is always a possibility in 
human life and in a sense 'radical evil' is for Schelling ,"an evil which 
attaches to us by our own act, but does so from birth"(OHF: 67). The 
possibility of a change from evil to good, and the repetitive reunion of 
potenCies, is possible for the human being even in the case that the good 
principle in him seems to be -but is not- dead: 
However, if it happens that human or divine aid- for some aid man always 
needs-determines him to change his conduct to the good, the fact that man 
accepts this influence of the good, and does not positively shut it out from him,-
this fact is also to be found in that initial act because of which he is this individual 
and not another. In the man in whom this transmutation has not yet taken place 
but in whom, too, the good principle has not completely died, there is that inner 
voice of his own better self (OHF: 67). 
One has to admit that of the many unsurpassable difficulties implied by 
Schelling's account of creation, the most important concerns the status 
of this 'intelligible' act that allegedly determines the life of a human 
being. Is this though conceived as a definite act that determines 
'irretrievably' the human life? Schelling is careful not to suggest that 
even due to their own determination human beings are divided into good 
and evil ones. Quite on the contrary, the philosopher secures himself 
against such misunderstandings, in argUing in favour of the possibility of 
conversion. 
Thus, it seems to us that what Schelling implies is that if the person has 
not suffered what we have called in the first chapter 'spiritual death' then 
there is always the possibility of change and transmutation. The human 
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being is actively taking eternally part to both 176 successive and 
simultaneous creations, that are the emergence of light and the 
emergence of spirit, and even in the case that he affirms light instead of 
darkness, there is always the possibility that, in her freedom 177, she can 
also suffer a conversion from good to evil. If one wants to further 
Schelling's argument, employing the terminology of the Ages of the World, 
one can argue that the possibility of the dissolubility of potencies makes 
the duration of human being's eternal past quite different from that of the 
divine being in the sense that although God's resolution in relation to 
eternal past is always one that confirms life and love, in the case of the 
human being this is a versatile relation since it can oscillate and change 
its position in a dramatic way. 
176 Because even within the limits of the eternal past there are parallel eternities that exist at the same time 
but in different times. . . 
177 Interestingly enough, Schelling argues that human freedom is secured even in the c~e ~h~t It I.S truly . 
argued that "however man be constituted, it is not he himself but either the good or e:II S~lf1~ wh~ch acts In 
him" (OHF: 68). This is because " ... this very letting-act-in-him of the good or the e:J1 p:,Inclple IS the 
consequence of the intelligible deed, through which man's being and life are determIned (loc. CIt). 
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concluding remarks 
In this chapter I attempted to present a different account of 
creation, freedom, time and theurgic repetition, and last but not least of 
God, through an interpretation of the works usually classified as 
belonging to Schelling's middle period. It was argued that Schelling 
offers us an account of a living and personal God qualitatively different of 
the representations ensuing from the writings of St. Augustine and Kant. 
It was furthermore shown how Schelling's innovative concept of 
identity provided the ground for an original account of evil and good that 
places the root of evil 'independent of God' but 'in God'. Schelling's idea 
of freedom as a possibility of good 'and' evil considered together with his 
account concerning the Simultaneity of different times (Le. eternal past, 
eternal present and eternal future) inaugurates a radical conception of 
the collision of time and eternity, that relates intrinsically the notions of 
repetition and contemporaneity. 
Finally, the person's ability to intervene and relate in different ways 
with the duration of her eternal past was considered in this chapter. 
More importantly as we have shown in the introduction of this 
thesis Schelling's writings of the middle period pave the ground for a 
revaluation and reinterpretation of the religious themes emerging from 
Kierkegaard's aesthetic writings and of which the latter urges his readers 
to 'take notice'. 
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Accepting the challenge, we undertake a fresh discussion and 
interpretation of the religious themes of contemporaneity, repetition, 
freedom and the Fall in Kierkegaard's works in the next and final chapter 
of this study. 
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Chapter Four 
Kierkegaard on Repetition, Faith and Contemporaneity 
If God himself had not willed 
repetition, the world would not have come 
into existence. Either he would have 
followed the superficial plans of hope or he 
would have retracted everything and 
preserved it in recollection. This he did not 
do. Therefore, the world continues, and it 
continues because it is repetition 
(Repetition: 133). 
Introductory remarks 
In this chapter a further elaboration of the notions of faith, repetition and 
contemporaneity in Kierkegaard's thought will be attempted. The first 
part of the chapter concerns the discussion of repetition as a religious 
movement towards faith as it can be derived from Kierkegaard's 
homonymous book. Furthermore, two celebrated biblical stories Job's 
ordeal and Abraham's sacrifice are also discussed as examples of true 
repetition, while they serve as instances for the development of a 
primordial understanding of repetition. In the second part of this 
chapter, we attempt to relate the concept of repetition with Kierkegaard's 
idea of being contemporaneous with the paradox of God's coming into 
existence. This allows us to re-address, under a new light, the meaning 
of the passage quoted above and in strategic moments of this thesis. 
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4.1 Repetition as a transcendent movement towards faith 
In the previous chapter we have discussed Schelling's treatment of 
the notions of human and divine freedom, of time and history, and of 
repetition and contemporaneity. In his vivid narration of cosmogony and 
theogony as well as anthropogeny, we have seen the interrelation of the 
aforementioned concepts and the intermingling of the divine, the human 
and nature, which makes us have a strong intimation of the mystic 
relation that permeates the cosmos as a whole. For Schelling, the 
human being is an active part of the cosmic becoming, communicates 
with the cosmic powers and thus she does not suffer from the loneliness 
in the "physical universe of modern cosmology" wonderfully described by 
Pascal in the following words: "Cast into the infinite immensity of spaces 
of which I am ignorant, and which know me not, I am frightened" (Jonas 
1992: 322; Pascal fr.205). Although unlike Schelling, Kierkegaard seems 
to be indifferent to the development of a holistic 178 narrative, he 
nevertheless still employs a terminology that looks similar to that of 
Schelling in order to express the highest forms of religiosity, namely the 
notions of repetition, faith and contemporaneity. As already mentioned 
in the introductory remarks, in this chapter we will explore Kierkegaard's 
conceptualisation of those notions and we will attempt to challenge the 
17S Kierkegaard's main interest is the single individual and therefore he does not develop any p~ilosop~y of 
nature, etc. On the contrary, he seems to endorse and to follow a far-fetched (in the sense ~hat m ou~ vIew 
Socrates himself retains a mystical relation with the whole) description of Socrates accordmg to whIch 
"when he [Socrates] perceived that the study of physical things was not our concern ... began to 
philosophize in the workshops and in the marketplace about ethical matters" (Repetition: 300). 
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boundaries of his thought that according to his self-understanding is 
focused solely on the single individual. Jonas, commenting on Pascal's 
fragment, points out that among all the features of this chaotic universe 
that isolates the human being, the worst and most frightening is "silence, 
that is, the indifference of this universe to human aspirations ... " (Jonas 
1992: 322). Let us recall that silence is also the term that Kierkegaard 
uses in order to express the sole company of Abraham in his ascent of 
the mount Moriah. Was Abraham experiencing the mystic silence that 
precedes every religiously ecstatic experience or was he suffering from 
the indifference of "this universe" towards him? Or to put it differently, 
was Abraham suffering from the indifference of God towards his 
paradoxical suffering? Although this question has to remain open, we 
should still attempt to come up with some sort of response. Abraham's 
story will serve as the vaulting horse of a proper discussion of 
Kierkegaard's conception of faith in the course of this chapter. 
Schelling's conceptions of faith as "confidence in what is divine, which 
excludes all chOice" (OHF: 73) and of religiosity as being the "highest 
commitment to the right without choice" (ibid: 71) certainly inform 
Kierkegaard's account of the same notions. 
If for Schelling the moment of this highest commitment retains its 
primordiality for it is tantamount to being contemporaneous with the 
eternal act of creation, then one has to look again, under this light, to the 
texts of Kierkegaard that refer to repetition and contemporaneity. In the 
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following passage, Johannes Climacus, in an attempt to emphasise the 
importance and the decisive significance of the moment, insists that 
... it was also once, when man could buy freedom and unfreedom for the same 
price, and this price was the free choice of the soul and the surrender of choice. 
He chose unfreedom, but if he then were to approach the god and ask whether 
he could make an exchange, the answer presumably would be: Undeniably there 
was a time when you could have bought what you wanted, but the curious thing 
about unfreedom is that once it is purchased it has no value whatsoever, even 
though one pays the same price for it (PF: 16 n. *). 
So, there was a moment, prior to freedom and unfreedom, where the 
human being could have committed herself to the surrender of the 
choice. We have seen in our first chapter that this was not a moment of 
rational decision. Adam's qualitative leap happened under the spell of 
anxiety and thus, if we want it to put it in Schellingean terms, Adam's 
commitment to unfreedom was a result of the dynamic relation between 
his inner potencies and not just a rational decision. Thus, this quote, as 
well as the recurrent quote cited again in the beginning of this chapter, 
can be interpreted in various ways. One can argue- follOwing mainly st. 
Augustine- that Kierkegaard conceives of the Fall as being an 
irretrievable situation separating permanently God and human beings. 
Salvation then becomes solely an issue of God and his grace, excluding 
consequently any active role of the human beings. On the contrary, one 
can argue that freedom, can 'be bought' again, in its eminent form, but 
the price is qualitatively different. This does not mean, as Kant would 
have it, that human being's fall was necessary in order for her to make 
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the transition from the state of nature to the state of freedom. In our 
understanding of Kierkegaard, the difference in 'price' lies in the fact that 
the human being has first to restore her fall and then, or simultaneously. 
to attain freedom through her surrender of choice, that is through faith. 
For Kierkegaard, this restoration is not to be seen as a return to a 
Paradise lost. In that case it would be synonymous with the Greek 
understanding of recollection, which "begins at the end instead of at the 
beginning, with the 'loss' instead of the task" (Repetition: 136; Caputo 
1987: 14; SV III 178/R 136). To begin with a loss is for Kierkegaard a 
great advantage for in that case the subj ect "has nothing to lose" whereas 
in the case of repetition the whole existence is at risk 179 (loc. Cit). 
Kierkegaard wrote his book Repetition in 1843, under the pseudonym 
Constantin Constantius. The choice of this pseudonym is indicative for 
it is in itself not only a repetition but it also "recreates eponymously the 
tension between something constant (an element to be repeated) and 
motion (something repeated)" (Mooney 1998: 285). 
Constantius applies the concept of repetition mainly to the sphere of 
individual spirit, leaving aside any discussion of repetition in nature or in 
the sphere of world- or universal- spirit. What is of crucial importance 
for Kierkegaard is neither the contemplation of the repetitive movement 
of nature nor the meaning of repetition in the sphere of world-spirit, nor 
even the contemplative study of the existence of repetition in the world of 
179 We will shortly come back to the difference between repetition and recollection. 
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the individual spirit. In his response to Professor Heiberg's comments on 
his book on repetition, Kierkegaard emphasises that his main interest is 
the life and existence of the single individual. Movement in life and 
movement in thought are for Kierkegaard two completely different things 
and their conflation introduces illusory elements into theorisation. 
Repetition is for him a task for freedom and not an issue for the 
contemplating spirit as it was for Heiberg180 (Repetition: 312). 
Repetition is a task that transforms the individual's life and, as we have 
seen in the first chapter, the journey of freedom, or more specifically the 
journey towards pure freedom and eternity has three stages, the highest 
and last being the religious leap of faith. Seemingly, the story of the book 
on repetition is mainly an erotic narrative where a young man, in love, 
deCides not to marry the object of his affection, but to rather become a 
poet. Even before the beginning of his erotic relationship, the young man 
found a silent confidant, under the guise of Constantin Constantius, the 
author of the book. Both men ask the same question, namely if 
180 Ironically enough, Heiberg accused Constantius of suggesting that the concept of repetition "would be 
able to bring about a reconciliation between the Eleatics and Heraclitus, that is to say, between two 
opposing philosophical schools, one of which denied motion while the other saw everything in 
motion"(Repetition: 379-81 n.14). The irony lies in the fact that Kierkegaard's last paragraph of his Fear 
and Trembling shows in a wonderful way quite the opposite, i.e. how in the level of pure contemplation, a 
certain point of view may be transformed into its opposite:" 'One must go further, one must go further'. 
This urge to go further is an old story in the world ... Heraclitus the obscure said: One cannot walk through 
the same river twice. Heraclitus the obscure had a disciple who did not remain standing there but went 
further- and added: One cannot do it even once. Poor Heraclitus, to have a disciple like that! By this 
improvement, the Heraclitean thesis was amended into an Eleatic thesis that denies motion, and yet that 
disciple wished only to be a disciple of Heraclitus who went further, not back to what Heraclitus has 
abandoned" (F&T: 123). 
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repetition is possible. The first 181 part of the book is a parody of examples 
and incidents in search of an answer to this question. Constantin 
Constantius arranges a trip to Berlin so as to explore if the trip that he 
had made years ago could be repeated. Trying to explore, in an exoteric 
manner, if repetition is possible, he is repeating exactly the steps that he 
followed in his previous trip, combining thus farcically repetition with 
regard to time and to space, or in an ironic manner Heraclitus and the 
Eleatics. In his reply to Heiberg, Constantius points out that 
Movement is dialectical, not only with respect to space ... but also with respect to 
time. The dialectic in both respects is the same, for the point and the moment 
correspond to each other. Since I could not name two schools in which the 
dialectic of motion with respect to time is expressed as explicitly as Heraclitus 
and the Eleatics express it with respect to space, I named them. In that way. I 
also managed to cast a comic light over the journey I took to Berlin. because 
movement thereby become a pun (Repetition: 309). 
Indeed, the simple repetition of the same trip did not bring any 
transformation to the inner existence of the author. On the contrary, 
although the young man did not experience the highest form of repetition 
where the collision of eternity and time would have come from higher 
levels acquiring thus eternal consciousness182, he still nevertheless 
attained a level of repetition, when he learned that his former fiancee got 
married with another man. Before his former fiancee got married, he was 
IXI That means up to the page 179 in Hong's translation. Kierkegaard himself makes this distinction 
between the two parts of the book. In a supplement - that according to Rose is a decoding of the story 
"philosophically in the 'sphere of individual freedom '" (Rose 1992: 24) - to his book, Kierkegaard harshly 
attacks Professor Heiberg's misinterpretation of him. Kierkegaard accuses him of taking seriously only the 
first part of the book(that is the one not to be taken seriously), implying at the same time that Heibe.r~ " 
completely ignored the second part, where one can find at least an "authentic statement about repetItIOn 
(Repetition: 295). 
IX2 This will be discussed later. Please note in advance that eternal consciousness is attained through 
recollection and is not a definite sign of repetition. 
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tortured by the responsibility he was feeling towards her for letting her 
down and not marrying her. His anxiety was accentuated by his inability 
to communicate the reasons behind his actions to her. He conceives of 
her wedding then as an act of generosity; He then felt free to follow his 
call as a poet and he exclaimed: "Here I have repetition; I understand 
everything and life seems more beautiful to me than ever" 
(Repetition: 220). Indeed, although the young man did not elevate his 
consciousness into the religious level, he nevertheless raised his 
consciousness to the second power (ibid: 229). 
If he [Le. the young man) had a deeper religious background, he would not have 
become a poet. Then everything would have gained religious meaning. The 
situation in which he was trapped would then have gained meaning for him, but 
the collision would have come from higher levels, and he would also have had a 
quite different authority, even though it would have been purchased with still 
more painful suffering. Then he would have acted with an entirely different iron 
consistency and imperturbability, then he would have won a fact of 
consciousness to which he could constantly hold, one that would never become 
ambivalent for him but would be pure earnestness because it was established by 
him on the basis of a God-relationship (ibid: 230). 
The archetypal religious hero that functioned as young man's compass 
was Job. Two biblical figures, Job and Abraham, would be the occasion 
to explore another dimension of the citation from Kierkegaard placed in 
the beginning of this chapter183, viz. one that could be related with the 
function of repetition in-the-world, leaving aside, as far as it is possible, 
any discussion of a pre-Adamic situation. The function of repetition into-
the- world is not to be seen as movement towards immanence. On the , 
contrary, repetition is a "transcendent, religious movement. by virtue of 
J~.l This passage is also repeatedly cited various times in this thesis. 
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the absurd when the borderline of the wondrous is reached" (Repetition: 
305). If, as we have seen in the first chapter, according to Rose the "fall 
or the beginning involves initiation into prohibition" (Rose 1992: 92) then 
one can argue that the reversal of this, although in the fonn of repetition, 
is initiation into arpT7v£lv (leaving completely oneselj) in God's hand, by 
virtue of the absurd. For Kierkegaard, exemplary figures of this kind of 
repetition are Abraham and Job. In other words, if Adam, and every 
subsequent Adam, did/does not listen to God's command, then Abraham 
and Job listen, by virtue of the absurd, to whatever God commanded 
them. 
Indeed, they followed the path of repetition that is a recollectionforwards 
and not that of recollection, that being of a repetition backwards (ibid: 
131). They did not attempt to restore the past by a conversion back to 
etemity. but on the contrary they followed God's order as sinners before 
him, and this consisted their movement towards the future. 
Kierkegaard considers Leibniz to be the only modern philosopher that 
had an intimation of repetition as a movement forwards. Indeed. Leibniz 
in his Theodicy. discusses one of the rules of his system of pre-
established harmony, according to which "the present is big withfuture" 
(Theodicy (360): 341). It has to be emphaSised that the context of 
Leibniz's writing is quite different. For Leibniz, God, among the 
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infinitude of possible 184 worlds, has chosen the best possible world, 
whereas he called World "the whole succession and agglomeration of all 
existent things, lest it be said that several worlds could have existed in 
different times and different places" (Theodicy (8): 128). 
Thus, when Leibniz refers to the relation of present with future, he 
speaks about God's ability to foresee in every part of the universe the 
whole universe "owing to the perfect connexion of things" and thus the 
present is not the immediate present, but is enriched with future and 
past (Theodicy (360): 341). This is not to suggest that Leibniz argues in 
favour of the principle of pre-destination in the sense that God pre-
determined everything, eliminating thus human freedom. What he 
suggests is that every monad or every part of this world contains in itself 
or herself, the whole cosmos. Thus, if we want to stretch Leibniz's 
argument and put it in Schellingean terms, not only God but also every 
human being, could elevate her con-sciousness and share with God not 
only her individual history but also the history of the cosmos. 
Furthermore, the problem that Constantius finds in the Greek 
conception of recollection is not only the theological issue of future which 
we will explore shortly, but also the discrepancy between thought and 
life. He argues that for the Greeks "all knowing is a recollecting" whilst he 
foresees that the main teaching of modem philosophy will revolve around 
184 Having in mind also Kierkegaard's polyvalent quotation regarding God and repetition, we h~v~ .a.lso to 
remark that for Leibniz possibility acquires a different meaning. Thus, "what are mere posSIbIlitIes of 
thought for us are possibilities of action for God" (Farrer 1985: 31). 
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repetition and that indeed the latter will advocate that "all life is a 
repetition" (Repetition 131). For Kierkegaard, repetition then is an action, 
a deed. and it can easily be argued that since both Schelling and Leibniz-
in their own ways- render dynamically the past into the future, they have 
an intimation of repetition in the Kierkegaardean sense. 
The difference between repetition and recollection could also be 
seen in the relation of the two notions with the past. Haufniensis 
provides us with a thorough analysis of the differences between the 
pagan's relation to the past and their supplementary notion of 
recollection with the Christian view where the future is pre-eminent (see 
CA: 81-110; also in Repetition: 131-133&149). There are some affinities 
to Kierkegaard's approach towards paganism with what Alliez, in his 
paper on St. Augustine, discerns to be the difference between the 
Plotinian and the Christian conception of time. Alliez pOints out that 
"while Plotinian conversion ... was dominated by the primacy of the past, 
Christian conversion projects humanity into the future, the biblical time 
of hope 185. For ever since the real Fall alone subsists, the return can only 
be carried out by going forward" (Alliez 1996: 11 7). But, one has to be 
careful not to assign to Kierkegaard an eschatological conception of time 
where almost deterministically, the future is presented as the time where 
the deliverancefrom time will occur for humanity. On the contrary, 
IR5 We have seen, mainly in chapter two, that Augustine's perception of hope implies death and the 
cancellation of time because for him the fallen and the biblical times are irreconcilable in time. In the same , 
chapter we have also shown that Kierkegaard sees hope as a kind of illusion. 
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Kierkegaard's main concern remains the individual, and its encounter 
with the future, the latter viewed as transcendence and not as a linear 
succession between the reified moments of past, present and future. In 
the Concept of anxiety he writes: 
... the future can in a certain sense signifY the whole. This is because the eternal 
first signifies the future or because the future is the incognito in which the 
eternal, even though it is incommensurable with time, nevertheless preserves its 
association with time ... (CA: 89). 
Returning to the discussion of the oft quoted passage regarding 
repetition, we have to consider that when Constantius speaks of the 
world that came into existence, the usage of the word "existence", or the 
verb to "exist" may not refer to the first creation of the cosmos (human 
beings included) but to what could be conceived of as a re-creation of the 
world after the Fall. If God would have not willed to give a second chance 
to the world, then he could have "retract[ed] everything and preserved it 
in recollection". Or alternatively, He 186 could have left everything to 
chance, "to the superficial plans of hope" (Repetition: 133). It is 
important to notice that Kierkegaard's employment of the word 
existence187 instead of that of essence is of major significance, since for 
him existence can be only attributed to the particular individual. 
186 Moreover this becomes even clearer if we take into consideration Leibniz's clarification that "Its 
[God's] under~tanding is the source of essences, and its will is the origin of existences" (Theodicy P.l: 
128). 
IN? In his thesis, Kierkegaard is particularly indebted to Schelling'S distinction between qui~ si: (what it is) 
and quod sit (that it is), although he was later disappointed by what he interpreted as Schelhng s 
abandonment of this distinction (NSBL: 335; CI: xxiii). 
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In addition to that, the latter's existence is subject to time and because 
of that it is considered to be always incomplete (PF: 72-88). More 
importantly, Kierkegaard distinguishes between two different meanings 
of the term "to exist", one which "touches on the ordinary meaning 
(temporal and spatial actuality)" and another which has a "special 
meaning (qualitative becoming, in view of which ordinary existence could 
more accurately be termed subsistence)" (PF: 298, n. 6). Thus, the 
coming into existence of the world, mainly perceived as the world of 
human individuals, is posited in the moment of the sin, which as we 
have seen indicates the beginning of history. Moreover, as Constantius 
is eager to clarify, history can have two meanings. It can be the history of 
humanity, measured in quantitative terms, or it can be the history of the 
individual, the latter being Kierkegaard's main concern (Repetition: 287). 
Accordingly, 
Sin is the new existence medium. To exist generally signifies only that by having 
come into existence the individual does exist and is becoming; now it signifies 
that by having come into existence he has become a sinner. .. the special 
qualitative meaning of to exist is expressed as a redoubling, a coming into 
existence within its own coming into existence (PF : 76&298 n.6). 
In turn, the notion of redoubling could be interpreted in various ways. It 
could either be understood as the coming into existence of the world after 
its original creation, or it could alternatively be interpreted as the 
inherent (due to its re-creation after the Fall) possibility for an atonement 
of the world. Each interpretation is supplementary to the other, and the 
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task of each individual is to attain the highest form of repetition, that is 
the repetition sensu eminentiori188• 
There is but one pregnant repetition, and that is the individ al·t ' 
t
.t. . d U I Y s own 
repe I IOn raI.se .to a n:w power. You [i.e.Heiberg] do not mention this repetition 
at all, despIte ItS beIng repetition sensu eminentiori and freedom's deepest 
interest (Repetition:294). 
Let us now briefly explore the stories of Job and Abraham, so as to 
deepen our analysis on the issue of repetition and faith. 
I HH Although one could say that by means of repetition God gave the world a second chance, one cannot 
draw a direct analogy with regard to the functioning of repetition as it is ascribed to human beings. In the 
latter case, sin plays a significant role and one has to pay attention to what anti-Climacus writes in the 
Sickness unto death: "Sin is the only one of the attributes ordinarily ascribed to a human being which can in 
no way be said of God, either via negationis or via eminentiae. To say of God that he is not a sinner (as 
one says that he is not finite and is therefore via negationis infinite) is blasphemy. As a sinner, man is 
separated from God by the most yawning qualitative abyss" (SUD: 155). 
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4.1.1 Job's ordeal 
Both Abraham and Job were tested189 by God, although not in the same 
manner. God, according to the biblical narrative, let Satan tempt Job's 
righteousness and faith, resulting in Job's being deprived of family, 
belongings, etc., only for Job to reply "The Lord gave, and the lord took 
away; blessed the name of the God" (Job: 1,2) . Those words made a 
significant impression on both Constantin Constantius and on the young 
man. Job, endured the trial and he thereby "received everything double", 
or as the biblical text says ..... the Lord gave to Job twice as much as he 
had before" (Job 42: 10). Few lines below, it reads: "So the Lord blessed 
the latter end of Job more than his beginning ... " (Job 42.12). This, 
according to Constantius "is called a repetition" (Repetition: 197 & 212). 
In Job's case, repetition is not exhausted by the fact of the redoubling of 
his material possessions190 , as we are told that he originally owed seven 
thousands sheep, and three thousand camels, while at the end of his 
ordeal he possessed fourteen thousand sheep and six thousand camels. 
More importantly, repetition takes the form of Job's courage to stand 
before God without betraying his faith. 
IN9 For the different meanings of the words "test", "tempt", "try", "ordeal", see Fear and Trembling: 341 
n.2. There it is stated that all those terms have "essentially the same meaning: to try by way of a test or an 
ordeal" (ibid:341). Nevertheless, there are different ways of 'testing', which will be explored further in the 
COurse of this chapter. 
190 For Kierkegaard, the fact that Job did receive everything in double except his children shows once more 
that "a human life cannot be redoubled that way" (Repetition: 221). 
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What strikes Kierkegaard even more is the very fact that Job entered 
into a purely personal relationship, one "of opposition with God, in a 
relationship such that he cannot allow himself to be satisfied with any 
explanation at second hand"(ibid:210). Job questioned God's testing of 
him in an immediate way and defended his position, believing that God 
would eventually do him justice. 
The category that in Kierkegaard's philosophy places the individual in an 
immediate and personal relationship with God is that of the ordeal. 
Although Abraham also suffered an ordeal, Job is the exemplary figure of 
this category. Thus, for Kierkegaard, Job was not a hero of faith as 
Abraham 191 , but the one that "gives birth to the category of the ordeal" 
(Repetition: 210). The category of the ordeal is not, according to the 
young man, an aesthetic or ethical or even dogmatic category. On the 
contrary it is an "altogether transcendent" category although a temporary 
one in the sense that it "is defined in relation to time and therefore must 
be annulled in time" (loc. Cit). Job's confrontation with God overcomes 
the boundaries of time since it denotes a meeting of the finite with the 
eternal, but at the same time the resolution of this confrontation 
happens in time: 
For this reason Job does not bring composure as does a hero of faith, but he 
does give temporary alleviation. Job is, so to speak, the whole weighty defence 
plea on man's behalf in the great case between God and man, the lengthy and 
appalling trial that started with Satan's creation of discord between God and Job 
and ends with the whole thing having been an ordeal (loc. Cit). 
191 Actually Abraham is the 'father of faith'. 
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One might wonder if Job had any other option than to surrender to this 
ordeal. The answer is yes, since he could follow his wife's advice not to 
retain his integrity but to curse God and then die (Job 2. 9). His reply to 
her suggestion is indicative of Job's attitude towards God: "Thou 
speakest as one of the foolish women speaketh. What? Shall we receive 
good at the hand of God and shall we not receive evil? In all this did not 
sin with his lips" (Job 2. 10). 
Thus, Job's surrender to this ordeal was not a compulsory one. On the 
contrary, 
.. .in freedom he still has something of greatness. has a consciousness that even 
God cannot wrest for him even though he gave it to him. Furthennore. Job 
maintains his position in such a way that in him are manifest the love and trust 
that are confident that God can surely explain everything if one can only speak 
with him (Repetition: 208). 
His stance towards God made Job a prototype for the whole humanity, 
whilst nobody refers to Job's wife (EUD: 123). Kierkegaard reserves for 
Job one of the highest places in the history of individuals and even 
names him a teacher of humanity and a gUide. Job acts as an archetype 
of action for the whole humanity, and although his words also have a 
captive power, nevertheless it is the immediacy of his actions that can 
make everyone that has also been tested in her life to understand him. 
Only the person who has been tried and who tested the saying in being tested 
himself. only he rightly interprets the saying; Job desires only that kind of pu~il. 
only that kind of interpreter ... we quite properly call Job a teacher of humankind 
and not of individuals. because he presents himself to everyone as his prototype. 
beckons to everyone with his glorious example ... (EUD: 112-3). 
Indeed, Job's action incited everyone to the terror and anxiety of life 
(EUD: 110), but also to his personal relationship with God. Job got 
everything back 192 in double, not only in material terms but mainly in 
inwardness. In his rebirth, he managed the impossible, namely to 
encounter God face to face: "I have heard of thee by the hearing of the 
ear; but now mine eye seeth thee" (Job 42.5). It is written in the Old 
Testament that the human being that will see God, will certainly die: 
''Thou canst not see my face; for there shall no man see me and love" 
(Exodus 33. 20). Nevertheless, not only Job but also Jacob is another 
biblical archetype of the human being that saw God but did not die. 
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After passing his two wives, two womenservants and his eleven sons over 
the ford Jabbok, Jacob stayed behind and as the story goes, he fought in 
his tent with someone who is first called man and at the end is revealed 
as God, as Jacob's exclamation at the end of the encounter indicates: 
.... .1 have seen God face to face but my life is preserved" (Genesis 32. 30). 
Faros considers Jacob's story as a description of the resistance of the 
unconsciousness to inwardness and self-knowledge. Accordingly, the 
inward metamorphosis of Jacob made him able to face God not 
externally but internally. The ford is for Faros, a symbol of the 
boundaries that Jacob has to overcome in order to elevate his con-
192 Interestingly enough, God did not free Job and did not give him back everything immediately after Job's 
understanding of his ignorance regarding the mystery of creation and of the world (Job 42. 1-6). J.ob . 
regained his freedom when he prayed for the salvation of his three friends who instead of comfo~mg hIm 
were torturing him with their judgemental words. It seems that this was the last task that ?~d assIgned to 
Job. The success in this task denoted the end of the ordeal: "And the Lord turned the captIvIty of Job, when 
he prayed for his friends; also the Lord gave Job twice as much as he had before" (Job 42. 10). 
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sciousness into a higher level. The fight before Jacob's personal passing 
over the river is necessary for the leap of faith to occur (Faros 1998: 184-
7). In his struggle with God, the latter "touched the honoe of his thigh; 
and the hollow of Jacob's thigh was out of joint" (Genesis 33. 25). Jacob 
sacrificed his thigh in order to gain greater inwardness and to become a 
"hero of faith", indicating perhaps that inwardness is only attained at the 
cost of a sacrifice. This realisation makes it necessary that we should 
tum our gaze to Abraham's narrative, so as to explore his sacrifice that 
make Kierkegaard to name him the "father of faith" . 
4.1.2 Abraham's silent sacrifice 
"I long to know how Jacob saw you fixed 
above the ladder ... That climb. how was it? 
... What is the mode. what is the law joining 
together those steps that the lover has set 
as an ascent in his heart? .. He who 
discovered Your struggle and Your vision has 
spoken to us of the gUides. But he would not-
perhaps he could not- tell us any more" (The 
Ladder of the Divine Ascent: 289). 
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Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling narrates the story of Abraham193, who 
was also tempted by God, and who ascended to the mount Moriah to 
sacrifice his only son, Isaac. The book is written under the pseudonym of 
Johannes de Silentio, which pOints to a very important theme of this 
book, namely to the 'silence' that accompanies Abraham in his journey. 
The name Johannes de Silentio is also a strong allusion to one of the 
most recurrent Kierkegaardean pseudonyms, namely that of Johannes 
Climacus. Interestingly enough, this is the only pseudonym that 
corresponds to a histOrically existent person. Indeed, St. John 
Climacus194 was a monk that lived in the desert of Sinai, born around 
579 and died around 649 (Ware 1982: 1-2). His major work, called The 
193 Abraham's name is also an instance of repetition. In the beginning his name was Abram, but when God 
renewed his covenant with Abram, He also changed Abram's name into Abraham (in Greek A~pall into 
A~paall) by doubling the letter a, so as to show a greater blessing of Abraham and his nation (Genesis 
17,5). 
194 Kierkegaard, in his book Johannes Climacus or De omnibus dubitandum est, describes the imaginary 
student Johannes Climacus as being immersed in the construction of a higher thought by beginning "with a 
simple thought and then, by way of coherent thinking, to climb step by step to a higher one, because to him 
coherent thinking was a scala paradisi , and his blessedness seemed to him even more glorious than the 
angels'''(JC: 118-9). Kierkegaard's ironic comparison of the divine ladder of St.John Climacus with the 
attempt of the young student to rationall y construct a thought, make us take notice of the discrepancy 
between the inward mystical ascent of the soul and the construction of a purely rational edifice. 
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Ladder of Divine Ascent, is a deSCription of the steps that a person has to 
take in her ascent towards God. This is the same ladder that Jacob195 
dreamed of: 
And he dreamed, and behold a ladder set up on earth, and the top of it reached 
to heaven; and behold the angels of God ascending and descending on it. And. 
behold, the Lord stood above it, and said, I am the Lord, God of Abraham thy 
father ... (Genesis 28. 12-13). 
The eleventh step of this ladder entitled "On Talkativeness and Silence" 
where silence is praised and where talkativeness196 is characterised as a 
sign of ignorance (Ladder: 158). According to st. John Climacus, "the 
lover of silence draws close to God. He talks to Him in secret and God 
enlightens him" (ibid: 159). Thus, the choice of this specific pseudonym 
could be seen as a Kierkegaard's attempt to point to the mystical inward 
ascent of Abraham. Abraham is described by Silentio as the father of the 
faith, for he followed God's order to sacrifice Isaac without questioning197 
his ordeal. The mystical journey of Abraham undergoes the following 
stages: God ordered Abraham to take his son to the land Moriah and 
then to ascend to a mountain there and to offer his son as a burnt 
offering. 
195 St. John Climacus concludes his book by expressing his longing to know 'how' Jacob saw G.od 
196 In his Present Age, Kierkegaard also speaks about the difference between talkativeness and sIlence, , 
Similarly with St. John Climacus, Kierkegaard identifies talkativeness with ignorance in the sense that ,It 
ignores one of the main distinctions between talking and non-talking: Talkativeness "is the resul~ of dOl,ng 
away with the vital distinction between talking and keeping silent" (ibid: 78). On the contrary, sIlence IS 
the "essence of inwardness, of the inner life" and only one who can keep silent, can 'talk' and 'act' 
essentially (loc, Cit). 
197 As for example Job did. 
210 
Without any questioning, 
Abraham ro.se up early in the morning, and took two of his young men with him, 
and Isaac hIS son and clave the wood for the burnt offering, and rose up and 
went unto the place of which God had told him ... Then on the third day 
Abraham ... saw the place afar off... (Genesis 22. 2-4). 
Then, he left behind his two young companions and ascended the 
mountain with his son. The expression "Abraham rose Up198" has been 
interpreted as pointing to the day of resurrection meaning thus that for 
Abraham this day denotes a joyful occasion. For Gaitanis, Abraham rose 
up in the morning in a festive mood, like having a premonition that this 
day was a day of resurrection (Gaitanis 1994: 321). Furthermore, 
Abraham rose up 'early in the morning' and this signifies for Boehme the 
kairological aspect of the call of God, i.e. the inward voice that "breaks 
forth as the dawning of the day" and calls the human being to "return, 
amend and truly repent; then it is time" (Mysterium Magnum: 520). 
Silentio is also astonished with Abraham's cheerfulness and confidence 
in his encounter with God. If someone else were in his place, Silentio 
wonders, then, when God called him by his name, he would have hidden 
or replied in a whisper 
Not so with Abraham. Cheerfully, freely, confidently, loudly he answered: Here I 
am. We read on: "And Abraham arose early in the morning". He hurried as if to 
a celebration, and early in the morning he was at the appOinted place on Mount 
Moriah. He said nothing to Sarah, nothing to Eliezer- who after all, could 
understand him. for did not the nature of temptation extract from him the 
pledge of silence? (F&T: 21). 
I~ . 
Or in Greek A~paa/-l ava<J'Ta<;, where avacrramc; also means resurrectIOn. 
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Abraham's personal relationship with God could not be communicated in 
words; he rather stands as a single individual before God. Silence 
permeates the whole story and is reciprocal, Neither does God, as 
Derrida pOints out, reveal the reasons behind his order but he rather 
keeps silent and everything happens in secrecy (Derrida 1998: 154). 
Mystical silence accompanies the three days of Abraham's journey, 
reminding us the three-day descent of Christ into Hades before his 
resurrection 199. For St. John Climacus, in contradistinction to 
talkativeness that is a sign of "a dissipation of recollection", "intelligent 
silence is ... a sure recollection of death ... hidden progress, the secret 
journey upwards ..... (Ladder: 158). For St. John Climacus the 
recollection of death could have two meanings: first it could be 
interpreted as J.l£A£'t1l 8ava'tou (study of death) in the Platonic sense, or 
secondly as a continuous recollection of the death and resurrection of 
Christ. In the case of Abraham, who lived before the coming of Christ, 
this recollection takes the form of recollection forwards, i.e. of repetition. 
To become more precise, for Boehme, Abraham's testing by God sets 
forth "the Figure of Christ's Offering in his Suffering and Death" 
(Mysterium Magnum: 517). Thus, this passage can be said to have also 
a futura1200 or prophetic character since "Abraham in the spirit saw the 
199 For Boehme, this passage also signifies the resurrection of Christ after three days in Hades, and the 
consequent lifting up of our human eyes "out of the grave, from the dead unto God" (Mysterium Magnum: 
521 ). 
200 Or, it can also be argued that Abraham has an intimation of the event that precedes time and the creati~n 
of cosmos, namely that "the Lamb was slain from the foundation of the world" (as cited in Berdyaev 193:->: 
174). 
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offering of Christ afar off, viz. above two thousand years to come" 
(Mysterium Magnum: 521). 
At this point, it seems important to clarify that although 
Kierkegaard indicates the shortcomings of the notion of recollection, he 
nevertheless considers it as the indispensable movement before that of 
repetition. Thus, although recollection is not to be considered as the 
highest stage of existence, it is nevertheless its presupposition. The 
movement of recollection, in a similar mode with Philo's and Schelling's 
conceptions of it, provides the human being with what Kierkegaard calls 
the 'eternal consciousness' (F&T: 15 & 342 n.2). Kierkegaard wonders 
what would have happened if a human being did not have an eternal 
consciousness, "if underlying everything there were only a wild, 
fermenting power that writhing in dark passions produced everything" or 
in other words, "if there were no sacred bond that knit humanity 
together" (ibid: 15). The emergence of the eternal consciousness enables 
the human being to make the movement of resignation and thus to 
reSide in infinity. This movement, as every movement of infinity, requires 
paSSion, the lack of the latter being the most important problem of 
Kierkegaard's own generation201 (ibid: 42). Thus, before the movement of 
201 Kierkegaard detects one of the major negative features of his contemporary age, namely the lack of 
passion: "our age is essentially one of understanding and reflection, without passion, momentarily bursting 
into enthusiasm, and shrewdly relapsing into repose" (P A: 33). Whereas Kierkegaard sees the age 
preceding his own age as an age of passion and action, this one is void of enthusiasm and feelin.g. . 
Enthusiasm was the unifying principle of the previous age, whereas the unifying principle ,of thiS age IS 
envy (ibid). Thus, anticipating Nietzsche, Kierkegaard uses the term ressentiment to descnb~ the negative 
outcome of the accentuation of the envy, through the suppression of feeling, passion and actIOn. Alth?~~h, 
one could find traces of ressenfimenf even in ancient Greece under the disguise of ostracism, the specifICIty 
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faith, there is the movement of infinite resignation, the steps of which are 
as follows. First, the individual has to "to concentrate the whole 
substance of his life and the meaning of actuality into one single desire". 
and then to "have the power to concentrate the conclusion of all his 
thinking into one act of consciousness" (F&T: 43). Then, the human 
being or the 'knight' as Silentio calls it is ready to make the movement of 
infinite resignation. Now, Silentio asks, will the knight forget everything 
since forgetfulness is also a kind of concentration? The reply is negative 
since the knight is not inclined to forget himself and to become another 
person. On the contrary, the knight will connect himself with his 'eternal 
past202' and "will recollect everything, but this recollection is precisely the 
pain, and yet in infinite reSignation he is reconciled with existence" (loc. 
Cit). In contradistinction to what is possible in the finite world, 
spiritually "everything is possible", and thus the advantage of the 
movement of infinite resignation is that it offers peace and rest. In his 
residing to the infinite, the knight "makes the impossibility possible by 
expressing it spiritually, but he expresses it spiritually by renouncing it" 
(ibid: 44). 
of ressentiment in the modem age lies in the fact that it is based on the process of levelling of any 
differentiation and enthusiasm. Thus, "while a passionate age storms ahead setting up new things and 
tearing down old, raising and demolishing as it goes, a reflective and passionless age does exactly the 
contrary: it hinders and stifles all action; it levels" (PA: 56). 
202 Silentio points out that "only the lower natures forget themselves and become something new. The 
butterfly, for example, completely forgets that it was a caterpillar, and may in tum so completely forgets 
that it was a butterfly that it may become a fish. The deeper natures never forget themselves and never 
become anything other than what they were" (F&T: 43). So, it seems to us that -in the same way as 10 
Schelling- the human being has the potentiality to recollect and then restore the duration ~fhe~ 'eternal' , 
past. This would be discussed more thoroughly in the last part of this chapter, together WIth Klerkegaard s 
notion of' contemporaneity'. 
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Nevertheless, although the movement of faith differs radically from 
that of infinite resignation since the latter does not require faith203, one 
cannot have faith if she has not made first the movement of infinite 
resignation204 
Infinite resignation is the last stage before faith, so that anyone who has not 
made this movement does not have faith, for only in infinite resignation do I 
become conscious of my eternal validity, and only then can one speak of 
grasping existence by virtue of faith (F &T : 46). 
The next movement, that is the leap of faith or, in other words, the 
movement of true repetition, requires taking a further step, since after 
the movement of infinity, one has to make again the movement of 
finitude. This is a paradoxical movement requiring faith by virtue of the 
absurd. This means that although on the one hand one accepts that in 
the finite world not everything is possible, on the other hand, taking into 
account that for God "all things are possible" (ibid: 46), one believes that 
everything is consequently possible also in the finite world by virtue of 
the absurd, that is when eternity and time collide through repetition. 
For Silentio, the category of the absurd is not to be taken as synonymous 
with "the improbable, the unexpected, the unforeseen", because the 
latter notions belong to the sphere of understanding whereas the absurd 
203 What someone gains from the act of resignation is her eternal consciousness and this does not require 
faith since it is a purely philosophical movement. The two movements, i.e. resignation an~ fa~~h, a~e ~ften 
confused since it is wrongly understood that faith is required "in order to renounce everythmg whIle m 
actuality this is the movement of infinite resignation (F&T: 48). 
~04 In his Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Kierkegaard alters slightly his termino~ogy and ~peaks about 
Religiousness A and Religiousness B, the first being the "dialectic of inward deepenmg" equI valent ~o 
infinite resignation and the latter being the decisive Christian movement of faith equivalent to true faIth. 
Religiousness A is the presupposition of Religiousness B (CUP: 557). 
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does not belong, "to the differences that lie within the proper domain of 
the understanding" (ibid: 46). Thus, the knight of faith "acknowledges 
the impossibility, and in the very same moment he believes in the 
absurd" (ibid: 47). In the case of Abraham, even "in the moment when 
the knife gleamed he hadfaith- that God would not require Isaac" or even 
if He would, then He would certainly give him an new Isaac 'by virtue of 
the absurd' (F&T: 18-9 & 36 & l15-emphasis added). The actual sacrifice 
never occurred, but Abraham's ascent and ordeal is still a sacrifice. As 
we have seen in our analysis in the first chapter regarding the emergence 
of sin, the crucial category is that of the possibility of being able to. In 
this respect, it is important to note that Abraham was able to sacrifice 
Isaac. Additionally, he was not trying to find external justification for his 
faith that God would not require Isaac. He simply had faith by virtue of 
the absurd (ibid: 34). Abraham made both movements, first the 
movement of resignation where he "gives up Isaac, which no one can 
understand because it is a private venture" and then the movement of 
faith (ibid: 115). What is great about this movement, Silentio emphasises, 
is that the knight of faith, after making the movement of infinitude he 
then makes also the movement of finitude, for he belongs to this world205 
(ibid: 39). It has to be remarked that there is a significant qualitative 
205 Caputo argues that Kierkegaard, by opposing existential repetition to recollection and m.ediation, 
inaugurates not only "the delimitation of the metaphysical tradition" but also the '''destructIOn of the 
history of ontology' and hence anticipated the central ontological argument of Being and Time ... " (Cap~t? 
1987: 32). The movement towards finitude denotes -in Caputo's interpretation of Kierkegaard- "our ablhty 
to take our stand in the flux, to press forward in the element of actuality and becoming rather than to seek 
some way around it" (ibid:32-3). 
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difference between hope as experienced by the knights of faith and st. 
Augustine's conception of it. Silentio compares the knights of faith with 
the knights of infinite resignation. He characteristically describes the 
knights of infinite resignation as ballet dancers "that have elevation" and 
"they make the upward movement and come down again" (F&T: 41). 
Every time they make the latter movement, "they are unable to assume 
the posture immediately, they waver for a moment and this wavering 
shows that they are aliens in the world" (ibid: 41). On the contrary, the 
knights of faith have the special gift to make the downward movement in 
such a way "that instantaneously one seems to stand and walk, to 
change the leap into life into walking, absolutely to express the sublime 
in the pedestrian" (loc. Cit). 
More importantly, Abraham'S faith is not a projection to a future life. 
Abraham had faith. He did not have faith that he would be blessed in a future 
life but that he would be blessed here in the world. God could give him a new 
Isaac. could restore to life the one sacrificed. He had faith by virtue of the 
absurd. for all human calculation ceased long ago (F&T: 36). 
Thus, Abraham got both himself and "a son a second time" (ibid: 9). 
In order to deepen our analysis of Abraham' story let us turn our gaze 
and discuss briefly the three problems that -according to Silentio-
Abraham's story brings to the fore. The first deals with the possibility of a 
teleological suspension of the ethical, the second questions the existence 
of an absolute duty to God and the third asks if it was "ethically 
defensible for Abraham to conceal his undertaking from Sarah, from 
Eliezer, and from Isaac" (F&T: 54 & 68 & 82). 
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The common underlying question of all these problems is the 
following: Are we justified to speak of a single individual that is beyond 
the boundaries of the universal and the ethical, and whose actions are 
incommunicable and untranslatable in the ethical sphere? On the one 
hand, the ethical as it is commonly perceived, is for Silentio, 
synonymous with the universal and as such not only it "applies to 
everyone" but also it "applies at all times" (ibid: 54). On the other hand, 
the single individual as the knight of faith is higher than the universal for 
her action cannot be mediated and communicated 
Faith is namely this paradox that the single individual is higher than the 
universal-yet, please note, in such a way that the movement repeats 
itself, so that after having been in the universal he as the single 
individual isolates himself as higher than the universal (ibid:55). 
Thus, the knight of faith stands in an 'absolute relation to the absolute' 
and this, for all eternity, "cannot be mediated" (ibid: 56), and this is what 
differentiates Abraham from a tragic hero like Agamemnon. Agamemnon 
faced a similar dilemma with that of Abraham, that is to sacrifice his own 
child or not. The difference lies in the fact that Iphigenia's sacrifice would 
bring benefit to the ethical level and thus everyone could compassionate 
With him, while he also could communicate his grief and find consolation 
(F&T: 57-59& 114-115). 
If Abraham's action is translated to the ethical level, then it would be 
rendered that "he meant to murder Isaac" whilst in the religiOUS level it 
means that "he meant to sacrifice Isaac" (ibid: 30). 
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The incommensurability of those two levels signifies the lack of 
extemal206 certainty that the single individual experiences in her 
encounter with the absolute. This conflict, according to Silentio, makes 
"a person sleepless and yet without this anxiety Abraham is not who he 
is" (loc. Cit). 
By mediation, in this context, Silentio refers to the untranslatability of 
singularity into universality. Abraham cannot speak and express his 
action in so far as communication and speech are features of the 
universal. Thus, speech is excluded and the ethical is teleologically 
suspended for Abraham since his telos is an absolute one and thus it is 
outside207 any immanence (F&T: 59). Existential pathos is defined by 
Johannes Climacus as the action or/and the transformation of existence 
whereas the appointed task is "simultaneously to relate oneself 
absolutely to the absolute ,,(£AO<; ••• and relatively to relative ends" (CUP: 
431). The absolute telos at this case is God, and Abraham, suspends the 
ethical so as to fulfil his absolute duty to God. Abraham acts both for his 
sake and for God's sake, both being for him identical. For the knight of 
faith, Silentio argues, wish and duty are almost identical whereas a 
tragic hero has to sacrifice his wish so as to comply with his duty. The 
knight of faith has to give up both duty and wish and to succumb to 
God, fulfilling thus his absolute duty (F&T: 78). He acts, for God's sake 
206 And even internal certainty, since, as we have seen in the first chapter, doubt lies in the centre of 
religious experience in Kierkegaard's thought. If doubt was completely removed, then Abraham would not 
have experienced anxiety and sleeplessness. 
207 See Philosophical Fragments p.80. 
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"because God demands this proof of his faith" and for his own sake "so 
that he can prove it" (F&T: 60). For Johannes de Silentio, the unity of 
those two premises is best expressed with the term 'ordeal' or 
'temptation' since a person is tempted by something that prevents her 
from doing her duty. In Abraham's case, his duty is to comply with 
God's will, but the ethical is tempting him thus holding him back (ibid: 
60). Temptation is for Kierkegaard the state of affairs when the lower 
tempts and "wants to lure the individual" (CUP: 458-9). If Abraham had 
succumbed to this temptation then he would have abandoned his 
absolute duty to God and declared that "his situation is a spiritual trial" 
(F&T: 60). 'Spiritual trial' in contradistinction to 'temptation' is when the 
highest, "seemingly envious of the individual" tempts him and wants "to 
frighten him back" (CUP: 459). According to anti-Climacus, spiritual 
trial208 is a characteristic of the religious sphere where the single 
individual can relate herself absolutely to the absolute. It also "increases 
in proportion to the religiousness" since the single individual has found 
the upper limit or boundary and the spiritual trial "expresses the 
response of the boundary against the finite individual" (CUP: 459). For 
anti-Climacus, although the individual is not innocent in relation to 
temptation, she is nevertheless innocent concerning the 'spiritual trial' 
and she bears terrible suffering (loc. Cit). Spiritual trial signifies "the 
20~ Climacus dismisses all previous theoretical attempts of proving the existence of God as .'the most 
terrible spiritual trials' in the sense that in theory one cannot have a true experience of the dl\me (PF: 36-
45). 
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absolute's own resistance" and emerges as a nemesis "upon the intense 
moments in the absolute relation" (loc. Cit). The danger of spiritual trial 
is great since it can mislead the single individual, making her believe 
that she is in an absolute relation with God. This is why, for 
Kierkegaard, the movement of repetition entails risk and danger. Silentio 
emphasises that only the single individual herself can decide whether 
she is "actually ... undergoing a spiritual trial or is a knight of faith" but 
the outcome of this decision is incommunicable (F&T: 79). This great 
possibility of doing the wrong thing made Kant disregard Abraham's 
story and "banish such acts of reason-blind faith" from the sphere of 
religion" (Agacinski 1998: 141). Indeed, Kant argues, that it is a moral 
prinCiple that "we ought to hazard nothing that may be wrong (qaud 
dubutas, nefeceris!)" (Religion: 173-4). Abraham's story then falls under 
this category since even if it seems that God commanded Abraham to 
"slaughter his own son like a sheep ... it is at least possible that in this 
instance a mistake has prevailed" (ibid: 1 75). 
This paradoxical absolute duty to God that surpasses the boundaries of 
ethical life and universality urges Abraham to keep silent and not inform 
anyone about his act. He could not speak not only because nobody 
could 'understand' his ordeal but also because he does not speak the 
language that belongs to the sphere of immanence but "a divine 
language" (F&T: 114). Abraham spoke just once, when Isaac asked him 
"where the lamb is for the burnt offering". His reply was "God himself will 
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provide the lamb for the burnt offering, my son" (ibid: 116). As it is 
evident from those words, Abraham's ironic209 reply to Isaac is not an 
untruth. It would have been an untruth if Abraham had answered that 
he knew nothing since he already knew what God had ordered. 
Abraham'S paradoxical answer then, signifies once more the absurdity of 
the movement of faith, since by virtue of the absurd it was possible for 
God to provide the lamb for the burnt offering (ibid: 119). 
For Silentio himself, Abraham's story is also a paradox that could 
happen either in the demonic or in the divine sphere. 
Silence and hiddenness can be - for Silentio- both demonic and divine. 
Thus, interiOrity is not a certain sign of "divinity's mutual understanding 
with the single individual" but it can also be "the demon's trap" (F&T: 
88). Consequently, there are for Silentio, two kinds of paradoxes, a 
divine and a demonic (loc. Cit). By relating to the divine paradox one is 
saved, whereas by relating to the demonic paradox, one is definitely lost 
(ibid: 1 06). 
Encountering with fear and trembling Abraham's ordeal, Silentio 
concludes his final chapter with the following words: "either there is a 
paradox that the single individual as the single individual stands in 
absolute relation to the absolute, or Abraham is lost" (ibid: 120). This 
paradoxicality that makes Abraham's inner truth incommunicable and 
ambivalent, urges Levinas to emphasise the importance of what he calls 
209 Since for Kierkegaard, "it is always irony when I say something and still do not say anything" (F&T: 
118), 
222 
persecuted210 truth that is beyond misinterpretations and 
misunderstandings but rather retains, in its secrecy, an element of 
revelation within the sphere of singularity. 
In the first pages of Fear and trembling, Silentio speaks of a man who 
was so absorbed by Abraham's story that his sole craving and longing 
was to follow Abraham in his three-day journey to mount Moriah. This 
man, being neither a scholar, nor a thinker, was free from any need to go 
'beyond faith' (F&T: 9). He wanted to repeat Abraham's movement and 
thus to be able to make himself the movement of repetition. Being 
contemporaneous211 with Abraham is a task that could make someone a 
single individual. Silentio himself declares that he lacks the courage to 
follow Abraham, and by being contemporaneous with him, to make the 
leap of faith. Once again, Kierkegaard emphasises the self-evident but 
concealed, namely that each generation starts from the beginning. Thus, 
every generation has "no task other than what each previous generation 
210 In his second comment on Kierkegaard, Levinas argues that for Kierkegaard the importance does not lie 
in the distinction between 'faith and knowledge' or 'uncertainty and certainty' but rather in the difference 
between "a victorious truth and a persecuted one" (Levinas 1998: 35-6). As Levinas writes: "A persecuted 
truth is not a truth that happens to have been mistreated and misunderstood. Persecution, and the humility 
that comes with it, are themselves the modalities oftruth ... Perhaps a Revelation which proclaims its own 
origin would be incompatible with the essence of transcendent truth, of a truth which can have no authentic 
manifestation unless it is persecuted. Perhaps the only possible mode of true revelation is the incognito, and 
perhaps a truth which has been spoken must therefore appear as one of which nothing has been said" 
(Levinas 1998:35-6).As we are going to see shortly, there is another dimension of truth that makes the 
notion of persecuted truth more comprehensible. Thus, for Kierkegaard 'truth' is synonymous with the 
coming of God-man and his sufferings. Moreover, the task of every individual is to become an 'imitator' of 
God-man, and thus to inwardly understand that "the truth must suffer and be mocked and derided" (PVW A: 
52). 
211 To be more precise, we have to clarify that Kierkegaard uses the term contemporaneity strictly in 
relation to single individual's task to become 'contemporaneous' with God-man's appearance. We took the 
liberty to extend his notion of being contemporaneous with Christ to being contempo~aneo~s also with . 
other exemplary figures (e.g. Job, Abraham and even Adam) because we think that thIs notIOn captures III 
an exact way the interrelationship between the single individual and those archetypal figures. 
had, nor does it advance further ... " (ibid: 121). By being 
contemporaneous with Adam, every human person makes the first leap, 
whilst being contemporaneous with figures like Job or Abraham, 
prepares the human being for the leap of faith. Let us not forget, that 
this second task, even in case of Abraham is a tentative task, and thus, 
"is always adequate for a person's lifetime" (ibid: 122). 
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4.2 Contemporaneity & Repetition 
contemporaneity with the biblical figures of Abraham and Job 
presupposes contemporaneity with Adam, who - according to 
Kierkegaard - symbolises also the possibility that every single individual 
becomes an Adam. Thus Adam and every consequent Adam, has the 
logic-defying task to make the free movement of repetition and to become 
contemporaneous with Abraham212 , 'the father of faith'. 
Let us now turn our gaze to what are for Kierkegaard the exemplary 
forms of repetition and contemporaneity, namely their Christian 
manifestations. Although, as we have already seen, Abraham and Job 
function as predecessors of Christ in a prophetic way, they nevertheless 
belong to the pre-Christian era. Although Kierkegaard asks us to follow 
inwardly Abraham and Job and thus to be contemporaneous with them, 
he nevertheless refrains from calling them teachers213 of the single 
individual. 
Johannes Climacus, in his book Philosophical Fragments, reserves the 
characterisation of teacher only for God. In contradistinction to Socrates 
who served as a midwife so as to show to people their ignorance and 
then, via recollection, to help them restore what they have already 
known, God gives to the people the 'condition' and the 'truth' (PF: 15). 
212 In Boehme's symbolism, Abraham stands in Adam's stead and Isaac "is represented in ~hrist'~ 
humanity". Moreover, "Abraham, that is Adam, should offer up his person in Isaac, that IS m Ch.nst, to the 
voice of God in the fire of God, that so the humanity might be proved in the fire of God"(Mystenum 
Magnum: 518). Thus, by asking Abraham to sacrifice his son, God called Adam in Abraham, namely to all 
~uman beings, and called them to repeat this sacrifice (loc. Cit). . . 
"1.1 Job was named the 'teacher of humanity' and Abraham 'the father of faith'. Moreover, SilentiO 
emphasises that "the true knight of faith is a witness, never the teacher" (F&T: 80). 
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Climacus argues that Socrates was the exemplary figure of the relation 
between one human being and another and that ~.Hxt£u£creal is the highest 
expression of this relationship. 'Giving birth' though 'belongs to God' 
and Socrates himself emphasises that "god forbade him to give birth" 
(ibid: 10-11). Thus, Socrates is presented as the 'occasion' of inwardness 
for every person in the sense that he prompts them to seek for self-
knowledge and inwardness. The relationship between two human beings 
is reciprocal. Thus, Socrates as teacher "is the occasion for the pupil to 
understand himself' but at the same time "the pupil is [also] the 
occasion for the teacher to understand himself' (ibid: 24). This 
reciprocity renders the relationship equal so as "in death the teacher 
leaves no claim upon the pupil's soul, no more than the pupil can claim 
that teacher owes him something" (loc. Cit). It becomes evident then, 
that Socrates, being the exemplary figure of the human teacher, did not 
provide his students with the 'positive' by learning them the truth, not 
mainly because he was aware that he did not possess the absolute truth, 
but because truth, being a 'persecuted' truth, cannot be imposed, but 
presupposes the learner's transformation (ibid: 14). So, Climacus argues, 
a human being cannot transform but only reform another human being, 
denying thus the possibility of a human teacher. 
What differentiates God as teacher from Socrates or any other human 
being is the fact that God can effect the necessary transformation to the 
Single individual so as to make her able to receive the condition and the 
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truth. Such a teacher is called by Climacus a 'saviour' since he "does 
indeed save the learner from unfreedom", a 'deliverer since he "does 
indeed deliver the person who had imprisoned himself' and a 'reconciler 
because he .. takes away the wrath that layover the incurred guilt" (ibid: 
17). 
Indeed, as we have seen in the beginning of this chapter, unfreedom was 
bought by Adam and every consequent individual with a certain price, 
while it cannot be re-sold, for it has lost its value. Only God then, 
according to Kierkegaard, can lift up the individual from her unfreedom. 
This does not mean though that the single individual after the Fall is 
devoid of power, totally subject to the help and grace of God. In our 
reading of Kierkegaard, although God is allowing 'repetition' to happen, 
he nevertheless cannot impose it. To be more specific, God, first prompts 
the individual to acquire the consciousness of sin, that is to become 'con-
sciously' contemporaneous with Adam and then God gives her the 
condition and the truth, through her being contemporaneous with Christ, 
the historically existent God. Only then, the single individual can 
become a person of a different quality or in other words "a new person". 
This change is called by Climacus, a 'conversion, and the sorrow that 
accompanies it, is called 'repentance' (ibid: 19). By this 'rebirth', Le. the 
highest form of repetition, the single individual "enters the world a 
second time just as at birth" (loc. Cit). Contemporaneity with Abraham 
and Job also make the individual able to make the leap of faith, by virtue 
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of the absurd. What differentiates the notions of the absurd as depicted 
in Fear & Trembling and of the paradox or absurd in the Philosophical 
Fragments. is the fact that the first "is the purely personal definition of 
existential faith" and the second "is faith in relationship to a doctrine" 
(CUP II: 163). More speCifically. Abraham and Job were human beings 
that function as archetypes of faith and they urge everyone to follow 
them and to be contemporaneous with their ordeal, by virtue of the 
absurd. On the contrary, the absurd in Philosophical Fragments becomes 
tangible, obtains a face and the task becomes to believe the absurd or the 
paradox and to become contemporaneous with it (ibid: 164). Indeed, the 
paradox is the event of the Incarnation of God and the latter's historical 
existence. Accordingly, the task ascribed to every single individual is to 
become contemporaneous with the existence of God in time, and thus to 
believe in the paradoxical collision of time and eternity. We have seen 
briefly in our first chapter, the importance and the deciSive significance 
of the notion of the moment, both in its human and divine dimensions. 
Accordingly, the moment214 , becomes for Kierkegaard, the instance of the 
collision of time and eternity not only in the sense that God, as eternity, 
invades time by acqUiring a historical existence, but also since 'in the 
214 It would be also important in connection to Kierkegaard's conceptualisation .of Christ's m.oment of 
incarnation, to point out that St. Dionysius the Aeropagite, speaks of the moment usmg the platOniC term of 
£~a[(pV77r;, that means the unexpected, the sudden in order to describe Christ's transition from concealment 
into unconcealment: 
"£;m<j>vllC; E(Jn 'to nap EA-mba, Kat EK 'tOD 'tEW<; a<j>aVODC; EtC; 'to q.1<j>avEC; E;aY0I.lEvOV" (Epistle C : 
266). 
moment' the single individual "becomes aware of the rebirth, for his 
previous state was indeed one of 'not to be'" ( PF: 21). 
Before further exploring the notion of contemporaneity, let us first 
discuss briefly the encounter of the single individual's understanding 
with the paradox of God's existence. It seems to us important to point 
out that 
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neither Johannes de Silentio nor Johannes Climacus declare themselves 
to be religious thinkers or believers (in the Kierkegaardean sense) and 
thus although their understanding of the absurd does not entail a 
collapse to the sphere of understanding, it could be said to acquire the 
form of what is beyond the upper boundary of thought and 
understanding. Indeed, the paradox is called the 'passion of thought', the 
ultimate paradox being "to want to discover something that thought itself 
cannot think" (PF: 37). As we have seen in the Introduction of this 
thesis, Kierkegaard does not present himself as an Apostle with 'divine 
authority', declaring emphatically that his whole authorship, even in his 
religious writings, remains within the sphere of reflection (My Activity as 
a Writer: 143 n*). Not being an Apostle has a double effect, both to him 
and to his readers. Deprived of divine authority, he is also deprived of 
the chance to communicate himself, and thus of speaking. As a 
consequence, what troubles most of his readers, is the very fact that one 
can not be certain if the author remains truly within the sphere of 
understanding and reflection, having also an admiration of the 'absolute 
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Other' (PF: 45) that lies beyond it-and is called the 'unknown' that is 
continually colliding" with the paradoxical passion of the understanding-
or if he had actually made the leap of faith, but is unable to speak, like 
another Abraham. If the former is the case, then one can argue that his 
whole authorship is an attempt to prove to himself that there is a God 
that exists 'existentially' and that this God has not become "the most 
terrible deceiver through the understanding's deception of itself' (PF: 46). 
If the second is the case, then one has the task to try herself, to make 
the leap of faith and become contemporaneous with the absolute paradox 
that transcends the limits of the understanding. 
We cannot risk deciding which one of the two cases is true, for to 
judge someone's interiority is beyond our intuitive capacity. Whatever the 
judgement would have been, one should emphasise that authorship 
implies linguistic expression and thus the terms that Kierkegaard 
employs, i.e absurd, paradox, etc are bound to be translations in the 
sphere of the ethical and the universal, thus tempting him and his 
readers in their encounter with the divine. Indeed, Climacus pinpoints 
the difficulty of a mutual understanding between the paradox, namely 
the God-man and the understanding of the human being, on the basis of 
their qualitative difference (ibid: 49). If mutual understanding was 
possible, then their encounter would be a happy one, whereas in the 
opposite case, it would be an unhappy one that is termed "offense"; 
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If. the paradox and the understanding meet in the mutual understanding of their 
dIfference, then the encounter is a happy one, like erotic love's 
und~rst~nding .. .If the encounter is not in mutual understanding, then the 
relatIOn IS unhappy, If I dare call it that. .. we could more specifically call offense 
(PF: 49). 
We have seen in our first chapter that for Climacus "all existence is 
suffering". Now, he claims that "all offense is suffering", implying thus 
that offense, or the unhappy relationship between the understanding and 
the paradox is inevitable (loc. Cit). The historical appearance of the 
paradox is fundamentally linked with the emergence of the offense, since 
for Climacus "all offense is in its essence a misunderstanding of the 
rrwment, since it is indeed offense at the paradox, and the paradox in 
tum is the moment" (ibid: 51). Interestingly enough then, the emergence 
of the offense is directly linked with the moment, around which -as 
Climacus argues- "everything indeed revolves" (loc. Cit). Let us pause for 
a moment and recall another Kierkegaardean concept i.e. that of anxiety, 
around which everything was also said to revolve. To become more 
explicit, in the same way as the dizziness of anxiety confuses every 
human being before the moment of the Fall, offense confuses her in her 
encounter with the paradox of God's historical existence. It seems to us 
that a suspension of the understanding is necessary for a primordial 
resolution to take place. Thus, the moment signifying the Fall, at another 
level becomes the moment that sets the ground for atonement. Or, in 
other words, one can argue that for Kierkegaard the moment one 
becomes again- as an outcome of a redoubling of her existence-
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contemporaneous with Adam, acquiring thus the consciousness of sin, is 
simultaneous with the moment one encounters with the paradox and 
becomes contemporaneous with it. The 'consciousness of sin' is the 
presupposition and the condition of such an encounter and never leaves 
the individual, but always reminds her of her untruth 
Through the moment, the learner becomes untruth; the person who knew 
himself becomes confused and instead of self-knowledge he acquires the 
consciousness of sin etc, for just as soon as we assume the moment everything 
goes by itself (ibid: 51). 
In this inward journey of 'contemporaneity' thus, the category of the 
offense is the indispensable accompaniment, since, in a sense, it acts as 
the safety valve against any improper intrusion of the understanding. To 
be more precise, Kierkegaard advocates the unbridgeable abyss 
separating the paradoxical existence of God-man and the single 
individual, arguing against any theoretical interpretations of it. 
According to anti-Climacus, only faith can save the individual from the 
possibility of offense, as indicated by the following passage: 
The possibility of offense .. .is present at every moment, confinning at every 
moment the chasmic abyss between the single individual and the God-man over 
which faith and faith alone reaches ... the possibility of offense is the stumbling 
block for all. whether they choose to believe or they are offended (PC: 139). 
It follows that Offense -or (JKav8aAov- emerges every time the paradox 
makes its appearance and that it can be fittingly called the scandal of the 
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understanding. Nevertheless, for anti-Climacus, the possibility of 
offense, or the repulsion that the understanding feels towards the 
paradox in the beginning of their relationship, confirms and retains the 
impossibility of direct communication between the God-man and the 
human being (ibid: 139). Let us now turn our gaze to Kierkegaard's 
conception of contemporaneity with Christ, so as to better understand his 
conception of the paradox. Does Kierkegaard's conception retain an 
element of a mystical union between the two parts, or, is this union 
precluded by the acceptance of the chasmic abyss that separates man 
and God-man and the impossibility of direct communication between 
them? 
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4.2.1 The paradoxical double movement of contemporaneity: God-
man and the single individual 
In our reading of Kierkegaard, contemporaneity with God-man and 
repetition in the eminent sense are 'identical' in his works in the sense 
that they both express the highest form of freedom and 'earnestness'. 
Contemporaneity, as we are going to see shortly, is not to be understood 
literally, namely as a reference to the actual historical contemporaries of 
Christ, but as a task for every single individual. 
We can take the liberty to express the peculiar quality of higher 
repetition with the term double contemporaneity, a term not used by 
Kierkegaard but in our view essentially faithful to the spirit of his 
writings. As already mentioned in the introduction, with this term we 
wish to capture in further accuracy and detail the state of affairs where 
not only the single individual but also God resolves to be 
contemporaneous with every human being and to give her, in Climacus 
expression, 'the truth and the condition'. This double movement of 
contemporaneity seen also as a double movement of repetition makes the 
passage with which we begin this chapter clearer. God wills repetition, 
and that is why He freely chose to come into historical existence and to 
appear as a God-man. On the other hand, the single individual has also 
the chance, by virtue of her freedom and in 'earnestness' to make the 
movement of repetition. 
Contemporaneity with the paradox is a very special category for 
Climacus since it allows for a transgression of the boundaries of time, 
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which nevertheless happens 'in' time. The paradox of God's coming into 
existence unifies the contradictories, or if we want to put it in 
Schellingean terms, it is the 'identity' of the eternity and the historical: 
·· ... the paradox specifically unites the contradictories215 , is the 
etemalising of the historical and the historicising of the eternal" (PF: 61). 
Climacus at this moment does not refer excluSively to God-man's 
appearance who although belonging to eternity, resolves nevertheless to 
come into historical existence, not only acquiring thus a historical form 
but also eternalising the 'moment' of his appearance. The author also 
refers to the 'moment' of human being's transformation- by virtue of the 
appearance of the paradox - in which eternity enters in her life and 
etemalises her 'moment' of decision to become contemporaneous with the 
God-man. 
Contemporaneity thus acquires in Kierkegaard a primordial character 
very similar to the one we have encountered in Schelling's narrative. 
Indeed, for Kierkegaard, the importance does not lie in the immediate 
contemporaneity with the paradox, but mainly in the contemporaneity 
beyond any temporal restrictions where it is possible for everyone to 
215 Anti-Climacus, in his Practice in Christianity, calls the God-man a "sign of contradiction". By.si.gn he 
means the "denied immediacy" or in other words, "the sign is not immedia~ely so~ething ?~t ~hat It IS a 
sign, and it is not immediately that which it is a sign or as a sign is not the Immediate that It IS (PC: 124). 
Moreover, a sign of contradiction contains for him an intrinsic contradiction. In the case o~ God-~an the 
contradiction lies in the fact that although God-man in immediacy seems to be a human bemg, he IS also 
and mainly God (ibid: 125-6). 
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attain it. Consequently, every human being can existentially be 'at the 
same time' but in different times. At the case of Kierkegaard, the 
moment of the emergence of paradox, prompts every individual to render 
her eternal past to her eternal future by being contemporaneous with the 
'moment', making thus possible the ascribed task of "the eternalising of 
the historical and the historicising of the eternal" (PF:61). Furthermore, 
one can possibly argue that Kierkegaard's conception of being 
'contemporaneous' with God-man is very close to Schelling's conception 
of 'contemporaneity' with the eternal act of creation. As we have 
previously noticed, although the sacrifice of God happened 'in' time, 
retains its eternal dimension and its intrinsic connection with the eternal 
act of creation since "the Lamb was slain from the foundation of the 
world" (Berdyaev 1935: 174). Thus, it can be argued that even for 
Kierkegaard, to be contemporaneous with the paradox of God-man's 
appearance is tantamount to being contemporaneous not only with 
Adam's or Abraham's historical existence but also, or simultaneously, 
with the eternal act of the creation of cosmos. 
It becomes evident then why immediate contemporaneity is not 
synonymous with genuine contemporaneity in Kierkegaard's work. In 
his Philosophical Fragments, Climacus distinguishes between those two 
kinds of contemporaneity arguing that immediate contemporaneity, if 
lacking the earnest relation with God-man, could be synonymous with 
noncontemporaneity: 
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But what does it mean to say that one can be contempor::lnJ without h b . t ~J , owever, 
eing con e~pora~, consequently that one can be contemporary and yet. 
although uSIng thIS advantage (in the sense of immediacy), be a 
~onco~temporcuy- what else does this mean except that one simply cannot be 
Immediately c~ntemporary with a teacher and event of that sort, so that the real 
contemporary IS not that by virtue of immediate contemporaneity but by virtue 
of something else (PF: 67). 
By virtue of something else: What differentiates the genuine 
contemporary then is this 'something else' that Kierkegaard calls 'faith'. 
Accordingly, faith is for Kierkegaard what transforms the unhappy 
encounter between the understanding and the paradox to a happy love 
affair. More explicitly, this happens when the understanding, in its 
encounter with the paradox, steps aside and the "paradox gives itself', 
and "the third something, the something in which this occurs ... is that 
happy passion", namely faith (ibid: 59). Indeed, faith is what overcomes 
not only the limits of understanding but also of knowledge, since 
knowledge, for Climacus is either the knowledge of the eternal, excluding 
thus temporality and the historical, or the knowledge of the historical, 
eternity being in this case excluded. As a consequence, no knowledge of 
the absurdity "that the eternal is the historical" is possible (ibid: 62). 
God-man, being the sign of contradiction, becomes then the object of 
faith, and his appearance as a teacher is far more important than his 
teaching. If we also take into account the fact that God-man appears 
quietly, as a simple man and not gloriously as a king, then one can 
understand, by virtue of the importance of God-man's unrecognisability, 
the importance of indirect communication. For anti-Climacus, God-man 
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is not the jealous God that, acting as a judge, wants to punish the 
human beings for their sin, denying thus direct communicability. Direct 
communicability, as we have seen already in the case of Abraham, 
implies the use of understanding and the disclosure to the ethical. On 
the contrary, God-man, being qualitatively different from the human 
beings, cannot disclose himself, for it is impossible for the human beings 
to directly understand him. Direct recognisability, is for anti-Climacus a 
feature of the idol, but God-man is not an idol but a teacher (PC: 136). 
Idols need admirers and Kierkegaard is harshly attacking admirers for 
they develop what he calls a pagan relationship with Christ. Admirers 
(according to the terminology of Practice in Christianity) or followers at 
second hand (according to the terminology of Philosophical Fragments) do 
not relate themselves with the real suffering of the historical existence of 
the God-man but they retain an external relation with him and 
consequently with the 'moment'. Furthermore, the admirer is only 
"spinelessly or selfishly infatuated with" whereas when "there is any 
inconvenience or danger, he pulls back; if this cannot be done, he 
becomes the traitor" (ibid: 246). According to anti-Climacus then, Judas 
is an exemplary figure of an admirer, for when he realised that what he 
was expecting from God-man were not to be realised, he became 
'impatient' and a traitor (loc. Cit). Thus, for Kierkegaard, there are no 
admirers or followers at second hand of God-man, since they lack what 
he calls the 'autopsy' of faith: 
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... there is not and cannot be any question of a follower at second hand fo th 
believer (and only he, after all, is a follower) continually has the autops~ 0; fai~h' 
he does not see with the eyes of the others and sees only the same as every , 
believer sees- with the eyes of the faith (PF: 102). 
Only a genuine contemporary can experience continuously an autopsy 
of faith; on the contrary, for the admirer, faith is based on the immediacy 
of direct communication and recognisability. Anti-Climacus further 
argues that faith is a choice in the sense that it is not "direct reception-
and the reCipient is the one who is disclosed, whether he will believe or 
be offended" (PC: 140). Once again we have to emphasise that choice is 
not to be conceived as being a rational decision stemming from the 
understanding, but quite on the contrary, it retains its Schellingean 
meaning by being identified with primordial resolution216 that excludes 
all doubt: "The conclusion of the belief is no conclusion but a resolution, 
and thus doubt is excluded" (PF: 84). Thus, in the presence of the sign 
of contradiction, i.e. of God-man, the single individual can only relate 
herself with Him by virtue of indirect -communication, namely with 
inwardness. The contradiction thus, serves as the mirror where the 
single individual reflects herself and makes the decisive choice, that is 
compared with a riddle that sets free the inner potencies of the individual 
216 It has also to be noticed though, that Kierkegaard argues that faith is "not an act of will, for it is always 
the case that all human willing is efficacious only within the condition", showing thus the crucial 
importance of the presence of the 'condition', without which all willing "is of no av~il" (PF:. 62-3). 
Although using a terminology within the Augustinian tradition (i.e. efficacious and mefficac!Ou~ grace), 
Kierkegaard does not argue in favour of a pre-Adamic state where only inefficacious grace was m effect. 
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.t: c?ntra~iCtion plac~d squarely in front of a person- if one can get him to look at 
It- IS a mIrror; as he IS forming a judgment, what dwells within him must be 
disclosed. It is a riddle, but as he is guessing the riddle, what dwells within him 
is disclosed by the way he guesses. The contradiction confronts him with a 
choice, and as he is choosing, together with what he chooses, he himself is 
disclosed (PC: 127). 
Thus, it becomes clear that although the genuine contemporary has as 
his point of departure the occasion of the historical existence of God-
man, that gives him the eternal consciousness, he nevertheless makes a 
further step. More explicitly, he freely and inwardly considers this 
historical event to be "the condition of his eternal happiness" (PF: 58). If 
we want to summarise Kierkegaard's argument then, we shall say that 
no matter if someone's is really217 contemporary with God-man or not2 18, 
he can be genuine contemporary with God-man by receiving by Him the 
condition (ibid: 100). What is this 'condition' then that on the one hand 
repulses the mere admirers and on the other hand attracts the genuine 
believers? According to anti-Climacus, what the God-man offers to every 
believer is the same condition, that is "to become just as poor, despised, 
insulted, mocked, and if possible even a little more ... " (PC: 241). Indeed, 
for the author, genuine contemporaneity is synonymous with inward 
repetition or imitation of the sufferings of the God-man which "no 
admirer has ever wanted to join" (loc. Cit). A mere admirer- in 
contradistinction to the imitator who "is or strives to be219 what he 
217 Where in that case the real historical event becomes the occasion for him to become a follower 
(PF; I 00). . 
~IS Where in that case the report of the contemporaries play the role of the occasIOn. 
219 Arguably enough then, Abraham and Job can be conceived as imitators of the God-man. 
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admires" - is detached from the object of its admiration, giving thus no 
attention to the claim that the God-man has laid upon him (loc. Cit). 
Only the individual who "personally receives the condition [and the truth] 
from the god" truly believes and between this person and the god-man a 
special relationship develops (PF: 69). 
The person who received the condition received it from the teacher himself, and 
consequently that teacher must know everyone who knows him, and the 
individual can know the teacher only by being himself known by the teacher 
(ibid: 68-9). 
This reciprocal knowledge between the Single individual and the God-
man is not communicable to those outside this relation, since for the 
human eyes that are uninitiated to the mystery of inwardness "untruth 
has exactly the same range as truth", making thus direct communication 
between individuals impossible. 
The God-man functions as the true prototype, leaving behind him 
footprints so as to become possible for the imitator to join Him in the 
various stages of His earthly existence. According to anti-Climacus, 
Christ's intention to leave those traces220 and become the prototype has a 
clear soteriological dimension (PC: 238). 
220 A classic and insightful elaboration of the notion of trace and its relation with the notion of face is that 
of Levinas who, in a theologico-ethical manner relates the notions of face and trace with the breaking of 
any continuity, which results, to the disarrangement of some kind of order. (Ricoeur 1988: 125). In 
Levinas's own formulation: "The Other proceeds from an absolutely Absent, but his relationship with the 
absolutely Absent from which he comes does not indicate, does not reveal, this Absent; and yet the .Absent 
has a meaning in the face ... The beyond from which the face comes signifies as a trace" or.' "a face IS of 
itself a visitation and a transcendence ... To be in the image of God does not mean to be an Icon of God but 
to find oneself in his trace ... To go toward Him is not to follow this trace, which is not a sign; it is to go 
toward the Others who stand in the trace ofilliety"(Levinas 1996: 60,64). Despite Levinas's critique of 
Consequently, the God-man resolves to be born and live as "po 
or, 
abandoned, abased ... " so as to indirectly show to everyone the 
contradiction of being simultaneously so high and so low 
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... he who is truly to be the prototype and be related only to imitators must in 
one sense be behind people, propelling forward, while in another sense he 
stands ahead, beckoning. This is the relation of loftiness and lowliness in the 
prototype ... Thus in one sense the prototype is behind. more deeply pressed 
?own Into abasement and lowliness than any human being has ever been, and 
In another sense, ahead, infinitely lifted up (ibid: 238-9). 
Having discussed so far how the single individual resolves to be 
contemporaneous with the God-man and thus to make repetition- in 
freedom and in earnestness-possible, we now shift our attention to the 
God-man's resolution to become contemporaneous with the human 
beings, allowing thus repetition to acquire its full meaning. 
The question is more precisely this: Why does God resolve to come into 
existence and to suffer? In other words, why did He decide to continually 
become contemporaneous with every human person by allowing her at 
the same time to become contemporaneous with the God-man? 
According to Climacus, God needs "no pupil in order to understand 
himself, and no occasion can act upon him in such a way that there is 
just as much in the occasion as in the resolution" (PF: 24). Only love, 
any conception that relates sign and trace and regardless of whether Kierkegaard would endorse Levinas's 
approach as far as the problem of the person being the image or icon of God is concerned, one can say that 
for Kierkegaard the struggle to touch upon the mystery of the human existence is an att~mpt t? trace the 
face of the others orland of God. The impossibility of a direct communication/commumon with G~d or 
with people is not only an urge of inwardness but it also indicates an attempt to escape the superficIal, the 
seemingly present and to move into the absent where only traces can be touched upon. 
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Kierkegaard argues, could move God to make his appearance and to 
acquire historical existence. 
What then, moves him to make his appearance? He must move himself and 
continue to be what Aristotle says of him, UKtvllL"o<; naYL"U KtVEt [unmoved he 
moves allJ. But if he moves himself. then there of course is no need that moves 
him ... But ifhe moves himself and is not moved by need. what moves him then 
but love, for love does not have the satisfaction of need outside itself but within 
(PF: 24). 
For Kierkegaard then, God is not an unmovable being that only 'is' but 
does not 'exist'; He rather is life. His love, Climacus argues, is 
procreative, because, as we have already said above it is God's distinctive 
quality to be able to beget. It needs be reminded that in Schelling's 
narrative too, the personal God comes into existence out of love in an 
instant that has eternal validity and duration. For Kierkegaard also, 
God's resolution to appear freely out of love has eternal validity, making 
thus contemporaneity and repetition possible. 
Out of love, therefore, the god must be eternally resolved in this way, but just as 
his love is the basis, so also love must be the goal. for it would indeed be a 
contradiction for the god to have a basis of movement and a goal that do not 
correspond to this. The love. then, must be for the leamer, and the goal must 
be to win him, for only in love is the different made equal. .. (PF: 25). 
Thus, God, out of love, resolves freely to leave concealment and to come-
into-existence, becoming a personal God that loves, sacrifices and 
suffers. For both Climacus and anti-Climacus, God-man suffers not 
only because he was mocked, crucified, etc but also because he 
undergoes the secret suffering of inwardness, when he wanted to make 
himself understood by humankind, knowing at the same time that this 
task is "not so easy if he is not to destroy that which is different" (PF: 25; 
pc: 136-7). 
Suffering and love then are two inseparable notions not only in 
Kierkegaard's account but also in Schelling's, who argues that God is 'a 
life, not a mere being' and 
All life has a destiny and is subject to suffering and development. God freely 
submitted himself to this too, in the very beginning, when, in order to become 
personal, he divided light and the world of darkness ... AlI history remains 
incomprehensible without the concept of a humanly suffering God, a concept 
which is common to all the mysteries and spiritual religions of ancient times 
(OHF: 84). 
A humanly suffering God then makes history comprehensible and 
inaugurates an era when the moment of his historical appearance 
becomes synonymous with the 'fullness of time' (PF: 58). 
In conclusion to the present chapter it has to be remarked that in 
the first chapter spirit was shown to be a crucial category in 
Kierkegaard's theorisation of Christianity. It was argued that in 
Kierkegaard's account spirit could furthermore drive the human being 
either to the state of 'sickness unto death' or to that of divine freedom. 
Similarly, it was argued in the previous chapter that in Schelling's 
narrative spirit is what differentiates human beings from the other visible 
creatures of the cosmos. In this case spirit is again seen as potentially 
leading either to false life and sickness or to true life and freedom. It has 
to be reminded that for Schelling, whilst in God the spirit of love 
subjugates the spirit of evil once and for all in what the philosopher 
tenus the second creation, this does not occur in the case for human 
beings. 
It could therefore be argued that for both thinkers, God, resolves out of 
love to appear in history as a humanly suffering God, leaving behind him 
the traces a person should repeat in a unique manner. Moreover, this 
movement of repetition grounds the very possibility of becoming truly 
and freely contemporaneous with the paradox of God's coming into 
existence. Being regarded as the 'fullness of time' this paradox bears in 
it not only the dimension of the eternal past that Schelling has 
masterfully narrated but also the two moments he never had the chance 
to explicitly address, namely the eternal present and the eternal future. 
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Concluding Thoughts 
The present work promised to challenge the interrelationship between 
the notions of the Fall, repetition and freedom, mainly through the 
aesthetic writings of Kierkegaard and secondarily through the writings of 
St. Augustine, Kant and Schelling. Kierkegaard's notion of 'taking notice' 
served as the vehicle in our attempt to show the importance not only of 
'rethinking' but also of experiencing or 'living anew' the moment of the 
collision of time and eternity, that signifies repetition and freedom in 
their eminent form. It should be established by now that the choice of 
Kierkegaard's so-called 'aesthetic writings' was based on our belief that 
they express in a perfect way the workings of his notion of 'taking notice'. 
To put it more explicitly, in his aesthetic writings the philosopher does 
not attempt to impose his own personal belief and 'truth' on his readers, 
but on the contrary he compels them to think, live, experience, and 'see' 
with their own eyes. The interrelation of the concepts of the Fall, 
repetition and freedom, and the different forms they acquire according to 
different interpretations, compels us to 'take notice' of different aspects of 
human and divine singUlarity, that emerge alongSide each interpretation. 
Thus, in our first chapter we explored more closely a key religious 
Kierkegaardean notion, namely the concept of anxiety. It was argued -
and hopefully shown beyond doubt- that by associating anxiety with 
Adam's fall, Kierkegaard offers a radical account of the book of Genesis. 
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More specifically, Kierkegaard argues that the Fall of each individual 
human being should not be conceived as a mere consequence of Adam's 
Fall, but as the actual happening in the life of each individual, in their 
freedom. Moreover, Kierkegaard has 'called our attention' to the 
significations of a possible distinction between a time before and after the 
Fall. Two fundamental questions arise in relation to this conception: 
Are the divine being and the human beings radically and irretrievably 
separated as a consequence of the Fall? And secondly, how should we 
conceive the boundaries of human freedom and repetition? 
Thus, in the second chapter of this study we challenged two 
accounts- viz. those of St. Augustine and Kant- that in our opinion 
advocate the existence of a radical gap between the time before and after 
the Fall, and moreover between God and the human beings to the extent 
that God is either distant or reduced to a regulative principle. 
In the third chapter we explored a radically different account not 
only of repetition, religiosity, contemporaneity, time, freedom and the 
Fall, but also of the divine as a personal God. This exploration is 
conducted through the writings of the middle period of Schelling's 
philosophy that arguably pave the ground for a re-interpretation of 
Kierkegaard in the final chapter of our thesis. 
Repetition, contemporaneity, freedom, faith and sacrificial love 
both in its human and divine manifestations as they emerge from a 
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revaluation of Kierkegaard's aesthetic writings were thus the main topics 
of the last chapter of this work. 
Instead of formally and systematically conclude this thesis we 
would rather remain faithful to the Kierkegardean spirit urging us to 
surmount the confines of formal and systematic thought that desperately 
seeks for conclusions. Thus, in our attempt to 'take notice' -for a final 
time in this work- of the religious themes haunting not only Kierkegaard, 
St. Augustine, Kant and Schelling but every human being, we are 
compelled to pursue our 'inconclusive' thoughts in an 'indirect' manner. 
Indeed, being structured along the lines of a work of art, the postscript of 
our thesis challenges and shows the restrictions imposed by the 
language of formal logic and rational understanding. Tarkovsky's film 
The Sacnfice- shot in Sweden in 1985- will provide us with the 'occasion' 
of speaking -but more importantly of remaining silent- about those 
religious themes, while it opens up new dimensions of thinking and 
experiencing them. 
Postscript 
Alexander, the hero of Tarkovsky's film Sacrifice, picked up a dry tree 
branch off the ground, stuck it in the cliff and started narrating the 
following story to his son 
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Once you know, ... an elder in a monastery ... also stuck a dry tree into a 
mountain ... He commanded his novice- Ioann ... to water this tree every day, until 
it came to life ... Each morning Ioann would set off uphill with his bucket of 
water ... so it went for three whole years. And then, one fine day, he ascended the 
mountain and saw: the tree was completely covered- every inch- with flowers 
(Tarkovsky 1999: 516). 
The Kid221listened silently to his father's soliloquy, temporarily confined 
to silence due to a minor operation he underwent in his vocal chords. 
Without expecting a certain response from the child, Alexander, whose 
birthday that day it was, continued his thinking by wondering if 'method' 
and 'system222' are the keys for understanding the mystery of life. If, he 
asks, someone performs the same action, every day, each day, at the 
same time "as though a ritual. .. systematically and without deviation" 
then, possibly, the "world will change" (ibid: 516). Almost ironically- and 
in a possible allusion to Kant's strict observance of his everyday routine-
Alexander gives an illustration of this hypothesis with the follOwing 
words: " ... suppose you wake up in the morning, get up at seven, go to 
the bathroom, fill a glass of water from the tap, and pour it down the 
lavatory. Nothing more ... " (Loc. Cit). 
221 The name of the son is not revealed in the course of the film. 
222 A possible allusion to Hegel? 
Put in Kierkegaardean tenus, what intrigues Tarkovsky's hero is 
repetition in its many guises. Externally viewed, Ioann's action to water 
the tree daily seems identical with the act of someone that every day 
follows mechanically and uninterruptedly the same routine and in this 
respect it can be likened with what has already been discussed in the 
previous chapter of the thesis about Constantius's journey to Berlin. The 
question therefore arises whether there are any means by which to 
distinguish empty or merely mechanical repetition from fulfilled 
repetition, when the very act of repetition is only made accessible to the 
onlooker in an 'external' manner. As perhaps expected, Tarkovsky 
refrains from providing us with a definite answer to this question, for 
there is arguably not one such answer. Sharing with Kierkegaard and 
Schelling this special ability to recognise the call of inwardness, the 
director simply prompts us to follow Alexander in his journey to 
inwardness. 
Alexander's thoughts are interrupted by the arrival on the scene of 
a mysterious figure, Otto the postman. Far from being an ordinary 
postman, Otto is rather a herald, similar to the one who brought the 
'news of the day' in Kierkegaard's account or with the madman in 
Nietzsche's Zarathustra. Indeed, Otto straightaway declares himself to 
be a postman not in profession but in his free time and goes on to 
further compare himself -and his whole manner of reasoning- with 
Nietzsche's dwarf (Tarkovsky 1999: 518-9). "What's your relationship 
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with God like?" Otto asks Alexander, only to receive the following answer: 
"No ... we're not acquainted with each other! I never had the honour of an 
introduction" (ibid: 518). 'That's no tragedy, no tragedy at all" replies the 
postman, implying perhaps that the real tragedy would be the illusion 
that one is in a perfect relationship with God. The honour of an 
introduction': Alexander seems to be looking for a relationship with a 
personal God, which is neither st. Augustine's transcendent God nor 
Kant's God conceived as a regulative principle. We could say that by 
admitting his non-existent relationship with such a God, Alexander 'took 
notice', maybe for the first time in his life, of how his "organ of faith has 
atrophied" (Synessios 1999: xxv). "All this has been lost nowadays! We 
have lost the knack of praying ... " Alexander exclaims, having now 
returned home to celebrate his birthday. 
Few minutes or perhaps hours later223 , the scenery has drastically 
changed. The 'IV is switched on and everyone looks scared and petrified. 
A terrible and mass-destructive world war is declared. It seems that there 
is no possibility of escaping such a war and an actual enemy is not 
named. The only enemy the prime minister recognises is panic, for it 
brings disorder and chaos. 
221 For one cannot easily judge the actual length of time in Tarkovsky's movies. 
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Using words that remind us of Kant, the prime minister orders: 
Every intelligent citizen is to summon up all his courage and steadily assist the 
ar:ny to pr~serve ~he peace, order and discipline, for the terrible enemy in our 
mIdst now IS panIc. Because it is contagious and beyond the influence of 
common sense. Only order and organisation, dear fellow citizens! Only order 
can oppose the chaos! I entreat you, I appeal to your courage and to your 
reason, come what may! (Tarkovsky 1999: 537). 
Tarkovsky does not bother to give us a clear picture of the country 
and the date the story is taking place. Taking into consideration that the 
film was shot in Sweden, we assume that the story is taking place there 
and by judging from the note that Alexander left at the end of the film, 
we learn that the date is June 1986. Needless to say, Tarkovsky's 
perception of time is peculiar; his heroes seem almost a-temporal and 
they -up to some extent- could be living in any modem era or European 
country. An indication of this only relative and loose situatedness in 
socio-historical contexts may be also traced in the birthday present that 
Otto brought to Alexander- an authentic map of Europe at the end of the 
17th century. In any case, Tarkovsky's characters could be characterised 
with some accuracy as being lonely and isolated citizens of a 
cosmopolitan society. 
Being a citizen in a cosmopolitan society does not fill the gap of 
loneliness that Tarkovsky's heroes experience. As Alexander pOints out 
in words quite strongly reminiscent of those of Pascal cited in the 
beginning of chapter four, this human being feels scared of everything in 
life: "Life was terrifying ... but instead of making an accommodation with 
nature, and sharing his fate with her. . .instead man began to defend 
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himself. .. People stopped communicating224 ... " (ibid: 521). If put in 
Schellingean terms, this passage could be seen as indicating that the 
human being, by moving away - or falling - from the 'centrum', develops 
an egocentric selfhood that deprives her from 'religiousity' and 'faith' in 
their primordial sense. What is lost then is the belief, by virtue of the 
absurd, or in the name of the paradox, that "everything is possible". 
Nuclear destruction being imminent everyone but Alexander's wife 
anticipate death in silent agony. Stricken by panic she cries out: "We 
must do something!" This is perhaps the typical reaction of the trapped 
person, the need to act against the sheer force of fateful events, which is 
so often completely deprived of any specific and even remotely intelligible 
course of action. With the intervention of the doctor this short feat of 
hysteria gives place to a relapse to the state of passivity and fatality 
characterising the whole company. In the midst of all this, Alexander 
seems still open to a mode of action, which despite being resolute is as 
far removed from the confines of rationality as to border with faith by 
virtue of the absurd. 
Speaking of Alexander, Tarkovsky pOints out that he is neither 
the prototype of hero nor a strong man. Alexander is rather an ordinary 
person that is nevertheless able to sacrifice himself, and moreover his 
224 It seems to us that Kierkegaard, not only in his writings but most importantly in his ?er~o~allife, 
experienced and captured in a wonderful and dramatic way the loneliness of th~ si~gle l~dlYI,dual and the 
lack of communication, This persistence in his conception of indirect commUnicatIOn m~ght mdlcate ,that, 
Kierkegaard might have lost his hope (and maybe his faith?) to the possibility of a mystIcal communicatIOn 
of the inner living experience between two or more persons. 
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egocentric self, in the name of a higher ideal, or in Kierkegaardean tenns. 
'by virtue of the absurd' (Tarkovsky 1987: 287). Thus, as another 
Abraham, Alexander puts his whole life at risk, for his actions. spring out 
of freedom, are incommunicable to the others in his environment (loc. 
Cit), 
If one could follow a chronological order in the description of the 
events taking place in the film, one could give the following account: 
First, Alexander prays to God, fervently, for the first time in his life: 
Then he goes on to his knees. folds his hands, and, trying to look at the black 
peaks of the still trees, he begins to pray properly, for the first time in his 
life .. .'O God! Save us in this terrible hour. .. Let not my children die, nor my 
friends ... because this war is the last ... and will leave neither victor nor 
vanquished .. .1 will give Thee everything I have, I'll leave my family which I love, 
I'll burn my home. I will deny myself the Kid, I'll become dumb, I'll never speak 
to anyone; I'll deny myself everything that binds me to life; but just make 
everything as it was earlier. this morning. like yesterday with none of this 
sickening. deathly fear! Help me, Lord and I will do all that I have promised 
Theel. . .' (Tarkovsky 1999: 543-4). 
Secondly, Alexander also follows the postman's paradoxical suggestion 
that the only alternative to this terrible situation is to go and sleep with 
Maria, his servant, who being a witch, has magical powers and she could 
save the world. Having visited Maria, Alexander returns home where he 
falls asleep only to wake up next morning and find everything being 
exactly the same as it was before the declaration of the war. Even 
everybody at home is now immersed in her own problem, as if the war 
has never happened or it was never even a remote possibility. Only 
Alexander, and perhaps Maria, Otto and the Kid, seem to have 
knowledge or recollection of the events. Thus, in inner consistency with 
what he promised in his prayer, Alexander burns the house, denies his 
family, and surrenders himself to the doctors that eventually lead him 
into the madhouse. His 'sacrifice' is moreover perceived by the others as 
madness and absurdity. Alexander is now considered a 'madman' and 
he does nothing to prove the opposite. He promised to be silent and he 
now keeps his promise. He finds it impossible to communicate his inner 
experiences even to his best friend, Victor 
I did it, don't' worry ... Listen Victor, I meant to tell you something very import .. .' 
But just then he remembers, and falls silent. He falls silent, never again to 
speak. As he has promised (ibid: 559). 
Far from being pedantic, the director neither exalts Alexander's 
action nor favours one of the two possible courses of actions undertaken 
by his character. Tarkovsky is far from being a preacher; he does not 
even make clear -but rather chooses to keep us confused through and 
through - regarding the possibility of the whole story with the war being a 
bad dream of Alexander. Even in the latter case though, one cannot 
ignore the importance of Alexander'S sacrifice given there is no doubt 
about the importance of dreams. 
For Schelling for example, in the dreaming state, the whole range 
of potencies are in effect, while for Kierkegaard the effects of anxiety and 
possibility are best described in comparison with the dizziness of the 
dreaming state. 
Divine or holy madness can not be distinguished in an external 
manner from pathological madness. Exoterically, Alexander is mad. and 
everyone seems sad and feels pity for him. Only Otto, the mad postman, 
and Maria, the witch, and as we are going to see the Kid. have an 
intimation of Alexander's inner movement of repetition. Alexander 
gained his freedom by 'seeing' the power of repetition that could render 
the past into future, although on another plane. The collision of eternity 
and time has happened for him, and consequently to him the world 
cannot be the same. 
We could say that being dissatisfied with approaches such as St. 
Augustine's and Kant's that see the relation between God and the human 
person as being trapped in the boundaries of fallen time, Alexander 
attempts the impossible, only to show the power of repetition and 
freedom. 
If for Kant, "we ought to hazard nothing that may be wrong" (Religion: 
173), then Alexander can be said to act in an essentially anti-Kantian 
manner. In effect he does exactly the opposite from what Kant prescribes 
to the moral agent, by achieving this primordial sense of religiosity where 
one surrenders himself to "the highest commitment to the right without 
choice" (OHF: 71), arguably cancelling therefore- in a sense- the act of the 
Fall. 
More importantly, Alexander left traces of his act of repetition 
behind him in the form of a note addressed to his family, urging them to 
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leave the house and to go for a walk: "Why not go for a little walk. The 
Kid will show you the 'Japanese' tree, which he and I planted yesterday. 
Or was it today? Love to you all ... Forgive me in advance ... " (Tarkovsky 
1999: 557). 
The film and our thesis both conclude with the following scene. 
Alexander is being driven away in an ambulance, only Maria in tow, until 
it reaches this place in the countryside just by the sea, where the planted 
tree still stands. The ambulance slowly passes the tree, and Alexander 
silently bids farewell to the Kid who keeps faithfully and repeatedly 
watering the tree 
He is walking along the road. and having difficulty carrying a heavy. large 
bucket full of water. When the vehicle draws level with him. he stops to rest the 
bucket on the ground and watches it drive past. Mr Alexander pulls himself 
away from the window in alarm. before his son notices him ... (ibid: 560). 
Then, the Kid, resting under the tree, speaks for the first time in the 
movie. The first words uttered by the Kid, are perhaps ironically the final 
words Tarkovsky wrote for the cinema before his untimely death. These 
compelling words invite us to 'take notice' of the importance of 
investigating 'who' instead of 'what' God or the divine are and are spoken 
with the uttennost simplicity that marks all genuine questions: WIn the 
Beginning was the Word ... " Why is that papa?' (Synessios 1999: xxv) 
Bibliography 
- Ackrill, J.L (1987), A new Aristotle Reader. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
- Agacinski, Sylviane (1998), "We are Not Sublime", in Kierkegaard: A 
Critical reader, ed. Jonathan Ree and Jane Chamberlain, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 129-150 
- Alliez, Eric (1996), Capital Times, tr.Georges Van Den Abbeele, 
Mineapolis:Minnesota University Press 
- Anz, Wilhelm (1998), Kierkegaard on Death and Dying, in Kierkegaard : 
A Critical reader, ed. Jonathan Ree and Jane Chamberlain, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 39-52 
- Aquinas, Thomas, st. (1993), Selected Philosophical Writings, trasl. T. 
McDermott Oxford: Oxford University Press 
- Arendt, Hannah (1982), Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy. Sussex: 
The Harvester Press. 
----------------------( 1989), The Human Condition. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press 
- Aristotle, Physics, Athens: Kaktos 
------------, Poetics, tr. Sykoutris, Athens: Estia 
_ Augustine, St., Confessions. tr. H. Chadwick, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
----------------------City of God. tr. A. Dalieziou, Athens 
---------------------City of God. tr. H. Bettenson, Middlesex: PengUin Books 
______________________ The teacher; The Free Choice of the Will; Grace and Free 
Will, tr. R. Russell, Washington: The Catholic University of America Press 
-Basil St., Hexaimeron, Thessaloniki: Gregory Palamas 
- Benjamin, Walter (1986), Reflections: Essays. Aphorisms. 
Autobiographical Writings. Schocken Books 
- Berdyaev, Nicolai (1947), The divine and the human, London: G. Bles 
-----------------------(1937), The destiny of the man, London: G. Bles 
-----------------------( 1935), Freedom and the Spirit, London: G. Bles 
- Boehme, Jacob (1978), The Way to Christ, New York: Paulist Press 
----------------------(1940), Mysterium Magnum or an exposition of the first 
book of Moses called Genesis, transl: John Sparow, Montana: Kessinger 
Publishing Company 
- Brown, Robert F. (1977), The Later Philosophy of Schelling: the influence 
of Boehme on the works of 1809-1815, London: Associated University 
Presses 
-Caputo, John.D (1987), Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction 
and the Hermeneutic Project, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 
- Caygill, Howard (1995), A Kant Dictionary, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 
---------------------(1998), The Colour of Experience, London: Routledge 
- Chadwick, Henry (1992), "Notes" in Saint Augustine's Confessions, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
- Collingwood, R.G (1994), The Idea of History, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
- Cioran, E.W (1987), History and Utopia, transl. R. Howard, London: 
Quartet Books. 
- Eliade, Mircea (1954), The Myth of the eternal return Or, Cosmos and 
History, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
- Deleuze, Gilles (1984), Kant's Critical Philosophy: The doctrine of the 
faculties, London: Athlone Press 
_ Derrida, Jacques (1989)' "How to avoid speaking: Denials", in S. Budick 
& W. Iser, Languages of the Unsayable: The play of Negativity in 
Literature and literary theory, New York: Columbia University Press, 3-70 
________________________ ( 1995), The Gift of Death, tr. David Wills, London: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
--~-------------------:~-(1998), "Whom to Give to (Knowing Not to Know)". in 
Kterkegaard: A Cntical reader, ed. Jonathan Ree and Jane Chamberlain 
Oxford: Blackwell, 51-174 . 
- De~cartes, Rene (1.996), Meditations on First Philosophy, transl. J. 
CottIngham, Cambndge: Cambridge University Press 
- Dionysius the Aeropagite St, On divine names; On Mystical theology. 
Thessaloniki: Pournara 
- Fackenheim, Emil (1996), The God within: Kant, Schelling, and 
Historicity, Toronto: University of Toronto Press 
- Faros, Filotheos (1998), Epwror; l/Jvmr; (The nature of eros), Athens: 
Armos 
- Farrer, Austin (1985), "Introduction" in Leibniz's Theodicy: Essays on 
the Goodness of God, the freedom of man and the Origin of Evil, Chicago: 
Open court Publishing Company 
- Foucault, Michel (1992), The history of sexuality: The use of Pleasure 
(vol.2), London: Penguin Books 
- Gaitanis, Vassileios (1994), H atrovma mr; trapovmar; (the absence of the 
presence), Thessaloniki: University Studio Press 
- Garff, J oakim (1998), 'The Eyes of Argus: The Point of View and Points 
of View on Kierkegaard's Work as an Author", in Kierkegaard: A Critical 
reader, ed. Jonathan Ree and Jane Chamberlain, Oxford: Blackwell, 75-
102. 
- Girard, Rene (1999), "Literature and Christianity: A Personal View" ,in 
"Philosophy and Literature" vo1.23, 32-43. 
- Goudeli, Kyriaki (2002), Challenges to German Idealism: Schelling, 
Fichte and Kant, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan 
- Hannay, Alastair (1989), "Introduction and Notes", in Kierkegaard's The 
Sickness unto death, London: Penguin books 
- Hart, Kevin (1989), The trespass of the sign: Deconstruction, theology 
and philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
- Heidegger, Martin (1985), Schelling's Treatise on the essence of human 
freedom, tr. J. Stambaugh, Athens: Ohio University Press 
260 
-------------------------( 1974), Identity and Difference, transl. J .Stambaugh. 
New York: Harper Torchbrooks 
- Herder, Johann Gottfried (1986), "Essay in the Origin of Language". in 
E~sc:y in the origin of languages / Jean-Jacques Rousseau-Essay on the 
ongln of language/ Johann Gottfried Herder, tr. J. Moran& A. Gode. 
intro. A. Gode, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 117-1 77 
- Hoeller, Stephan A. (2001), Jung and the Lost Gospels, Athens: Kybelh 
- Jaspers, Karl (1962), Kant, New York: A Harvest/ HBJ Book 
------------------( 1956), Reason and Existenz, London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul 
- John Climacus (St.), The ladder of divine ascent, transl. C. Luibheid & 
N. Russell, New York: Paulist Press 
- Jonas, Hans (1992), The Gnostic Religion, London: Routledge 
- Kant, Emmanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, transl. N. Kemp Smith, 
London: Macmillan 
----------------------- (1960), Religion within the limits oj reason alone, New 
York, London: Harper and Row 
-----------------------, Critique oj Judgment, Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company 
---------------( 1991), "Conjectures on the Beginning of Human history", 
2nd.ed., in Hans Reiss, ed. Kant: Political Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 221-234. 
---------------( 1991), "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan 
Purpose", 2nd.ed., in Hans Reiss, ed. Kant: Political Writings, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 41-53 
---------------(1991), 'The Contest of the FacuIties", 2nd.ed., in Hans Reiss, 
ed. Kant: Political Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 76-
190. 
-------------( 1991), "Reviews of Herder's Ideas on the philosop~~ of the 
History of the Mankind", 2nd. ed., in Hans Reiss, ed. Kant: Polltical 
Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 201-220 
261 
- Kelly Armstrong, George (1969), Idealism, Politics and History. London: 
Cambridge University Press 
- Kierkegaard, Soren (l985), Philosophical Fragments; Johannes 
Climacus, tr. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 
---------------------------- (1980), The Concept of Anxiety, tr. Howard V. 
Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
--------------------------- (1989), The Concept of Irony with continual 
references to Socrates; Notes of Schelling's Berlin Lectures, tr. Howard V. 
Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
----------------------------(l983}, Fear and Trembling; Repetition, tr. Howard 
V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
----------------------------(l989}, The Sickness unto death, tr. Alastair 
Hannay, London: Penguin Books 
----------------------------(l992}, "A first and Last Explanation", in 
Concluding Unscientific Postcscript to Philosophical Fragments I, tr. 
Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 625-630 
----------------------------( 1992), Concluding Unscientific Postcscript to 
Philosophical Fragments 1&11, tr. Howard V.Hong and Edna H. Hong, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press 
----------------------------( 1962}, The Point of view for my work as an author 
: a report to history, tr.& introd. Walter Lowrie, New York: Harper 
Torchbooks 
--------------------------- (l962), The Individual; My Activity as a Writer, tr.& 
introd. Walter Lowrie, New York: Harper Torchbooks 
---------------------------(1938), The Journals of Soren Kierkegaard, London: 
Oxford University Press 
___________________________ ( 1990), Eighteen Upbuilding discourses, tr. Howard 
V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
--------------------------( 1978), Two Ages: The Age of Revolution and The 
Pr~sent Age -. A literary review, tr. Howard and Edna Hong, Princeton: 
Pnnceton UnIversity Press 
262 
--------------------------(1962), The Present Age and Of the Difference 
between a Genius and an Apostle. transl. Alexander Dru, Oxford: Oxford 
U niversi ty Press / Collins 
-------------------------( 1998), The Moment and Late Writings, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
-------------------------(1991), Practice in Christianity, tr. Howard V. Hong 
and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
- Kleist, Heinrich, On the Marionette Theatre, transl. Idris Parry 
- Korsgaard, Christine (1996), Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
-Law David (1993), Kierkegaard as Negative Theologian, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press 
- Leibniz. G.W (1985). Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the 
freedom of man and the Origin of Evil, transl. E. Huggart, Chicago: Open 
court Publishing Company 
------------------(1985), "Observations on the book concerning the 'origin of 
evil'" .In Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, thefreedom of man 
and the Origin of Evil, transl. E. Huggart , Chicago: Open court 
Publishing Company 
-Levinas, Emmanuel (1996), "Meaning and Sense"(l964), in Basic 
Philosophical Writings, ed. A. Peperzak, S. Critchley, R. Bernasconi, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 33-64 
------------------------( 1998), "Existence and Ethics", in Kierkegaard A 
Critical reader. ed. Jonathan Ree and Jane Chamberlain, Oxford: 
Blackwell. 26-38 
- Lossky. Vladimir (1991), The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, 
Cambridge: James Clarke & Co. Ltd. 
- Lowrie, Walter (1962), "Introduction", in Kierkegaard's The Point of view 
for my work as an author: a report to history, New York: Harper 
Torchbooks 
263 
- Matsoukas, Nikolaos( 1996), 
,d0YJ1anKll Kal LVf.1f30AlKTJ B£oAoyra II (Dogmatics and symbolic theology II). 
Thessaloniki: Pournara 
- Mc Farland, John D (1970), Kant's concept of teleology, Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press 
- Mooney, Edward F (l998), "Repetition: Getting the world back" in The 
Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, ed. Alastair Hannay & Gordon D. 
Marino, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 282-307 
- Nelson, Benjamin (l962), ''Torchbrook Preface" in Kierkegaard's The 
Point of view for my work as an author: a report to history, tr. & introd. 
Walter Lowrie, New York: Harper Torchbooks 
- Nietzsche, Friedrich, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, London: Penguin Books 
--------------------------, Twilight of the Idols /The Anti-Christ, London: 
Penguin 
--------------------------, The Gay science, tr. W. Kaufmann, New York: 
Vintage Books 
- Palmer, Donald D (1996), Kierkegaardfor Beginners. New York: Writers 
and Readers. 
-Pascal, Blaise (l995), Pensees and Other Writings, transl. Honor Levi, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 
- Philo, On the account of the World's creation given by Moses & 
Allegorical Interpretation of Genesis II, III, Vol.l, tr. F.H. Colson * G. H. 
Whitaker, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 
- Plato, Timaeus, tr. V. Kalfas, Athens: Polis 
- Plotinus, Enneades, vol. II & III, transl. A. Armstrong, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press 
- Quinn, Philip (l998), "Kierkegaard's Christian ethics", in The 
Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard , ed. Alastair Hannay & Gordon D. 
Marino, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 349-375 
- Reiss, Hans (1991), "Introduction", in Kant: Political Writings, 2nd ed .. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
- Ricoeur, Paul (1988), Time and Narrative, vol.3, tr. K. Blarney & D. 
Pellauer, Chicago: Chicago University Press 
264 
------------------( 1998), "Philosophy after Kierkegaard", in Kierkegaard: A 
Critical Reader, ed. J. Ree & J. Chamberlain, Oxford: Blackwell, 9-25 
- Riley, Patrick (1992), "Hannah Arendt on Kant, Truth and Politics", in 
Howard, Williams (eds) Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy, Cardiff: 
University of Wales Press, 305-323 
- Rose, Gillian (1992), The Broken Middle, Oxford: Blackwell 
- Fr. Seraphim, Rose (2000), Genesis, Creation and Early Man, Platina: 
st. Herman of Alaska Brotherhood. 
- Ruin, Hans (1994), Enigmatic origins, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell 
International 
- Sartre, Jean-Paul, "Kierkegaard: The Singular Universal", in Between 
Existentialism and Marxism, transl. John Matthews, London: NLB 
- Schelling, F.W.J., Of human freedom, tr. J. Gutman, Chicago: The open 
Court Publishing Company 
----------------------, The Ages of the world (lB15), transl. Jason Wirth, New 
York: State University of New York Press 
----------------------(1997), ''The Ages of the World (1813)" ,)n Zizek's The 
Abyss of Freedom; Ages of the world, transl. J. Norman, Michigan: The 
University of Michigan Press 
- Stack, George J. (1977), Kierkegaard's existential ethics, Alabama: The 
University of Alabama Press 
_ Staniloae, Dumitru (2001), Eternity & Time, Oxford: SLG Press, Convent 
of the Incarnation Fairacres 
_ Sykoutris, Ioannis (1997), "Introduction, comments and interpretation", 
in Aristotle's Poetics, Athens: Estia 
_ Synessio, Natasha (1999), "Introduction", in Tarkovsky: Collected 
Screenplays, London: Faber & Faber Limited 
~65 
- Tarkovsky, Andrei (1987), Sculpting the 
time(IJ.llAEvoV'ra~ TO XpOVO), trans!. Velentsas, Athens: Nefeli 
-------------------------(1999), Collected Screenplays, transl: W.Powell & N. 
Synnesios, London: Faber & Faber Limited 
- Thompte, Reidar (1980), "Introduction and Notes", in Kierkegaard's The 
Concept of Anxiety, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
- Tillich, Paul (1963), Systematic Theology 3, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press 
-----------------( 1980), The courage to be, New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press 
-Wahl, Jean(1969), Philosophies of Existence, transl.F.M.Lory, London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul 
- Ware, Kalllistos(1982), "Introduction", in Johannes Climacus: The 
ladder of divine ascent, trans!. C.Luibheid & N. Russell, New York: 
Paulist Press 
-Wirth, Jason (2000), "Introduction", in Schelling's The Ages of the 
world{l815), transl.Jason Wirth, New York: State University of New York 
Press 
- Walsh, W.H (1977), An Introduction to Philosophy of History, London: 
Hutchinson University Library 
- Yannaras, Christos(1988), XalvTEYYCP Kal ApEo1raJ'lr7J~(Heidegger and 
Areopagites), Athens: Domos 
--------____________ ( 1988), LXEblaO'j1a ElO'arOJYl7~ O'r7Jv fjJIAo(JofjJla (Introduction 
to Philosophy), Athens: Domos 
-------------------------(1992), To Ilpo(JOJ1ro Kal 0 EpOJ~(Person and Eros), Athens: 
Domos 
_ Yovel, Yirmiahu (1974), "Kant and the History of Reason", in Yinn~ah:u 
Yovel (eds) Philosophy of History and action, London: D. Reidel PublIshIng 
Company, 115-132 
